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This dissertation examines the economic association 
that existed between the Blood Indian reserve and the 
surrounding region of southern Alberta for the period of 
the 1880s through the 1930s. This study fills the gap left 
by Canadian historiography that has largely ignored the 
economic associations between Natives and non-Natives 
living in a common and limited environment. Instead 
historians have uncritically accepted the perception that 
Native reserves have played only a minor role in regional 
development. Consequently Natives and their reserve land 
base are seen by Anglo-Canadians to have had little 
influence on the economic circumstances in which Natives 
and newcomers found themselves in the post treaty period on 
the Canadian Plains. 
The Blood tribe and their large reservation were a 
significant factor in the southern Alberta region in which 
they were located. Their land base was important to the 
nascent and established ranching industry near the reserve 
through the period of the Depression. The produce of the 
Blood reserve, especially coal and hay, were commodities in 
demand by settlers and the Bloods were encouraged to 
provide them as needed. The Bloods became expert 
freighters and the local community sought them out to 
u 
transport the much needed produce from the reserve and to 
trans-ship goods for non-Native entrepreneurs. Blood field 
labour in the Raymond area sugar beet fields was at times 
critical to the functioning of that industry. Their 
availability and willingness to work was a deciding factor 
in the operations of the Knight Sugar Company especially 
during the first decade of operations. Finally the Bloods' 
ties to the merchant community, especially in Cardston and 
Fort Macleod, resulted in a significant infusion of money 
into the local economy. Importantly, much of this cash 
resulted from the personal wealth of the Bloods and was not 
a consequence of Department of Indian Affairs charity. The 
Bloods were not a drain on the local resources but were 
important contributors to the developing economy of the 
region. The relationship that the Bloods had with local 
merchants was very much like that of their White 
neighbours. 
Unfortunately the Department of Indian Affairs did not 
recognize the potential of the reserve to serve the needs 
of the Bloods, or at least did not let this recognition 
mitigate their policies of restriction and paternalism. 
Had they done so the fortunes of the Bloods, and many other 
Native reserves, might be much different today. So too 
might there be greater recognition of the part played by 
Natives in regional economies. 
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There is a long standing and firmly entrenched axiom in 
Canadian thought that holds that Indian reservations are 
culturally confused, economically emaciated, physically 
isolated 'islands' of poverty. 1 While some Native reserves 
fit this description the predisposition to accept such a 
judgment is, in part, informed by the pseudo-scientific 
theories that were in vogue at the turn of the century! and 
1 Helen Buckley believes that the process of moving to 
reserves resulted in the Indians "taking up a new life, but 
never becoming part of the larger society or regaining their 
independence." Helen Buckley, From Wooden Ploughs To Welfare: 
Why Indian Policy Failed in the Prairie Provinces (Montreal: 
MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), P. 3. In a reference 
to both physical isolation and special status she also notes 
that "The isolation of the reserve is the very essence of its 
being" and "So it is that the reserves remain as tiny islands 
in a sea of white culture, terra incognita to all but their 
own people ... Buckley, Wooden Ploughs, pp. 11-12. Emphasis 
in the original. Cam Mackie states that "In a sense, 
economic development on Indian reserves both ended and began 
with the establishment of reserves ••• Some attempts were made 
to establish an agricultural base, but for the most part up 
until the early 1960s little of substance occurred that would 
lead to any form of economic self-sufficiency." Cam Mackie, 
"Some Reflections on Indian Economic Development," in J. Rick 
Panting (ed.) Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and 
Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland And Stewart, 1986), p. 
214. Likewise Menno Boldt, Surviving as Indians: The 
Challenge of Self-Government (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1993), p. 235. Heather Robertson concludes that for 
the 1960s "Most Indian Reserves produce nothing-nothing, that 
is except people." Heather Robertson, Reservations are for 
Indians (Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, 1970), p. 27. 
2 Angus McLaren, Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in 
2 
results which issued from the theory cum policy embodied in 
the Indian Act. The aims and the inherent contradictions of 
the Act were best summed up by Duncan C. Scott, 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs from 1913-1932. 
Scott, arguably the most influential individual to hold that 
post stated: 
This system was designed to protect them from 
encroachment and to establish for them a sort of 
sanctuary where they could develop unmolested, 
until advancement had rendered possible their 
absorption with the general citizenship. The 
Reserve System was intended to ensure the 
continuation of the tribal life and the life of the 
individual as an Indian, as well as to render 
possible a continuous and consistent administrative 
policy directed toward civilization.·' 
Ultimately, of course, 'civilization' as envisioned by Scott 
and the government, was incompatible with the continuation of 
Native economic and social traditions. The plains Indians' 
loss of the buffalo by 1880 was, for the government of 
Canada, a fortuitous circumstance. The loss of ancient 
economic and cultural patterns created significant confusion 
in Native life; thus assisting the government's 
assimilationist war aimed at erasing Native identity through 
Canada, 1885-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1990), 
Chapter 1; Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American 
Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), Chapters 8 & 9; Robert 
F. Berkhoffer, The White Man's Indian: Images of the 
American Indian from Columbus to the Present (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 55-61. 
3 Duncan c. Scott, "The Aboriginal Races", The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 
CVII (May 1923), pp. 63-64. 
3 
re-education~ and the curbing of social and religious 
. ::; pract1.ces. · 
The policy of isolation was vigorously promoted and 
zealously inflicted on Canada's aboriginal peoples by an army 
of Indian agents and other government servants. Both the 
policy and its repressive application, however, were 
challenged by the Indians from day to day and generation 
after generation. The Act intended to protect and 
assimilate, 11 while at the same time it severed Native 
homelands from the social, political and economic milieu 
4 The attempts to re-educate Natives in White run 
schools are among the most painful remembered experiences of 
Indians. Linda Pelly-Landrie, "First Nations Cultures, Now 
and In the Future", in Henry Epp (ed.), Three Hundred Prairie 
Years: Henry Kelsey's 'Inland Count~ of Good Report' 
(Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1993), p. 178. On 
a negative view of the education system as it was and is for 
Indians see Kateri Akiwenzie-Danun, "We Belong To This Land: 
A View of 'Cultural Difference'", Journal of Canadian 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 24-25; Celia Haig-
Brown, Resistance and Renewal: Surviving the Indian 
Residential School (Vancouver: Tillacum, 1989), pp. 76-79. 
See also the reminiscence of Ojibwa, Basil Johnston in Basil 
H. Johnston, Indian School Days (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 
1938) • 
5 For the efforts to stamp out plains Indian religious 
practices see Katherine Pettipas, Severing the Ties that 
Bind: Government Repression of Indigenous Religious 
Ceremonies on the Prairies (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba 
Press, 1994); especially chapters 4 and 5. Similarly see 
Douglas Cole and Ira Chaikin, An Iron Hand Ucon The People: 
The Law Against the Potlatch on the Northwest Coast 
(Vancouver: Douglas and Mcintyre, 1990), chapter 6. 
6 John L. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, 
4 
which surrounded them and to which they were attached. This 
view has, to a large degree, been uncritically accepted by 
canadian historians, both Native and non-Native alike. Thus 
the 'fact' of Native exclusion and isolation, with all the 
attendant disadvantages that this circumstance entails, has 
been sustained. The consequence of Canada's hegemony over 
Indians has been the assumption of a less than marginal 
existence for Native people, the ultimate victory being 
'survival' itself.' 
Native Canadians have been presented as culturally 
primitive with an unsustainable population base and therefore 
dependent on Canadian government beneficence. The belief 
that Indian societies had lost their vibrancy and were a 
people headed for extinction has helped perpetuate the view 
of an unimportance which is reflected in Canadian history and 
literature, especially that dealing with the period 
subsequent to World War I.~ Discussion of Native interactions 
Assimilation: An Outline History Of Canada's Indian Policy," 
Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology, Vol. VI, No. 2 
(1976), p. 13. 
7 George Manuel and Michael Posluns, "The Fourth World 
in Canada", in Jean Leonard Elliot (ed.), Two Nations, Many 
Cultures: Ethnic Groups in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-
Hall Canada Inc., 1983), p. 15. 
8 Daniel Francis, The Imagina6Y Indian: 
the Indian In Canadian Culture (Vancouver: 
Press, 1992), pp. 53-57. 
The Image of 
Arsenal Pulp 
5 
with Whites is generally cast in a negative moldq because they 
were perceived as irrelevant to Canadian economic and social 
development. 10 Historian James St. G. Walker has noted that 
Indians have made little impression on how historians write 
Canadian history. In fact, Native peoples are denied a 
historic role except for that which the dominant society 
chooses to give them.LL Clearly the Indians did not matter, 
notably so after the failed 1885 North West Rebellion. 12 
The denial of significant Native participation in 
Canada's modern history, so difficult to overcame, was set by 
an earlier generation of scholars the most influential being, 
9 • . 1 Toby Marantz, "Recent L~terature on Nat~ve Peop es: A 
Measure of Canada's Values and Goals", Acadiensis, 18 (1988), 
p. 237. 
10 James w. St. G. Walker, "The Indian In Canadian 
Historical Writing." The canadian Historical Association, 
Historical Papers (Ottawa, 1971), pp. 38-40; James w. St. G. 
Walker, "The Indian In Canadian Historical Writing, 1971-
1981." in Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine s. Lussier (ed.), AI, 
Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian 
Native Studies (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1983), pp. 348 ff.; Heidi Tiedemann, "The 
Representation Of Native Culture From Duncan Campbell Scott 
To Margaret Laurence." Canadian Studies Program, University 




Walker, "The Indian In Canadian Historical Writinq," 
It is argued that the Natives were reluctant and 
minor participants in the Rebellion being drawn in by the 
force of circumstance. See Blair Stonechild and Bill Waiser, 
Loyal till Death: Indians and the North-West Rebellion 
(Calgary: Fifth House Ltd., 1997), pp. 1-4, 238-241. 
6 
arguably, G.F.G. Stanley. In his work The Birth of Western 
canada, first published in 1936, Stanley established the 
premise of a dichotomy between 'civilized' and primitive 
peoples and cast the latter or aboriginal peoples at a 
predictable disadvantage. How could it be otherwise for 
societies described as 'simple' and 'inflexible'? In essence 
he proposed that on the Canadian plains Native culture, in 
the face of Euro-Canadian advancement, was economically, 
socially, and politically not viable. 13 There were 
essentially then, for the Indians, only two possible ends. 
Native society would have to adjust, such adjustment 
requiring total cultural reorientation. Fortune and disease 
would dictate whether or not they would physically succumb as 
a race. 
Stanley also firmly established the myth of the 
permanent disaster to plains Indian culture of the loss of 
the buffalo, "the complete destruction of their livelihood 
and morale".H The consequences of this event are believed by 
historians to be a cultural and economic de-stabilization 
from which the Indians have never recovered. Inherent in 
Stanley's outlook is the supposition that Anglo-Canadian 
13 George F.G. Stanley, The Birth of Western Canada: A 
History Of The Riel Rebellions (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1960), pp. 196-197; 217. 
14 Stanley, Birth, p. 219. 
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individualism in both social behaviour and economic 
enterprise is superior to both individual Native initiative 
and to Native communities acting in social and economic 
concert. Though surrounded on their reserves by an tmmigrant 
culture there was apparently nothing they could contribute to 
or gain from this association. Thus the stage was set for 
Indians to fade to the back of both the real and perceptual 
landscape. In the interim Stanley has not lacked supporters 
who have adopted and championed his theme. 15 
Ramsay Cook's call, in 1967, to explain Canadian 
identity in terms of ethnici ty and class Ih went largely 
15 Hugh Dempsey's work, for example, has focused on the 
valiant if vain efforts of individual Native leaders to lead 
their people into a modern age after the disappearance of the 
buffalo and the move to reserves. His work is a calendar of 
cultural turmoil and the struggle to remain culturally 
relevant. Hugh A. Dempsey, Crowfoot: Chief of the Blackfoot 
(Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1972); Hugh A. Dempsey, Red 
Crow: Warrior Chief (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie 
Books, 1980); Hugh A. Dempsey, Big Bear: The End of Freedom 
(Vancouver: Douglas and Mcintyre, 1984); John w. Bennett, 
Northern Plainsmen: Adaptive Strategy and Agrarian Life 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 148-49; A.D. 
Fisher, "Indian Land Policy and the Settler State in Colonial 
Western Canada", in David Leadbeater, Essays On The Political 
Economy of Alberta (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1984), p. 
85. Hana Samek concludes that the failure of the Blackfoot 
economy was due to cultural differences. Hana Samek, The 
Blackfoot Confederacy 1880-1920: A Cgmparative Study of 
Canadian and u.s. Indian Policy (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1987),pp. 55, 183. 
16 As discussed by J.M.S. Careless, "'Limited 
Identities' in Canada", Canadian Historical Review, Vol. L, 
No. 1, March 1969, p. 1. 
8 
unheeded especially with regard to viewing Native Canadians 
as ethnically significant. Consequently, comprehensive 
accounts of Canada's national history of the twentieth 
century have ignored the importance of the Native presence 
and participation in both local developments and extended 
nation building strategies. Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay 
Cook, in their ambitious contribution to the Canadian 
Centenary Series Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, make 
no mention of Canada's Indians. 17 Thompson and Seager, in 
their much-praised Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord, 
make only a two sentence reference to Native population 
growth between 1871 and 1921. They concluded that the sorry 
state of the Canada's Indian population was the result of 
their having been 'abandoned' by the dominant society. 1K 
Donald Creighton in The Forked Road entirely neglected any 
discussion of Canada's Native population1') and J .L. 
Granatstein noted, in his introduction to Canada 1957-1967: 
The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, that the Native 
17 b . d Ro ert Cra~g Brown an Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: 
A Nation Transformed (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1974). 
18 John Herd Thompson, with Allen Seager, Canada 1922-
1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1985). 
19 Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976). 
9 
population, despite their serious economic and social 
problems, have largely been ignored by Canadian society. 
Regrettably, they suffered much the same fate in 
Granatstein's book. 20 The writers of a general survey, Canada 
Since 1945, made more mention of Canada's aboriginal peoples; 
but only to reinforce the well-worn adages of Natives as 
discriminated against and disadvantaged. 21 
Regional histories of the west have been, marginally, 
more faithful in their depiction of the Native's place in the 
evolving community and economy. Howard Palmer, in his more 
recent Alberta A New History, though devoting more attention 
to Indian concerns, set the tone for much of his discussion 
by noting they were "outsiders in the land that had once been 
theirs."a John G. Reid, in an essay "Writing About Regions", 
although acknowledging the "flowering of Native and ethnic 
studies~~ in the 1970s and 1980s, makes only passing, and 
inadequate references that tie Native history to regional 
20 J.L. Granatstein, Canada 1957-1967: The Years of 
uncertainty and Innovation (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1986), p. 8. 
21 Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, John English, Canada 
Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1981), pp. 5, 33, 109, 313. 
22 Howard Palmer with Tamara Palmer, Alberta A New 
History (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990), p. 103. 
10 
discussions. 23 
Gerald Friesen's The Canadian Prairies: A History, is 
perhaps the best example of what can be done to properly 
reflect the shared history of Native and non-Native through 
the fur trade and post fur trade contact experience. He 
concludes, however, that the relationship has largely been a 
frustrating and 'unhappy' experience. 1~ A recent work that is 
admirable for its sophistication and the breadth and depth of 
its analysis is Frank Tough's 'As Their Natural Resources 
Fail'. This work analyzes the participation of Natives in 
the economy of northern Manitoba. Tough concluded that the 
part they played was a significant contribution to the 
development of that region, even through the first three 
decades of the twentieth century.B Similarly a recent study 
of the Manitoba Metis determined that they were not 
primitives dispersed from the Red River region by forces 
23 John G. Reid, "Writing About Regions", in John 
Schultz (ed.), Writing AboUt Canada: A Handbook for M9dern 
Canadian History (Scaraborough: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 
1990), pp. 76-77. 
24 Gerald Friesen, The Prairies: A History (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 129-161, 
25 Frank Tough, 'As Their Natural Resources Fail': 
Native Peoples And The Econgmic History Of Northern Manitoba. 
1870-1930 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1996) • 
11 
beyond their control. Rather they made deliberate and, at 
times, successful choices that suited their emergent economic 
circumstances. 16 J.R. Miller's Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, 
though a general history, contains a significant chapter that 
discusses the Native place in the western regional 
,-
experience.-' Admittedly though, his view of that experience 
is bleak, believing as he does that Canada's Natives existed 
in a limbo of 'irrelevance' until the post World War II 
period. 2s Generally speaking Miller may well be correct. The 
extent to which Natives and Whites co-participanted in the 
economic development of a limited area, however, has yet to 
be investigated. 
Intellectual history has also failed to accord Canada's 
Indians recognition. Doug Owram's Promise of Eden pays 
scant attention to Indians, viewing them only as a negative 
aspect of a land to be conquered. 29 Significantly, Douglas 
26 Gerhard J. Ens, Homeland To Hinterland: The Changing 
Worlds of the Red River Metis in the Nineteenth Century 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 172-173. 
27 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A Historv 
of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 189-210. 
28 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, p. 221. 
29 Doug owram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian 
Expansionist Movement and the Ideal of the West 1856-1900 
12 
Francis, in his study, Images Of The West: Changing 
Perceptions of the Prairies, 1690-1960, failed either to note 
or to find evidence that Indians were part of the mental 
landscape for the period after the late nineteenth century. 30 
The social, political, and economic culture of the west tends 
to be viewed strictly in terms of a transplanting and melding 
of Euro-Canadian influences. 31 This is an important 
consideration when one realizes that Indians were, though 
often in a negative way, so much a part of what was perceived 
as the western setting. Much about Indian life and mythology 
also permeates both our cultural and literary heritage. 32 Why 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 16-17, 24-
25, 50-51,131-132. 
30 R. Douglas Francis, Images Of The West: Changing 
Perceptions of the Prairies, 1690-1960 (Saskatoon: Western 
Producer Prairie Books, 1989), see especially pp. 107-173. 
31 R. Douglas Francis, "In Search of a Prairie Myth: A 
Survey of the Intellectual and Cultural Historiography of 
Prairie Canada," Journal of Canadian Studies, Journal of 
Canadian Studies, 24, No. 3 (Fall 1989), pp. 46-56. 
32 There are detailed historical and literary 
discussions of positive and negative views of Indians in 
relation to the west and Canada as a whole. On the Indian 
image in early history of the west see; Francis, Images, pp. 
10, 39-40, 79; R. Douglas Francis, "From wasteland To 
Utopia: Changing Images Of The Canadian West In The 
Nineteenth Century," Great Plains Quarterly, (Summer 1987, 
Vol.7 No. 3), p. 184 -186. For general literary discussion 
see; Leslie Monkman, A Native Heritage: Images of the Indian 
in English-Canadian Literature (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1981), chap. 4, pp. 65-95; Terry Goldie, Fear 
And Temptation: The Image of the Indigene in Canadian, 
Australian, and New Zealand Literature (Montreal: McGill-
13 
Natives have apparently made no lasting impression on Anglo-
Canadian interpretations of the 'image' or of the history of 
the region is an important consideration. This may, in part, 
explain why efforts to study non-Native and Native economic 
history as a regional integrated whole have been slow to 
occur •. B 
Recently, Hana Samek, in The Blackfoot Confederacy, 
scrutinized the similarities and differences in the 
administration of Canadian and American Indian policy by 
focusing on the reserves of the Blackfoot Confederacy. Her 
study, however, ends in 1920 and her discussion of the most 
recent years is brief and thus unsatisfactory.~ E. Brian 
Titley's, A Narrow Vision, explained government Indian policy 
and viewed its imposition on the Indians. Titley, however, 
does not take his study to the community level, and so the 
reader gets little feel for community reaction or the depth 
of feeling behind it. 35 Sarah Carter's excellent work, ~ 
Queen's University Press, 1989), Chap. 5 and Chap. 8; Gaile 
McGregor, The Wacousta Syndrome: Explorations in the 
Canadian Langscape (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1985). pp. 216-229. On stereotyping in art see Ronald Rees, 
11 Images Of The Prairie: Landscape Painting And Perception In 
The Western Interior Of Canada'" Canadian Geographer, Vol. 
10, No. 3 (1976), p. 261. 
33 A notable exception to this is Friesen, The Canadian 
Prairies. 
34 Samek, The Blackfoot Confederacy. 
35 E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell 
Harvests, is centered on the strategies of Treaty Four 
Natives in Saskatchewan for coping with new and ever changing 
conditions. Although touching on the non-Native response to 
the Native presence in the market place, Carter presents no 
detailed analysis of this economic association. 3b This work, 
specific to Saskatchewan experience, should not be 
generalized to all prairie Indians. J.R. Miller's, 
Skyscrapers Hide The Heavens3; and Gerald Friesen's, The 
Canadian Prairies3~ are survey texts and, though admirable for 
their integration and analysis, lack the depth of local 
discussion characteristic of this approach. Regardless, it 
is clear that Indians have not been viewed as integral to 
local or national economic processes and generally have not 
been presented as a part of Canada's twentieth century 
collective experience. 
Both pioneering ethnographic works in the 1940s and 
1950s, and current styles of historical investigation, 
however, have established the basis for focused regional and 
community research. Emphasis on the mutual geographic 
Scott And The Administration Of Indian Affairs In Canada 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986). 
36 ah . . d' Sar Carter, Lost Harvests: Pra1r1e In 1an Reserve 
Farmers And Government Policy (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1990), pp. 184-190. 
37 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide The Heavens. 
38 Friesen, The Canadian Prairies. 
15 
cohabitation of an area and the resulting shared experiences 
is especially pertinent. Lucien and Jane Hanks and Esther 
Goldfrank, for example, detailed the acculturation process 
among the Blackfoot and the Bloods in the 1920s and 1930s.~ 
But these works are based primarily on field research 
supplemented with the little official documentation then 
available, most notably the Department of Indian Affairs 
(DIA) Annual Reports. The voluminous archival collections of 
private, business, and government documents now available, 
the existence of more published monographs, and the more 
sophisticated approaches to analysis, make a re-evaluation 
both possible and necessary. 
Robin Fisher noted, in a bibliographical piece in 1982, 
that there was a need for study of the effect of prairie 
settlement on Native peoples.~} He could well have made the 
point about the impact of Natives on prairie settlement. A 
recent bibliographical essay by J.R. Miller clearly 
39 Esther s. Goldfrank, Changing Configurations In The 
Social Organization Of A Blackfoot Tribe During The Reserve 
Period: The Blood Of Alberta Canada (Seattle: University of 
washington Press, 1945); Lucien M. Hanks, Jr., and Jane 
Richardson Hanks, Tribe under Trust: A Study Of The Blackfoot 
Reserve Of Alberta. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1950); Esther S. Goldfrank, "Administrative Programs And 
Changes In Blood Society During The Reserve Period," Applied 
Anthropology (Vol. 2 No. 2, January-March 1943), pp. 18-23. 
40 Robin Fisher, "Historical Writing on Native People in 
Canada," The History and Social Science Teacher (Vol. 17, 
No. 2, winter 1982), p. 69. 
16 
illustrates that Natives are no longer in the background of 
canadian historical literature but he failed to detect any 
studies of a regional or local nature that depict the Indians 
as influencing rather than influenced. 41 Historian Ken Coates 
concluded that anthropological and ethnographic works, 
because they focus mainly on aspects of Native culture and 
society, deal unsatisfactorily with Native-white contact. 42 
This conclusion is, I believe, equally applicable to southern 
Alberta. There is much about the nature of relationships 
between non-Native settlers and Native people for this time 
and place yet to be detailed. 
There are scholarly works which support the arquments in 
favour of integrated non-Native/Native studies and of a 
limited geographic scope. These works are dismissive of the 
injunctions laid down by ethnohistorians, such as Calvin 
Martin. Martin argues that cultural differences and 
ethnocentric biases are such as to practically make 
impossible any accuracy in reconstructing the collective 
contact and post contact experience of culturally diverse 
-+l J.R. Miller, "Native History", in Doug OWram (ed.), 
Canadian History: A Reader's Guide; Volume 2: Confederation 
to the Present (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1994), pp. 179-201. 
-+2 Ken s. Coates, Best Left as Indians: Native-White 
Relations In The Yukon Territo£1. 1840-1973 (Montreal: 
MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), p. xvii. 
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groups.~ Two notable works that have looked at reciprocal 
social and gender relationships in the fur trade economy are 
Sylvia Van Kirk's "Many Tencier Ties" .wand Jennifer S.H. 
Brown's Strangers in Bl00d.~ Both of these works determined 
that Native women were essential to the functioning of fur 
trade activities as conducted both by the Hudson's Bay 
Company and its chief rival the North West Company. 
43 See for example Calvin Martin, "The Metaphysics Of 
Writing Indian-White History", Ethnohistory, Vol. 26, No. 2 
(Spring 1979), p. 153; Calvin Martin, "An Introduction Aboard 
the Fidele, .. Calvin Martin (ed.), The American Indian and the 
Problem of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987), p. 6-7. For criticism of this view see James Axtell, 
After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. lO-
ll; Bruce G. Trigger, "Evolutionism, Relativism and Putting 
native People into Historical Context," Culture, Vol. VI, No. 
2 (1986), p. 667 Wilcomb E. Washburn, "Distinguishing 
History from Moral Philosophy and Public Advocacy," Calvin 
Martin (ed.), The American Indian and the Problem of HistohY 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 95; Peter 
Novik, That Noble Dream: The 'Objectivity Question' and the 
American Historical Profession (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 470; Bruce G. Trigger, 
"Ethnohistory: The Unfinished Edifice," Ethnohistory, Vol. 
33, No. 3 (Summer 1986), p. 263. Though not entirely 
negative about the potential for cross cultural studies 
Georges Sioui does admit to limitations in the scholarship to 
date. George E. Sioui, For An Amerindian Autohisto&Y 
(Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp. 98-
102. 
44 1" "k T d . I w . F sy v~a Van K1r , 'Many en er T~es : omen ~n ur-
Trade Society, 1670-1870 (Winnipeg: Watson & Dwyer 
Publishing Ltd., n.d.). 
45 Jennifer S.H. Brown, Strangers In Blood: 
Company Families In Indian Country (Vancouver: 




Similarly the economic interactions of the fur trade have 
been expertly detailed by Arthur J. Ray in Indians In The Fur 
Trade~ and Ray and Donald Freeman in 'Give Us Good Measure'.~ 
Peter Elias in The Dakota of the Canadian Northwest, made a 
respectable effort at locating and explaining the Native 
experience and adjustment to emergent local economic 
circumstance in southern Manitoba.~ Jennifer Reid 
rationalized her recent study of British and Mi'kmaq 
religious interaction in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Acadia by accepting the continuing 'alienation' of Native 
from non-Native.~ One of the most narrowly focused and yet 
revealingly original works of the past decade was W.H. 
Graham's history of four farms on the outskirts of the small 
Ontario town of Greenbank. Despite the limited geographic 
46 Arthur J. Ray, Indians In The Fur Trade: their role 
as hunters. trappers and middlemen in the lands southwest of 
Hudson Bay 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1974). 
47 Arthur J. Ray and Donald Freeman, 'Give Us Good 
Measure': An Economic Analysis Of Relations Between The 
Indians And The Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1978). 
48 Peter Douglas Elias, The Dakota of the Canadian 
Northwest: Lessons for Survival (Winnipeg: University of 
Manitoba Press, 1988). 
49 Jennifer Reid, Myth. Symbol. And Colonial Encounter: 
British And Mi'kmag In Acadia. 1700-1867 (Ottawa: 
University of Ottawa Press, 1995), p. 1. 
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focus of the study, Graham believes that the life histories 
of these people and their farms mirrored "the fortunes of the 
province and the world. "5° Clearly, there is equal 
justification for a study of southern Alberta that challenges 
the predominant perception of Native economic failure and 
exclusion. 
Hana Samek, for example, accepts 'the failure of 
reservation economies• among the Blackfoot, including the 
Bloods. 51 Helen Buckley • s study is a chronicle of the long 
despairing descent by prairie Indians into welfare. 5l John w. 
Bennett does attempt to explain the economic fit between Cree 
* Indians and the Saskatchewan plains community of 'Jasper• for 
the 1960s. But he ignores the relations between Natives and 
Whites in the post 1880s and concludes that for the period 
beginning in the 1960s both the Indians' economic behaviour 
and interaction was intermittent, marginal and negative. 53 
Niels w. Braroe's social psychological study of the 
50 W. H. Graham, .:G.::.r.:e:.::::e:.:.:nb=a:.:.:n::.;k:..:~::-~C::.:o:=.:u~n~t:::.:ry~-=M:.:;a::.t.:.t.::.e=r=-=-s--=I~n~l.::.9..::t=h 
Century Ontario (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1988), p. 
1. 
51 Samek, Blackfoot, Chapter 4, pp. 70-105. 
52 Buckley, Wooden Ploughs. 
*•Jasper' is a fictious name for a community that the 
author did not wish recognized. 
53 Bennett, Northern Plainsmen, pp. 162-165, 168. 
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*+ 
Saskatchewan community of 'Short Grass' discovered a mutual 
racial antipathy and economic co-dependency. Natives, 
however, occupied the subservient role in that relationship.~ 
In her recent study of hired hands, Cecilia Danysk accords 
Native Canadians no place in the development of prairie 
agriculture despite significant space devoted to ethnicity. 55 
Steven High, however, in a recent detailed critique has 
commented on the perceived 'irrelevance' of Native wage 
labour from the decline of the fur trade to the post World 
War II period. He argues that this assumption is largely 
erroneous.~) Clearly, scholarship which tends largely to the 
view of the Native experience in the post fur trade and 
treaty era as stagnating culturally and economically, and 
** 'Short Grass' is a fictious name for a community 
that the author did not want recognized. 
54 Niels Winther Braroe, Indian & White: Self-Image and 
Interaction in a Canadian Plains Community (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 79-82. 
55 Cecilia Danysk, Hired Hands: Labour and the 
Development of Prairie Agriculture. 1880-1930 (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1995), pp. 76-81. See also entries 
for various groups such as Asian, pp. 78, 79; Austrian, 78, 
104; black, 66, 78, 79, Danish, 42, 142-143; etc. 
56 Steven High, "Native Wage Labour and Independent 
Production during the 'Era of Irrelevance'", Labour/Le 
Travail, Vol. 37 (Spring, 1996), p. 243-244. 
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unimportant to the local or extended economy, is inadequate 
and in need of reassessment.~ 
Although the nature of Indian participation has yet, in 
large measure, to be determined, 58 there is little doubt that, 
in the case of the Blood tribe of Southern Alberta, its 
partial integration into the economy was deliberate, 
sustained and an important contribution to the local economic 
activities in which it was involved. Willingness to look at 
the southern Alberta area as an organic whole leads to other 
possible conclusions with regard to the extent of the Indian 
detachment from, or conversely attachment to, the physical 
and economic environment in which the Blood reserve existed. 
Accepting the above in no way excludes accepting differing, 
perhaps divergent, experiences for other Native and non-
Native communities sharing physical and economic 
neighbourhoods. Even a heritage of sometimes uneasy 
cohabitation of a region need not, however, result in 
completely or exclusively divergent experiences when there is 
clearly a 'conjunction of interests'. 
57 See for example Peter s. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of 
Southern Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1991), pp. 213-215, 220-221; Bruce w. Hodgins and Jamie 
Benidickson, The Temagami Experience: Recreation, Resources, 
and Aboriginal Rights in the Northern Ontario Wilderness 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 65, 86. 
58 High, "Native Wage Labour," (Vol. 37, Spring, 1996), 
pp. 243, 263-64. 
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Why this study? A case study to assess the fit of the 
Bloods and their reserve into the economic development of the 
local region can add a dimension to the knowledge of events 
which have not, as yet, been explored. Historian Paul Voisey 
assumes that "everything about a new community in an area 
lacking a Native host culture can ultimately be traced to 
environment, tradition, frontier, and metropolis. "5q In this 
proposed study, allowance must be made for modification and 
formation through interaction with a host Native community; 
in this case the Bloods. The intent then will be to analyze 
the impact of some of the economic points of intersection of 
non-Native and Native in the process of forming a community. 
Though governments at various times attempted to isolate the 
Bloods and their affairs from the emerging surrounding 
communities, it failed to prevent the Natives' interaction 
with the newcomers. 
In their study of the settlement process, John w. 
Bennett and Seena B. Kohl, despite the presence of Natives in 
their study area, noted no significant influence by Natives 
on the 'pioneer adaptation and community building' process.w 
59 Paul Voisey, Vulcan: the Making of a Prairie 
Community (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), p. 
7. 
60 Though noting the strong ties of American businesses 
with southern Alberta Bennett and Kohl failed to mention that 
much of this business was in supplying the Native wards of 
the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs. John w. Bennett 
23 
In his s-tudy of frontier economic development, Jeremy Adleman 
noted only the failure of prairie Natives "to make the 
transition to commercial agriculture based on private 
property. '' Although Adleman conunented that when farmers were 
pressed for labour they looked to their neighbours61 he failed 
to recognize that often those neigbours were Native. In 
their study of small town Alberta, Donald Wetherell and Irene 
Krnet give only incidental attention to Indian influence on 
Fort Macleod and Cardston, thereby seemingly accepting "the 
assumption that they were not a legitimate part of the 
community ••• ubl Similarly I in his incisive study of Abernethy 
District, Saskatchewan, for example, Lyle oyck accords to the 
Natives of the Abernethy area minimal influence in the 
development of the non-Native community there. Shunted to 
reserves, they were expected to adapt to the new order 
and Seena B. Kohl, Settling the Canadian-American West, 1890-
1915: Pioneer Adaptation and Community Building. An 
Anthropological History (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1995), pp. 13-14. They do recognize a minor physical 
influence of Indians in determining roads. pp. 131-132. 
Gl Jeremy Adleman, Frontier Development: Land. Labour. 
And capital On The Wheatlands Of Argentina And Canada. 1890-
1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 147-148. 
62 Donald G. Wetherell and Irene R.A. Kmet, Town Life: 
Main Street and the Evolution of Small Town Alberta. 1880-
1947 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1995), pp. 
244-245. 
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without effectively becoming part of it.@ 
The Native presence in southern Alberta, however, defies 
the rigid application of formulae to predict a pattern of 
relationships as the community developed from pioneering 
beginnings to the more permanent structures of the 1930s. 
The Bloods' presence, with their land base, likely 
complicated formal and informal group and economic relations 
so that simple dichotomies did not exist. The economic 
development of southern Alberta occurred in response to both 
on and off-reserve conditions that prevailed from the pioneer 
period through the Great Depression. Clearly, any attempts 
to economically and physically isolate the Bloods were bound 
to be frustrated by the demands and needs of the non-Native 
community and the governments and agencies that worked on 
their behalf.b+ 
63 Lyle Dick, Farmers 'Making Good': The Development of 
the Abernethy District, Saskatchewan. 1880-1920 (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Service, 1989), pp. 20-21. See also 
Lyle Dick, "Factors Affecting Prairie Settlement: A Case 
Study of Abernethy, Saskatchewan, in the 1880s", Canadian 
Historical Association, (Historical Papers, 1985), pp. 11-28. 
64 In a telling comment Fred White, N.W.M.P. Comptroller 
wrote "Townspeople encourage the redman when he has money to 
spend, and it frequently happens that settlers are glad to 
have an Indian family or two camped near them so that they 
may get the benefits of their labour; and unfortunately, 
white men have on more than one occasion taken up the defense 
of the Indians and their legal right to be off their Reserves 
if they behave themselves." NAC, RG 18, vol. 218, file 469, 
Fred White to Mr. [James) Smart, August 30, 1901. 
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The entire southern Alberta community suffered great 
privation during the decades of the 1920s and 1930s. Hugh 
Dempsey concluded that: "the Bloods fared as most Westerners 
did, except that those who already were poverty-stricken did 
not notice the difference. In fact, some Bloods were to say 
in later years that they didn't even realize that there was a 
Depression outside the reserve." 65 A.D. Fisher believes that 
the reserve economy during the 1920s and 1930s was not self 
sustaining and that government interference left 'profound' 
effects. hh These are commonly accepted notions. What is 
lacking, to date, however, is the empirical evidence that 
will best determine the extent of Blood and non-Native 
interaction and whether such beliefs about dire long term 
consequences are sustainable. Success or failure cannot be 
assumed, they must be qualified. 
What should be analyzed is the relationship of the 
peoples to each other as they experienceed many of the same 
environmental and economic forces. Generally, historians and 
critics are adamant in their view of the government's 
responsibility for events that befell the Bloods, implying 
65 Hugh A. Dempsey, The Gentle Persuader: 
of James Gladstone, Indian Senator (Saskatoon: 
Producer Prairie Books, 1986), p. 78. 
A Biography 
western 
66 A.D. Fisher "Introducing 'Our Betrayed Wards,' By 
R.N. Wilson", Western Canadian Journal of Anthropology 
(January 1974), p. 24. 
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that without a diversified economy, the Bloods were captive 
to influences beyond their control.~ Nowhere, in these 
views, is there any recognition of the potential for the 
efforts of White and Native Albertans to serve each other's 
interests in their efforts to prosper. 
Although Natives were often economically and socially 
marginalized the Bloods did not exist outside the regional 
southern Alberta environment and economy. Both non-Native 
and Native had overlapping interests and merging concerns 
bringing with them both tensions and rapport. My research 
will be directed towards answering these questions - What was 
the economic relationship between the non-Natives and their 
neighbours the Bloods? How were aspects of this association 
initially determined by the presence of the Blood reserve and 
subsequently by conditions on the reserve and in the non-
Native community during the study period? This relationship 
was much too complex and substantial to be left to all-
embracing generalizations based on long held popular and 
generally unsubstantiated notions. Even in occupying niches 
at the margins we may assume that Natives were a visible and 
effective presence. 
67 The 'destruction' of the Blood cattle herd during the 
winter of 1919-20 has been so depicted. R.N. Wilson, Our 
Betrayed Wards: A story of 'Chicane6Y, Infidelity and the 
Prostitution of Trust (Ottawa, 1921), pp. 16-19. 
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Standard historical models used to explain Canadian 
development, frontier, metropolitanism, geographic and 
economic determinism, are generally unsatisfactory for the 
post fur trade period. All are prefaced by the implicit 
assumption that Whites arrived and directed the forces that 
molded the 'character' of land, economy and culture, 
irrespective of and with little recognition of a 'host• 
Native culture. Attempting to apply any one theory to 
explain Native influences on non-Native community formation 
is folly at best. Relations over time are determined and 
influenced by forces both complex and transitory. Success or 
failure in the recreation of tradition is not nearly so 
important as the fact that the physical environment and 
Native peoples had to be experienced as found and 
relationships worked out as required. Traditions were more 
likely adapted to new environs rather than transplanted whole 
-a view implicit in Paul Voisey•s statement that some 
pioneers ~~struggled to recreate the life they left." 68 
Influence is rarely, if ever, a one way street. 
Clearly, historical analysis of the post fur trade era 
has led to a stilted view of the reality and extent of 
canadian Indian integration into local economies. The 
government policy of reserve isolation, with the assumed 
result that there was no movement of people and materials to 
68 . 1 5 Vo~sey, Vu can, p. • 
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and from Native reserves is unrealistic. Equally, the 
potential for a distinct Native population and its reserve 
land base to influence developments among an immigrant 
population have not been recognized. How, for example, does 
the White population determine its economic and social 
agenda, execute its economic functions, and otherwise express 
itself in consideration of the Native presence? What is the 
nature of the attempts to draw the reserve and its 
inhabitants into the newly imported economic strategies? 
Are, in this case, the Bloods considered as liabilities or, 
when needed, a resource upon which to draw? 
Peter Carstens has properly observed that though Native 
reserves are defined spaces they are nevertheless politically 
and economically tied to the broader community.~ My aim is 
to move beyond the view of the Natives as passive receivers, 
and the notion of plains Indians, and their neighbours 
(homogeneously grouped as pioneers on the frontier) as 
having, despite their diversity, separately felt homogeneous 
experiences. It is my view that change and accommodation 
accompanied the realization by both Natives and Whites that 
they shared neighbourhoods. 
69 Peter Carstens, The Queen's People: A Study of 
Hegemony, Coercion. and Accommodation among the Okanagan of 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 
103. 
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The Government of Canada viewed the Bloods, and Natives 
generally, as obstacles to •civilization•, as did certain 
other elements of the local community. Many locals, however, 
recruited the Indians to help create and amass wealth for 
themselves. Robin Fisher has determined that in British 
Columbia the government•s policy .. reflected the fact that the 
Indians had become largely irrelevant to the development of 
the province by white settlers ... iO The experience in southern 
Alberta, however, was that the government•s policies aimed at 
creating and sustaining that irrelevance were much diffused 
in transmission from the Department of Indian Affairs 
officials in Ottawa to the citizen in Fort Macleod or 
Cardston, the ranchers and farmers in the surrounding 
countryside and the reserve agent. This study will present 
evidence that the Bloods aggressively and sensibly 
participated in local economic activities because they chose 
not to remain on the periphery. Often circumstances beyond 
the Bloods' control; such as depletion of resources, drought, 
depression, national economic policies, dictated that they 
should retreat to the confines of their reserve. However, in 
some ways and at some times, their integration into the local 
economy was so complete that their disengagement was 
resisted. Indeed, the extent to which they withdrew their 
70 Robin Fisher, Contact And Conflict: Indian-European 
Relations In British Columbia. 1774-1890 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1980), p. xv. 
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labour, and access to their land and their capital, 
precipitated significant discomfiture among the local 
business interests which in many instances found their very 
survival compromised. 
Historian Deborah Doxtater has charged that "the act of 
building canada involved asserting a nation literally over 
the top of Native cultures." it Hence the historian's tendency 
to fit aboriginal Canadians into Eurocentric history rather 
than to see certain strands of Canada's development in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a common 
shared heritage. By studying a small region of southern 
Alberta it is hoped that detail will emerge to more sharply 
focus the non-Native and Native partnership in the 
development of a given locality. It will be made clear that 
in the period of supposed Indian 'irrelevance' the Bloods, at 
least, forged a relevant meaningful association with their 
non-Native neighbours in the period between the establishment 
of the reserve and the onset of World War II. 
It is certain that the Bloods' relations with the 
surrounding community were not determined by an economic 
agenda alone and that social, political, legal and other 
71 Deborah Doxtator, "The Implications of Canadian 
Nationalism for Aboriginal Cultural Autonomy." Canadian 
Museum of Civilization, Curatorship: Indigenous Perspectives 
In Post-Colonial Societies (Mercury Series: Paper 8, 1996), 
p. 61. 
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cultural factors were equally ~portant. Why then were these 
not addressed? Although it was earlier intended to study 
several of these factors it quickly became clear that to do 
so would make the project unmanageable. The economic aspect 
was isolated because the body of primary documents consulted 
favoured this approach. It may equally be asked why the city 
of Lethbridge was not formally included in the study area. 
Again the official documents contained very little mention of 
Lethbridge in regards to an economic association. Indian 
agents tended to direct official reserve business to 
merchants located in Fort Macleod and Cardston. It was also 
determined that the communities of Fort Macleod and Cardston 
provided good illustration of the Bloods' economic 
associations with urban communities. 
Comment is also needed on the irrevocable Mwhiteness" of 
the sources and the apparent dominant influence of the Indian 
agents. The bulk of the documents consulted, however, were 
either generated by the agents or were in response to them. 
The agents were also the chief facilitators of much of the 
interaction between Indians and Whites. Treating the Bloods 
as homogeneous also presents a difficulty not easily 
resolved. Although an attempt has been made to differentiate 
groups the fact remains that a Blood who harvested hay one 
month could be a freighter or a beet worker in subsequent 
occupations and in quick succession. 
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The shape of this work was determined as much by what 
was not consulted as by what was. One collection of 
documents in Record Group 10, National Archives, was denied 
me because it contained information on the financial affairs 
of the Bloods. This material could only be viewed with the 
tribe's consent. One request by letter to the Tribal Council 
went unanswered. Another effort to have a member of the 
tribe intercede with the Tribal council on my behalf 
similarly brought no results. 
With regard to structure, this dissertation consists of 
five chapters, excluding the introduction and conclusion. 
Chapter Two maps the study area and provides detail with 
regard to the inhabitants, their locations, and the natural 
and other resources of the area. Chapter Three examines the 
use of the Blood reservation land by the non-Native 
community. The study begins with the period of the large 
ranches in the 1880's, considers changes during the homestead 
period through the Great Depression and describes both the 
Blood and non-Native attitudes towards the economic use of 
the land. Chapter Four details the Blood's integration into 
the local economic system through the provision of coal, hay 
and freighting services. These made the Bloods competitors 
with Whites in local supply and service industries. Chapter 
Five offers an analysis of Blood Indian labour in the sugar 
beet fields of Raymond, located just to the east of the 
reserve. The importance of the Bloods to the functioning of 
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this industry in the period from 1903 to 1915 will be 
discussed. The documents consulted suggest that after this 
period Blood participation in the sugar beet industry was 
sparotic and individualized. This work was, therefore, not 
as important to the Bloods or to the industry as initially. 
Chapter Six analyzes Blood relations with merchant houses in 
the area of the reserve and especially at Cardston. The 
primary purpose is to reveal the importance and influence of 
both individual Blood and official reserve spending habits on 
local businesses. Taken together the subjects of the above 
chapters will reveal the form and extent of economic 
integration of an Indian reserve and the surrounding 
community. 
These thematic subjects reconstruct the basic economic 
links between the Bloods and the non-Native community of 
southern Alberta. These associations formed over time and 
this approach presents more opportunity to analyze their 
structure as the economic circumstances of the reserve, the 
local community, the province and the nation changed. The 
pattern of change reveals a Native side to the economic 
development of southern Alberta, to date, largely 
unappreciated. Analyzing the economic force the Bloods 
generated in association with Whites is the most appropriate 
way to reveal Blood economic influences on the shared 
neighbourhood. It is also the most satisfactory way to 
approach new evidence and avoid established fallacies of 
34 
Native insignificance to economic developments in the reserve 
period and thus reveal patterns of change over time. The 
time period selected for this study is, arguably, when the 
most significant economic changes for all the inhabitants of 
the study region occurred and adjustment was demanded. The 
Bloods' responses to these changes at this time were 
sophisticated, enduring and well thought out. 
Chap~er 2 
Place and People 
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The primary focus of this work is people and place, more 
specifically people in a place. The main study area is 
roughly the shape of a parallelogram bounded on the north 
with an axis connecting Lethbridge and Fort Macleod and on 
the south with an axis connecting Cardston with Hill Spring 
just west of the Blood reserve. The bulk of this territory 
is 541 square miles of reserve land, centered around Twps. 3 
to 9, Rge. 21 to 28, West of the fourth meridian. The 
reserve has natural borders bounded as it is on the east by 
the St. Mary's River, on the north by the Oldman River and in 
the west by the Belly River. Its southern extent is an east 
to west line determined by the township survey system. 
(Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4.) 
During the 1880s the Bloods settled their reserve 
mindful of established historical communications patterns and 
ties to the surrounding area. They tended to concentrate 
along the western border; that is along the eastern bank of 
the Belly River. Townships 5 north through Township 8 had 
the heaviest concentration of settlement. The south and the 
eastern length of the reserve along the St. Mary's River were 
relatively empty of settlers. This tendency to group in the 
west can, perhaps, be explained by the presence of Fort 
I 
TRt:ATY N9 7. N.W.T. 
I.'\D\AN REsERVE (BLooo) 
N~l48 
SHCWIMG APPi\ClClMAT E POSITIONS 






)ii.J Odometer Distances 
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Macleod to the west and north of the reserve. The Blood 
agency buildings in the northern portion of Township 7 were 
only 12 miles from Fort Macleod where many Bloods shopped and 
where much official agency business was conducted. The 
presence of a Mounted Police post near the confluence of the 
Belly and Kootenai Rivers, the location of the Bloods' timber 
limit in the mountains to the west, and Cochrane Ranche lands 
to the immediate west of the reserve in this area likely 
influenced reserve settlement patterns. Bands and family 
groupings also naturally concentrated to the north and south 
of the agency occupying available space. Eventually ties to 
Cardston became important drawing settlement into the 
reserve's southern portions. 
Trails also tended to cross and exit the reserve in 
relation to important sites such as the old Fort Slide Out 
and the old Fort Whoop-Up located in the western and 
southeast portions of Township 9 respectively. A trail from 
the area of the agency buildings crossed the reserve to Coal 
Banks, on the St. Mary's River, where Black Horse operated 
his mine. Another trail crossed the northern tip of the 
reserve in the vicinity of Fort Kipp (Kipp), continued to 
Butte Bottom Crossing and carried on east to Lethbridge. 
Trails exiting the reserve at Fort Whoop-Up and Houk's 
Crossing were similarly used. These trails were so placed as 
to eventually tie in with developed communications and 
transportation routes. Thus contact with Fort Macleod and 
40 
Lethbridge and eventually with Cardston, Raymond and small 
communities was maintained. Figure 2.5) 
Physiographic and Bcoloqical Characteristics 
This region of Alberta is physically and ecologically 
diverse, but the purpose here is to give a general overview 
of its most prominent characteristics. The prairies or 
plains are divided into three distinct regions based on 
elevation. Southern Alberta is in the third level, at 
elevations ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 feet. 1 The Blood 
reserve occupies an area in the lower ranges of these 
elevations. 2 The area is undulating-to-flat cut in places by 
rivers, coulees and ravines. At the approximate centre of 
the Blood reserve in Township 6 there is a sandstone 
formation known as the Belly Buttes. The soil in this region 
is very dark brown soil and prairie plain dark brown soil. 
These soils are generally high in mineral content and are 
very fertile except where poorly drained. Thus native 
1 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Agriculture. Climate 
and Population of the Prairie Provinces of Canada (Ottawa, 
F.A. Acland, 1931), p. 22. 
2 R.W. Murchie, Agricultural Progress On The Prairie 
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grasses thrive and cereal crops do well with irrigation. 3 
The eastern portion of the study area lies within 
Palliser's Triangle, whose western extent is sometimes placed 
at a divide that joins Calgary in the north to Cardston in 
the south and is drier than the territory immediately to the 
west. A major influence on climate and weather is the 
eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains which contributes to 
strong winds, the "rainshadow" effect and "Chinooks". Air 
masses moving onto the region from the north, northeast and 
east are cool and dry while those from the southwest are 
similarly dry. Air masses in southern Alberta in the summer 
tend to originate in the southwest and these are dry and 
sufficiently warm to scorch standing grass.~ Drought which 
11 burned" the natural grass cover was often a concern for 
ranchers and farmers. 
Sparse rainfall resulting from the "rainshadow" effect 
of the mountains, along with the seasonal extremes in 
weather, in particular high summer temperatures in 
combination with the dryness,~ characterize the area and 
3 w. A. Mackintosh, Prairie Settlement: The Geographic 
Setting (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1934), p. 
23; Agriculture. Climate and Population of the Prairie 
Provinces of Canada , p. 22 and Figure 23 p. 24. 
4 
. 1 1' d 1 . f h .. Agr~cu ture, C ~ate an Popu at1on o t e Pra~r~e 
Provinces of Canada, p. 11. 
5 Ray Jackson Fletcher, "The Climate of Southern 
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result in short summers and a short growing season. The 
reserve is in an area where the precipitation ranges from 50 
em. in the south to 40 em. in the north but only about half 
of this annual precipitation falls during the summer growing 
season." The reserve area generally experiences less aridity 
than the mean for the region. 7 
Late spring and early fall frosts can also affect 
agricultural potential in the region. The last killing frost 
of spring usually occurs between days 130 and 135x while the 
first killing frost of fall usually occurs between days 260 
and 265. ·> However, because of the mountains' extremes of 
temperatures, wind velocity and precipitation can cause 
"unusual climate conditions in any season.·· 111 This weather 
pattern, especially complicated by mild thawing Chinook 
Alberta," in F. Jankunis (ed.), Southern Alberta: A Regional 
Perspective (Lethbridge: University of Lethbridge, 1972), 
p. 20. 
6 Fraser Taylor, Standing Alone: A Contemporary 
Blackfoot Indian (Halfmoon Bay, Arbutus Bay Publications, 
1989), p. 38. 
7 Agriculture. Climate and Population of the Prairie 
Provinces of Canada, Figure 20, p. 21. 
8 Agriculture, Climate and Population of the Prairie 
Provinces of Canada, Figure 16, p. 19. 
9 Agriculture, Climate and Population of the Prairie 
Provinces of canada, Figure 15, p. 18. 
10 Taylor, Standing Alone, p. 38. 
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occurrences in the winter, led settlers to a false impression 
of the overall appropriateness to cattle raising and to 
'civilizing' the region through certain kinds of crop 
agriculture. Though blessed with adequate sunshine, crop 
yields are restricted by inadequate moisture which must be 
supplemented by irrigation. 11 
Southern Alberta has a great variety of animal and plant 
life. The fauna of the region was dominated by the plains 
bison which no longer exist outside of parks and privately 
owned herds. Mule deer and white-tailed deer are now the 
most numerous of the ungulates. A variety of bird species 
inhabit the area; crows, gulls, magpies, ducks and geese 
being the most recognizable. Smaller mammals are also 
numerous, particularly the Richardson ground squirrel or 
'gopher'. The lakes and streams are inhabited by a variety 
of amphibians and fishes 12 but none of these were extensively 
utilized by the plains Indians as a food source. 
The surface cove~ing of the flatland is largely made up 
of mixed grass prairie. In the river valleys and coulees, 
however, more moisture and protection from wind make for 
greater diversity in plant life and supports a variety of 
l 1 Fletcher, "The Climate of Southern Alberta," p. 29. 
l2 For a full discussion of the fauna of the region see 
William H. Sharp, "Flora and Fauna of Southern Alberta," in 
F. Jankunis (ed.), Southern Alberta: A Regional Perspective 
(Lethbridge: University of Lethbridge, 1972), pp. 35-47. 
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trees, such as poplar, pine, spruce, juniper and willow, 
which cannot be found on the prairie flat lands. Common to 
these areas also are a variety of berry bushes such as 
saskatoon and chokecherry. 13 
Commercially exploitable resources in southern Alberta 
consist of two types, agricultural and non-agricultural. The 
agricultural consists of grass cover for grazing animals or 
land for crop agriculture, chiefly grain cereals. Non-
agricultural are oil, gas, and coal resources with the latter 
being historically the most important in the study region. 
Research has identified more than 1,700 coal mines in the 
Alberta plains regions, more than half of these in the south 
of the province. Though some of these are simple 'prospect 
pits' the numbers do indicate a resource of some commercial 
importance. 14 
The physical and biological diversity was an attraction 
which drew the Blackfoot Confederacy, including the Bloods. 
Sparse White settlement meant that the Natives' presence and 
influence were considerable following Treaty 7 and the 
13 Sharp, "Flora and Fauna of Southern Alberta," pp. 35-
38. 
14 C.B. Beaty, "Geomorphology, Geology, and Non-
Agricultural Resources," in F. Jankunis (ed.), Southern 
Alberta: A Regional Perspective (Lethbridge: University of 
Lethbridge, 1972), p. 18. 
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establishment of the Blood reserve in 1880. 15 Whites quickly 
gained an appreciation for the potential of the grasslands to 
support grazing herds of cattle and it was not until the 
first decade of the Twentieth Century that an immigrant 
influx dedicated to crop agriculture brought a more dense 
population which rivaled the influence of both the Indians 
and the ranchers. lh With immigrants in place the region had 
both the resources and people necessary to become an 
integrated economic unit. 
People 
The population of the study area is composed of Natives, 
chiefly the Bloods, and non-Native ranchers, farmers and 
settlers residing in rural and urban settings. Towns have a 
centralized social, political and economic infrastructure 
directed towards attracting resources and people from the 
periphery. From the start the Bloods, by dint of numbers 
were poised to be significant players in the local economy, 
helping to both generate and sustain growth. Most of the 
Bloods' commercial intercourse was in trading and purchasing 
lS Hugh A Dempsey, "Story of the Blood Reserve," The 
Pioneer West (No. 2), p. 1. 
16 Many townships around the reserve remained unoccupied 
in 1891. R. Louis Gentilcore, (ed.), Historical Atlas of 
Canada: Volume II. The Land Transformed 1800-1891 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), Plate 42. 
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in both Fort Macleod and Cardston and in selling their labour 
in Raymond. Donald Whetherell and Irene Kmet surmise that 
phases in the growth of newly established towns in southern 
Alberta likely mirrored developments in the region as a 
whole, towns focused both population and trade and trade in 
particular " •.. remained a force in knitting together a 
patchwork of local concerns and policies." Before World War 
I there was high growth and expectations while the inter-war 
period through World War II saw a struggle to maintain the 
status guo. 11 
Comparing the population figures for these towns and the 
Bloods, it is possible to get some perspective on the Bloods' 
relative position. In 1882 the Blood population was reckoned 
by the government at 2,589. 1s Thereafter it declined but in 
1901 the Blood population was 1,253 or 87% of that of Fort 
Macleod and Cardston combined. Given that the reserve was 
established in 1880, there were two decades in which the 
Bloods likely had a significant impact on the economic well-
being of one or both of these places. The relative weight of 
17 Donald G. Wetherell and Irene R.A. Kmet, Town Life: 
Main Street and the Evolution of Small Town Alberta, 1880-
1947 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1995), p. 
xvii. 
18 The Bloods claim a larger number of 3,542. 
Lethbridge Herald, March 26, 1994, p. AS. The government's 
figure is down from the 2,892 that were paid annuities in 
1881. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1549, p. 4, Indian Agent to E. 
Dewdney, August 29, 1881. 
48 
the Blood population sharply declined to 1,168 or 31.5% of 
Fort Macleod, Cardston and Raymond in 1906 and by 1911 was at 
1,128 or 25%. Thereafter it appears to have hit a low of 
approximately 20% in the mid 1920s. (Table 1) But even at 
this minimal ratio the number of Bloods represented an 
attractive and significant market to local businesses, some 
of which specialized in retailing to Native peoples. 1Y 
The population for these communities peaked in 1926, 
declined during the early Depression, and recovered again in 
1936. The Bloods' economic value was likely greater during 
this period of non-Native population decline. The Blood 
population maintained its levels and in fact began a slow but 
perceptible increase. An indication of that value is 
illustrated by the heightened desire for Native patronage and 
the frantic demands for the settlement of credit accounts as 
discussed in chapter 5 below. 
Towns were the focus of commercial activities and the 
attractions they offered lured the Bloods to frequent them. 
However, the rural setting was not insignificant. The nature 
of land use, and government regulations, during the ranching 
* The low is achieved by comparing the Bloods' 1924 
population of 1,158 with the total of Cardston, Fort Macleod, 
and Raymond for the 1926 census. The Blood population for 
1926 is not available. 
19 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, see p. 234. 
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era encouraged sparse populations.~) The ranchers and few 
farmers, however, incorporated the Indians into their economy 
by hiring them as ranch labour, renting their land and 
purchasing from the Natives fuel and fodder supplies. These 
commercial bonds increased as the area became more settled 
and as Blood labourers and entrepreneurs became more adept at 
marketing their resources. 
The Reserve 
The Blood (Kainai) Tribe is a member of the Blackfoot 
Confederacy and like other tribes is usually divided into a 
number of bands. There was no single leader for the tribe 
but each band had its own chief. Leaders usually assumed one 
of two separate mantles, warrior or political leader. Tribal 
members tended to support a respected leader of their choice. 
Decision making was collective with consensus being achieved 
through mediation.L1 Important matters, such as the 
20 Paul Voisey points out that in the decade between 
1881-1891 population increase for all of the prairies was 
only 118,000 with the majority of this growth in southern 
Manitoba. Paul Voisey, "The Urbanization of the Canadian 
Prairies, 1871-1916," Histoire Sociale-Social History, 8 
(1975), p. 82. 
21 Hugh A. Dempsey, Red Crow: warrior Chief 
(Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1980), pp. 49 
and 71. Hugh A. Dempsey, Tribal Honors: A History of the 
Kainai Chieftainship (Calgary: Kainai Chieftainship, 1997). 
pp. 13-16. 
so 
negotiation of treaties, had to be decided in a council of 
all chiefs in the immediate vicinity. Band chiefs, however, 
could mediate disputes among band members. 11 
By the mid 1870s, Chief Red Crow held sway over his band 
the Fish Eaters. When the Bloods joined the other Blackfoot 
tribes at Blackfoot Crossing for Treaty 7 negotiations in 
1877, Red Crow used his considerable political skill to 
23 
solidify his position of prestige and power. The Bloods saw 
the treaty as something more than adherence to a document 
that expressed the will of Whites. They regarded the treaty 
as a cementing of a "'good and lasting realtionship'" between 
h 'd 24 bot s~ es. Completely at odds with White interpretations 
of Treaty 7 as a land surrender, generations of Blood elders 
have argued that such a concept was foreign to them and that 
h . h d h . . 25 t ey were agree~ng to s are, not surren er t e~r terr~tory. 
Thus the Bloods perceived an obligation on the part of 
the Canadian government to protect their interests and views 
22 Dempsey, Red Crow, pp. 71-72, 85. 
23 Dempsey, Red Crow, pp. 99-100. 
24 Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council with Walter 
Hildebrandt, Dorothy First Rider and Sarah Carter, The True 
Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: MeGill-
Queen's University Press, 1996), p. 68. 
25 Treaty 7 Elders et. al., The True Spirit, pp. 114, 
125-127. 
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of treaty obligations. The realization that the government 
was lax in this regard spurred Red Crow and later chiefs to 
protest. They had accepted the promises made at Blackfoot 
Crossing at face value; "The Government said they would be 
good to us. We took what the Government offered us." There 
was some regret among the Bloods at having been seduced away 
from their initial reluctance to make treaty. This 
reluctance was heightened by the Bloods' feelings of betrayal 
at the hands of the government representatives, especially 
26 Colonel James F. Macleod. In 1899, for example, Red Crow 
protested interference with the reserve and the Bloods' 
. d d 27 ~n epen ence. These were charges that would be much 
repeated. 
Red Craw's successors, Crop Eared Wolf and Shot Both 
Sides, exercised similar influence and in many ways dominated 
the affairs of the tribe during the reserve period. In doing 
so they, on many occasions, frustrated the ambitions and 
designs of agents, Indian Commissioners and the Department of 
Indian Affairs. 
26 NAC, RG 18, vol. 19, file 249, Notes of an interview 
between the Chiefs of the Bloods and North Peigans, and 
Messrs. Pocklington and Springett of the Indian Department 
and Supt. P.R. Neale, Comanding N.W.M. Police in the Macleod 
District, February 2, 1888. 
27 William M. Baker (ed.), Pioneer Policing In Southern 
Alberta: Deane of the Mounties 1888-1914 (Calgary: 
Historical Society of Alberta, 1993), pp. 96-98. 
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Because it was a political entity the Blood reserve was 
not independent of Canadian law or political influences. A 
common thread affecting both the well-being of the Bloods and 
their relations with their non-Native neighbours was both the 
infrastructure of the DIA and its policy, as embodied in the 
Indian Act. The reach of the Department was extensive and 
was, as far as the Native peoples were concerned, a 
smothering embrace. Other than the often expressed and 
significant Native resistance, the only protection that the 
Indians had from the Department's grasp was the presence on 
the reserve of a concerned agent who placed the well-being of 
his charges before blind obedience to Ottawa. As for policy, 
it was nativist informedl~ and was based on the ultimate goal 
of assimilating the Natives on the one hand, and making them 
economically self-sufficient by turning them into subsistence 
farmers, rancher or entrepreneurs on the other. 
The reserve was subject to decisions made by a host of 
government bureaucrats, chiefly those in the Department of 
Indian Affairs in Ottawa. The main purpose of policies 
emanating from Ottawa was to isolate and control the Indians 
on their reserves while encouraging them to adopt White 
ideals of advancement and eventually assimilate with the non-
Native population. Hence, it was hoped that Native peoples 
28 Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice: A History of 
Nativism in Alberta (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1982), pp. 6-7. 
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as a distinct segment of the Canadian population, and their 
reserves as distinct political units, would ultimately 
disappear .l<J 
The move to a reserve-based Indian policy began in Upper 
Canada in the 1830's, when the Indians had lost their 
usefulness as military allies. The primary motive was to 
'civilize' them by providing them with the skills needed for 
self-support and thereby absolve the Crown of the cost • .ill But 
as in the Canadian west in later decades, the initial reserve 
29 There are several sources which offer excellent 
overviews of the administrative setup and intent of Canadian 
Indian policy. John Leonard Taylor, "Canada's North-West 
Indian Policy in the 1870s: Traditional Premises and 
Necessary Innovations," in J.R. Miller (ed.), Sweet Promises: 
A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 207-211; John L. 
Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline 
History Of Canada's Indian Policy," Western Canadian Journal 
of Anthropology, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1976), pp. 13-30: Allan G. 
Harper, "Canada's Indian Administration: The 'Indian Act'," 
America Indigena, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1946), pp. 297-314; 
Douglas Leighton, "A Victorian Civil Servant at Work: 
Lawrence Vankoughnet and the Canadian Indian Department, 
1874-1893," in Ian A.L. Getty and Antoine s. Lussier (eds.), 
As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in 
Canadian Native Studies (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1983), pp. 104-119; David J. Hall, "Clifford 
Sifton and Canadian Indian Administration 1896-1905," Prairie 
Forum, Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 1977), pp. 127-151; E. Brian 
Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott And The 
Administration Of Indian Affairs In Canada (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1986), Chapters 1 and 
3. 
30 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide The Heavens: A History 
of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1989), pp. 99-100. 
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experiments did not fulfill expectations, largely because 
Anglo-Canadians demanded radical cultural change from the 
Natives. The government's efforts to divert the Natives away 
from their traditional economic activities 31 and to destroy 
their social cohesion and assimilate them into the larger 
society, were unsuccessful. 3l Unfortunately this forceful and 
ill-advised policy continued when Canada assumed 
responsibility for Indian affairs after Confederation in 
1867. Canada's annexation of Rupert's Land in 1869 meant 
that whole new Indian populations were to experience the 
application of policies that had already failed elsewhere. 
In the newly confederated Canada, Indian affairs were 
handled by the Secretary of State but were transferred to the 
Minister of the Department of the Interior in 1873. A board 
of Indian Commissioners was created in 1873 to oversee 
matters and relations with Indians in the west and in 1876 
superintendents and agents were appointed in order to 
maintain closer field supervision. The Indian Commissioner 
became the most important regional official in the Department 
of Indian Affairs (DIA) as he was responsible for overseeing 
government policy in his geographic jurisdiction. Indian 
31 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide The Heavens, p. 102. 
32 Donald B. Smith, Sacred Feathers: The Reverend Peter 
Jones CKahkewaguonabyl & the Mississauga Indians (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 238-239. 
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agents and inspectors were appointed to carry out the 
Commissioner's instructions at the local level. Information 
gathered at the Commissioner's behest was eventually 
communicated to headquarters in Ottawa. In 1880 the Indian 
Branch was transformed into its own separate department, the 
DIA, under the direction of the Department of the Interior, 
with a Deputy Superintendent General to head it. As a cost 
cutting measure the office of Commissioner was eventually 
abolished in 1909; 33 thus making it possible to maintain more 
direct communication between agents, inspectors and Ottawa. 
The DIA was organized into an inside and outside 
service. The inside service was composed of the personnel at 
Ottawa which included divisions for a deputy superintendent 
general, chief clerk, accountant and unskilled positions. 
The outside service was made up of the workers in the field 
who dealt with the Indians on a daily basis. The most 
important of these was the reserve Indian agent, the ultimate 
government authority on the reserve. His main responsibility 
was the implementation of DIA directives and the Indian Act. 
Because of his intimate daily contact with the Indians under 
his charge he was in a position to influence decision making 
among the Indians. The agent's powers were increased in 1881 
when an amendment to the Indian Act made him a justice of the 
peace with powers to effect an arrest, conduct trials and 
33 Titley, A Narrow Vision, pp. 10-13. 
pass sentence.~ Other reserve personnel, such as farm 
instructors, worked under the agent's supervision and 
direction. 
When the Laurier Liberals came to power in 1896, 
Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton instituted cost 
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saving reforms which ultimately resulted in more centralized 
decision making. Consequently more power was concentrated in 
the hands of J.D. McLean, Secretary and eventually Assistant 
Deputy Superintendent, and accountant Duncan Campbell Scott. 
Scott became the Deputy Superintendent General in 1913, a 
post he held until 1932. McLean and Scott were the major 
influences and powers in Indian Affairs during their tenure 
in office. Scott was succeeded by Harold W. McGill. 
Canada made its most significant contribution to the 
management of Indians and their affairs with the passing of 
the Indian Act in 1876, an act so comprehensive in scope that 
it regulated practically every aspect of Native life. 35 The 
passage of this repressive and extensive legislation was 
justified on the basis that it would turn Indians into 
34 Titley, A Narrow Vision, pp. 13-14. The powers of 
the agents were debated in the House of Commons in 1905 and 
concerns were expressed about the possibility of agents being 
prejudiced against Whites in cases where they were involved 
with Indians. House of Commons Debates, Vol. IV, May 25, 
1905, 6545-6546. 
35 
· d a· · 1 h c h Treat1es an 1stor1ca Researc entre, T e 
Historical Development Of The Indian Act (Ottawa: Indian 
and Northern Affairs, 1978), p. 52 ff. 
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'civilized' and productive citizens of Canada. Thereafter 
the matter of most concern to the government bureaucracy was 
the implementation of the agenda as outlined in the Act. As 
part of that plan Indians were given some responsibility for 
their own local affairs as the act made provision for the 
election of chiefs and councilors. The powers of intrusion 
reserved to the Department, reserve inspectors and the agent, 
however, were so extensive3(J as to make the decision making 
authority of the band and council somewhat of a legal 
fiction. An amendment to the Act in 1895 allowed the 
minister to depose chiefs, an amendment necessary, according 
to one historian, "because the band leaders in the west were 
found to be resisting the innovations of the reserve 
system ••. n.ii 
This official and legal position, however, does not 
truly reflect the status of the Bloods and their chiefs and 
band council. The chiefs and council wielded a great deal of 
authority with regard to band and reserve matters. Though 
some agents were repressive the Bloods and their leaders were 
determined not to surrender total control of their affairs to 
officials, they believed, ought to advance their cause and 
36 J. McKenna, "The Indian Laws of Canada," Catholic 
World, Vol. 54 (Oct. 1891), p. 66-67; Titley, A Narrow 
Vision, p. 12. 
37 Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation", p. 
20. 
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protect their rights. In such cases the Bloods appealed to 
other authorities. When Agent James Wilson attempted to 
prohibit the holding of a sun dance in 1898, Red Crow 
appealed to the North West Mounted Police at Fort Macleod to 
use their influence to permit the holding of the event. 38 One 
notable attempt to coerce the Bloods into a surrender of a 
portion of their reserve failed in the face of the determined 
opposition of Chief Crop Eared Wolf. Crop Eared Wolf both 
cultivated and mustered his people's resistance to the 
alienation of the land •. N Agents often sided with the Bloods 
against DIA policies regarding reserve land leasing and 
considered both the wishes and needs of the Bloods in their 
decisions and petitions to reserve inspectors and 
headquarters. It is clear that the Bloods were active agents 
on behalf of their own interests. 
Red Craw's selection of the area between the Belly and 
Kootenai Rivers for the Blood reserve precipitated the first 
of many disputes between the Bloods and their neighbours as 
the selected land was disentangled from the surrounding Crown 
land, private farms and ranches. For example, land belonging 
38 w. Keith Regular, u'Red Backs And White Burdens': A 
Study Of White Attitudes Towards Indians In Southern Alberta 
1896-1911," (Calgary: University of Calgary, M.A., 1985), 
pp. 86-88. See Dempsey, Red Crow, pp. 208-210. 
39 Hugh A. Dempsey, The Gentle Persuader: 
Of James Gladstone, Indian Senator (Saskatoon: 




to long-time settler David Akers, in the vicinity of old Fort 
Whoop-Up was included in the Blood reserve through a clerical 
error~ 1 and it became necessary to amend the treaty, in 1886, 
to recognize Aker's claim. 41 In another case D.J. Cochrane 
already resident on a portion of the land that the Bloods 
claimed had to be compensated for being forced to abandon his 
home for another location. 42 When the Bloods became 
belligerent at what they considered unseemly delays, Cochrane 
was paid $3.00 an acre because of improvements which would 
accrue to the benefit of the Bloods.~ 
In 1887, Red Crow laid claim to the land between the 
western border of the reserve and the Rocky Mountains, a 
claim disputed by the reserve surveyor John C. Nelson. It 
was Nelson's view that Red Crow was attempting a peremptory 
action because he was "alarmed" at the establishment of 
Mormon settlers at Lee Creek on the reserve's southern 
40 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3622, file 4948, J.C. Nelson to E. 
Dewdney, April 30, 1886. 
41 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3622, file 4948, Hayter Reed to J. 
Macleod, May 10, 1886. 
42 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3577, file 421, L Vankoughnet to E. 
Dewdney, June 14, 1883. 
43 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3577, file 421, L. Vankoughnet to E. 
Dewdney, May 29, 1885; also see appraisal signed by w.c. 
McCord, August 2, 1883; L. Vankoughnet to E. Dewdney, January 
26, 1884; c.c. McCord to E. Dewdney, March 29, 1884; w. 
Pocklington to Indian Commissioner, March 16, 1885; L. 
Vankoughnet to E. Dewdney, April. 4, 1885. 
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boundary. But as the Department of the Interior had already 
subdivided the area in anticipation of the arrival of more 
settlers~ it was unlikely that it would recognize such a 
claim. Red Craw's confusion relative to the limits of his 
reserve was likely due to his absence when the boundary was 
initially surveyed.~ William Pocklington, the first agent of 
the Blood reserve, reported that when the boundary was 
reviewed with Red Crow and other minor chiefs they expressed 
satisfaction with its extent.~) But in August, 1888, Red Crow 
reiterated his claim to "all the land between the two rivers 
back to the Mountains", 4i a sure sign that, in his mind, the 
extent of land to which the Bloods were entitled was far from 
settled. 
44 NAC, RG 10, val. 3793, file 45,995, John C. Nelson to 
Hayter Reed, December 2, 1887. 
45 NAC, RG 10, val. 3793, file 45,995, Hayter Reed to 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, February 8, 1888. 
46 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3793, file 45,995, w. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, August 30, 1888. 
47 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1556, pp. 645-646, w. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, August 30, 1888. There is ongoing 
negotiations between the Bloods and the Government of Canada 
over an extra almost 200 square miles of land south of the 
reserve's current border the Bloods believe they are entitled 
to because the government counted their population 
incorrectly for the purposes of determining their reserve. 
Lethbridge Herald, February 24, 1976; March 23 and March 26, 
1994. 
Once the reserve was established, defending its 
integrity from the encroachment of Whites determined on 
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achieving access to its resources was a constant concern of 
both the Bloods and the Department of Indian Affairs.~ After 
some initial growing pains, the boundaries of the reserve 
were established and its integrity was, in the main, 
successfully defended; though defending its resources was 
considerably more difficult. 
The Rural Community 
As the Blood reserve was being occupied the area was 
quickly coming under the dominance of the large cattle 
ranching interests. ~) Scattered settlers, such as Dave Akers 
and D.J. Cochrane~', were harbingers of the formal occupation 
of the land that was to follow as the large ranches gave way 
to smaller ranches. Eventually cereal farmers and mixed 
farmers predominated. 
48 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, p. 117, James Wilson to Amos 
Rae, April 28, 1894; pp. 126-128, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, May 7, 1894; pp. 199-200, James Wilson to A. 
McNab, June 5, 1894. 
49 John o. Higinbotham, When the West Was Young 
(Lethbridge: the Herald Printers, 1978), 188, 264-65. 
50 See for example NAC, RG 10, vol. 3577, file 421, L. 
Vankoughnet to E. Dewdney, June 14, 1883. 
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It can be assumed, but not without qualification, that 
the region experienced much the same cycle of growth as 
described by Paul Voisey for the Vulcan area. Here there 
occurred quick settlement, followed by continual growth and 
the realization that a quarter section of land was inadequate 
for prosperity. Subsequently there was a forced exodus of 
surplus population and the redistribution of the land among 
those left. 51 During the various phases of settlement and 
growth the rancher and farmer/settlers worked out an 
accommodation with the Bloods and their reserve as required. 
The demands most often placed on the Bloods were for direct 
use of the reserve land, labour, and supplies such as coal 
and hay. 
Fort Macleod 
The erection of the North West Mounted Police post, Fort 
Macleod, in 1874, predated the establishment of the Blood 
Reserve by a decade. The fort was first built on an island 
in the Old Man River for defensive reasons but this island 
proved too small for a town site. Soon businesses and 
residents began moving to the mainland followed by the police 
post in 1884. As a result the town experienced rapid growth. 
By 1887 it had most of the services usually associated with 
51 
. 1 28 Vo~sey, Vu can, pp. 33 and 1 • 
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small towns including general stores, hotels, blacksmiths, 
bank5l and newspaper. 
By 1892, with a population of about 350, it was the 
regional centre for the NWMP and the ranching industry. 53 
Further rapid growth eluded Fort Macleod, however, because 
both the Calgary and Edmonton Railway and the Canadian 
Pacific Railway refused to locate their stations directly in 
the town creating considerable uncertainty.~ Despite this 
initial setback the railways did bring continental 
integration and seemed to ensure that Fort Macleod, even if 
it did not experience the full measure of expected 
prosperity, could look to a promising future. 
Such hopes, however, proved elusive. Fort Macleod's 
ambition, like that of every other western town, to become 
the main economic force for a region by controlling the 
immediate hinterland proved difficult to realize. The 
transportation and communication systems not only brought 
customers in, but also allowed them to escape. 55 Worse it 
52 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, 115. P• 
53 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, 2-3. PP• 
54 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, 8-11. PP· 
55 For discussion of local variations of these ideas see 
Theodore Binnema, "'A Feudal Chain of Vassalage': Limited 
Identities in the Prairie West, 1870-1896," Prairie Forum, 
{Vol. 20, No. 1), Spring 1995, p. 3; Wetherell and Kmet, 
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brought in competition. The town merchants would become 
greatly concerned over mail order businesses, such as Eaton's 
of Toronto, which became aggressive competitors early in the 
century, :)h thanks to the train and the post office. 
Fort Macleod never became as commercially important as 
its most ardent boosters hoped. The development of Cardston 
and Lethbridge blunted its commercial expansion and absorbed 
its much sought after hinterland. Though starting out with 
much promise it failed to thrive as its population and 
commercial growth peaked during the second decade of this 
century. (Table 1) 
The Fort Macleod Gazette may have inadvertently 
contributed to the town's declining fortunes when it 
encouraged the shift towards mixed farming and predicted the 
decline of ranching which was the mainstay of the town. 57 
Mixed farming never fulfilled the Gazette's hopes. Although 
ranching did decline, farmers never really adopted mixed 
farming and by 1911 were abandoning the area as they found it 
unsuitable for farming in general. 58 Having ceased to be a 
Town Life, p. 129. 
56 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, p. 126 ff. 
57 David H. Breen, The Canadian Prairie West and the 
Ranching Frontier 1874-1924 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1983), pp. 70-71; Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, p. 
93. 
58 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, p. 93-94. 
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distribution centre for the ranching industry Fort Macleod 
lost its economic base as it had neither mining nor industry 
to fall back on. 
The relationship between Fort Macleod and the Blood 
Indians began with the arrival of the police in 1874. The 
forces of integration were at play even before the reserve 
land base was established and the incidence of conflict was 
never severe enough to significantly impede this process. 
Fort Macleod, situated northwest of the chosen reserve site, 
was a focal point for an economy based on the import of 
consumer goods and export of raw materials along the Whoop-Up 
Trail. (Figure 2.6) Its selection as a NWMP post, and the 
later establishment of the town, were largely determined by 
the presence of the Blackfoot Indians among whom the Bloods 
figured prominently. The supply of the Indians with food and 
other goods following the 1877 treaty, in large part, drove 
the economy of the region, creating wealth and attracting 
permanent non-Native settlement. Sl> 
Mercantile firms such as I.G. Baker and T.C. Power and 
Bro. had been established in Fort Macleod by the time the 
59 R.C. Macleod, The North-West Mounted Police and Law 
Enforcement 1873-1905 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1976), p. 25; Breen, Ranching Frontier, p. 15; John w. 
Bennett and Seena B. Kohl, Settling the Canadian-American 
West, 1890-1915 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1995), pp. 13-14. 
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Figure 2.6 -From Peter Darby, "From River Boat To Rail Lines: Circulation 
Patterns in the Canadian West during the i....ast Quarter of the Nineteenth 
Century", in L.A. Rosenvall and S.M. Evans (eds.) Essays on the Historical 
Geograony of the Canadian West (Calgary, University of Calgary, 1987), pp. 
9 and 15. 
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police post was finished in December, 1874.~} Newly arrived 
merchants likely drew lessons from the example of John J. 
Healey and Alfred B. Hamilton who, realizing the advantage of 
the trade in buffalo hides, established a post in the Bloods' 
territory which grossed $50,000 in the first winter of 
trading. 111 Meanwhile providing beef to feed the Indians, much 
of it to the Bloods, garnered $500,000 a year for the I.G. 
Baker company in the late 1870s. hl The Macleod Gazette 
commented on the transfer of I.G. Baker and Co.'s business in 
the North West Terrorities to the Hudson's Bay Company, in 
1891, by observing that in the days before the NWMP "the 
Indians were about the only customers and it was more a case 
of the traders going to the customers, rather than the 
reverse" • 113 The Indians in general, and the Bloods in 
particular, were the focus of the regional economy at this 
early point, their presence a boon for I.G. Baker Co. just as 
60 James G. MacGregor, A History Of Alberta (Edmonton: 
Hurtig Publishers, 1972), p. 123. Policeman R.B. Nevitt 
mentions a visit to Conrad's store in January 1875. R.B. 
Nevitt, A Winter at Fort Macleod, Hugh A. Dempsey, ed. 
(Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Insititute, 1974). p. 30. 
6 L Alex Johnston and Andy den Otter, Lethbridge: A 
Centennial History (Lethbridge: City of Lethbridge, 1985), 
pp. 27-33. 
62 Breen, Ranching Frontier p. 15. 
63 Macleod Gazette, February 12, 1891. 
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it would be for other national and local businesses as the 
changing economic patterns severed the all-embracing 
influences from south of the 49th parallel~. 
Although Paul Sharp correctly emphasizes Fort Macleod's 
commercial dependence on American trading companies out of 
Fort Benton, Montana,t6 he sees this history as exclusive, 
with Fort Macleod as the meeting of "the two great streams of 
Anglo-Saxon pioneering. uhu The Natives are, therefore, 
ignored or relegated to the position of displaced hangers-on, 
reminders of a once 'noble' primordial past. This perception 
is common to the historiography of the formation of non-
Native communities in aboriginal territory, and the 
subsequent associations of Natives with non-Native 
communities is generally viewed by historians as negative. 
David Hammer has argued that the establishment of towns 
"involved the obliteration of, attractive aspects of the 
natural landscape ••• of all indications of the original, 
64 Peter Darby, "From River Boat To Rail Lines: 
Circulation Patterns in the Canadian West During the Last 
Quarter of the Nineteenth Century," in L.A. Rosenvall and 
S.M. Evans (eds.), Essays on the Historical Geography of the 
Canadian West: Regional Perspectives on the Settlement 
Process (Calgary: University of Calgary, 1987), pp. 7-10. 
65 Paul F. Sharp, Whoop-Up Country: The Canadian-
American West. 1865-1885 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press , 19 7 3 ) , P • 7 • 
66 Sharp, Whoop-Up, p.B. 
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'primitive' condition of the site. Included in this were the 
indigenous peoples of the territories being settled ... The 
result was banishment to the hinterland and "their presence 
in towns became more and more marginal and ghostly. nhi But 
this view was/is more ideal than real and the banishment, no 
matter how much desired, never became totally effective or 
complete. In fact, the Bloods were drawn to the area 
reassured by the Mounties' presence.t~ The selection of the 
reserve with Macleod located to the north west, therefore, 
only cemented an already established tie. 
Cards ton 
The town of Cardston was founded in 1887 near the St. 
Mary's River by refugee Mormons from Utah led by Charles Ora 
Card. Their move to Canada was made in a bid to preserve 
religious tenets and culture under attack in the United 
67 David Hammer, New Towns in the New World: Images and 
Perceptions of the Nineteenth-Century Urban Frontier (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 11-12. This 
seems to have been very much universal wherever Europeans and 
their descendants have encroached on territory occupied by 
Native people. See Hammer, New Towns, pages 214-223; Robert 
G. Athearn, Westward The Briton (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1953), p. 126 ff.; Robert Hughes, The Fatal 
Shore: The epic of Australia's founding (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1987), pp. 280-281. 
68 ld A k" . . h . h h 1 . Rona t ~n, Ma~nta~n T e R~g t: T e Ear y H~story 
of the North west Mounted Police. 1873-1900 (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1973), p. 85. 
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States. Their practice of polygamy~ also came under attack 
in Canada70 though the Mormons protested their innocence. il 
Card and his followers chose to settle at Lee Creek, 
close to the Blood Reserve's southern border and from the 
very beginning relations between the Bloods and the Mormon 
settlers were based on mutual mistrust and disagreement. 
Initially the ill will stemmed from the belief that deception 
had been used to gain Blood acquiescence to Mormon settlement 
in the area. Blood Elder Camoose Bottle claimed that the 
Mormons acquired the land at Lee Creek by getting Red Crow 
drunk. This, and the fact that the subsequent agreement 
between the Bloods and Mormons was not sanctioned by the 
tribe, led to some Bloods questioning its legitimacy. 71 
Eventually, however, Red Crow accepted the official survey, 
69 L.A. Rosenvall, "The Transfer of Mormon Culture To 
Alberta," in L.A. Rosenvall and S.M. Evans (eds.) Essays on 
the Historical Geography of the Canadian West: Regional 
Perspectives on the Settlement Process (Calgary: University 
of Calgary, 1987), pp. 122-133. 
70 A.A. den Otter, Civilizing the West: The Galts and 
the Development of Western Canada (Edmonton: University of 
Alberta Press, 1982), p. 202. 
71 See for example: NAC, RG 18, Vol. 41, File 250 
(1890), Charles o. Card to A.M. Burgess, February 22, 1890; 
John A. Woolf, to A.M. Burgess, February 7, 1890. 
72 Hickey, Lynn; Lightning, Richard L.; Lee, Gordon, 
"T.A.R.R. Interview with Elders Program," in Richard Price 
(ed.) The Spirit of the Alberta Indian Treaties (Montreal: 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, n.d.), p. 134. 
71 
which placed cardston to the south of the reserve, but some 
continued to feel that the Bloods were somehow tricked or 
that Red Crow betrayed them. Hugh Dempsey, however, contends 
that Red Crow simply accepted the evidence presented to him 
and a situation he was powerless to change. i:; 
It was clear from the beginning that the Mormons at 
Cardston saw themselves as a people apart, sharing little 
with their Native neighbours except the land which both 
claimed as their own. A clear indication of that 
separateness was the manner in which the Cardston Record 
chose to locate the community within the western setting. In 
1898 the paper described Cardston's location in relation to 
the broader western community, as "nearly 800 miles due west 
of Winnipeg, forty-eight miles south-west from Lethbridge, 
and twenty miles north of the international boundary or the 
49th parallel. A semi-weekly stage plies between Cardston 
and Lethbridge our most convenient railway station." The 
same article also noted ~hat Cardston had more than one 
thousand residents and was close to the settlements of Aetna, 
Leavitt and Mountain View.~ Interestingly, no mention was 
made of the Blood reserve which in 1897 had a population of 
73 Hugh Dempsey, Red Crow, pp. 183 ff. 
74 Cardston Record, August 6, 1898, p. 1. 
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1,300i5 making it the largest community in the vicinity next 
to Lethbridge. ih 
Unlike Fort Macleod, the town of Cardston did increase 
its commercial influence in southern Alberta and became the 
dominant trading centre in the area around the Blood Reserve. 
The Blood and Peigan reserves to the north and west of 
Cardston separated the town from Euro-Canadian settlement to 
the west creating a 'sub-region• which Cardston dominated. 
Spared from competition and stimulated by railways, 
irrigation, sugar beet growing and chosen as the religious 
centre of Mormonism, Cardston grew apace.~ 
Like other western towns Cardston was infected by 
boosterism, and businessmen demanded support from townspeople 
and government alike in their drive for growth and 
development. The local press and boards of trade were the 
foremost boosters of town progress as they identified 
community and business interests as one. This was reflected 
in their opposition to the mail order business and their 
support of "shop local" campaigns. At the same time their 
activities flew in the face of the need to acquire a 
75 House of Commons Debates, vol. 1, 1909, col. 1005. 
76 Lethbridge's population in 1901 was 2,072. Wetherell 
and Kmet, Town Life, p. 305. 
77 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, p. 81-82. 
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hinterland and attract business from the periphery. This in 
turn was reflected in the establishment of chain storesi8 and 
in Cardston's bid for unimpeded access across the Blood 
Reserve in order to access communities to the west. As 
urbanization increased in the 1930s and the trend to fewer 
towns emergedil) it became more important to be efficient and 
accessible in order to attract commerce. The lobbying 
efforts made by Macleod and Cardston to have the Blood and 
Peigan reserves sold and turned into homesteads reflected 
this emphasis on growth and development.~' 
Raymond 
Unlike Fort Macleod and Cardston, Raymond, to the west 
of the Blood reserve was, from the very beginning, planned as 
a one industry town. It was the centre of a sugar beet 
industry that would be the mainstay of the community and 
provide an export commodity to supply the sugar needs of the 
immediate area and beyond. 81 The industry, however, held its 
78 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, 124-125. p. 
79 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, 87. p. 
80 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, 91. p. 
8l L.A. Rosenvall, ''The Transfer Of Mormon Culture," pp. 
142-143. 
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brightest promise only in its planning stages, sustaining it 
proved to be a frustrating and in the end bitter experience. 82 
Initially, however, sugar beet cultivation brought 
Raymond stable and sustained growth. By 1906 it was the 
largest Mormon town in southern Alberta with a population of 
1,500~3 and it soon began to rival Cardston as the centre of 
the Mormon religion in Canada. But lacking Cardston's 
history, it also lacked its influence, and when Cardston was 
chosen as the site of the Mormon temple, Raymond's secondary 
status was confirmed.~ 
Interaction between Raymond and the Blood reserve 
revolved primarily around the need of the sugar beet industry 
for a stable labour supply to work the beet fields, 
especially during the fall harvest. Large groups of Bloods 
made the trip to Raymond to engage in wage labour during the 
period of 1903-1915. It is reasonable to assume that there 
would have been commercial interaction between the Bloods and 
Raymond businesses during times of Blood presence in the 
town, but this is by no means certain. Little evidence 
82 Town of Raymond, Settlers. Sugar And Stampedes: 
Raymond Remembered (Raymond: Town of Raymond, 1993), p. 4-
37. 
83 Brigham Y. Card, "The Canadian Mormon Settlements, 
1886-1925: A North-American Perspective," Canadian Ethnic 
Studies, XXVI, No. 1 (1994), p. 25. 
84 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, p. 82. 
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appears in either the local press or government documents to 
shed much light on the subject. 
Lethbridge 
Lethbridge, although occasionally mentioned in this 
work, has not figured prominently in any formal economic 
relationship with the Blood reserve. Both agency and Native 
business activities were concentrated in Fort Macleod and 
Cardston, especially the latter. 
Conclusion 
Ranchers and later settlers entered this region with 
pre-conceived notions about its climate and about how the 
environment could best be made to serve their various 
interests. The Bloods too were forced to rethink their 
strategies regarding the utility of the land. Precipitation, 
temperatures, water resources and soil ultimately determined 
that without artificial assistance such as irrigation, the 
area was best suited to ranching. How many cattle to how 
much land, however, remained problematic even while providing 
the Bloods with employment and income opportunities. The 
abundant coal of the region also did much to determine the 
economy of the region and the Bloods' place in it. Reserve, 
ranch and farm, town and village, were adaptations to a 
common environment that required and encouraged cooperation. 
76 
Chapter 3 
"Free Range Or Private Property": Integrating Blood Reserve 
Land into the Ca..unity 
Introduction 
Once established there was considerable pressure on the 
Bloods to lease their reserve land to the non-Native 
community. This pressure was tied to the perception that the 
Bloods possessed land in excess of their needs and more than 
they were entitled to hold. The Bloods and their leaders, 
however, refused to recognize these views. They also refused 
to recognize arbitrary attempts by the Department of Indian 
Affairs to unilaterally determine the disposition of Blood 
property. Consequently there was conflict between the Bloods 
and the DIA. The Bloods and their agents were determined to 
guide the reserve's economic development while the DIA was 
set on its course of 'civilization' for the Bloods. However, 
one fact remains clear, during the development of the economy 
of the region between 1880 and 1939, there was little, if 
any, decline in demands by Whites for access to the reserve 
and its resources. Under such circumstances the guardianship 
responsibility of the DIA for the Bloods and their property 
was put to the test. 
This chapter has two interrelated themes. The first is 
a discussion of changing perceptions of the economic value 
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and utility of land use in southern Alberta. 1 Integral to 
this analysis is how increased demands for more land resulted 
from these changes. Consequently the Blood reserve was 
integrated into the non-Natives' land use schemes. Although 
the focus here is on a small region of southern Alberta these 
changes were but a microcosm of larger trends in land use 
affecting the great plains region of the continent. 2 The 
second theme is centered on the decision making procedures 
employed by the Bloods and the DIA to determine the role the 
reserve played in local land use schemes. 
An important and largely unexplored aspect of this 
economic agenda for Native reserves is the management of land 
and resources. The reserves were central to the overall 
policy of having Natives pay their own way. Why then was the 
use of the Bloods' land so often manipulated to suit the 
needs or demands of their White neighbours despite their 
protests? The Blood people clearly understood Whites' 
desires and the government's intentions and only their 
staunch defense of their rights prevented more interference 
in reserve affairs. They were not reluctant to enlist the 
1 For a detailed discussion of these developments see 
A.A. den Otter, "Adapting The Environment: Ranching, 
Irrigation, And Dry Land Farming In Southern Alberta, 1880-
1914," Great Plains Quarterly, 6 (Summer, 1986), pp. 171-189. 
2 For one aspect of this see Lawrence B. Lee, "The 
Canadian-American Irrigation Frontier, 1884-1914," 
Agricultural History, 40 (October, 1966). 
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aid of their agent in attempts to repeal or soften the DIA's 
determination to adhere to its set agenda. In conjunction 
with their agent, the Blood chiefs, headmen and concerned 
individuals achieved some limited success in influencing the 
policies that were to affect them. Their efforts ensured 
that their will could not be entirely ignored and that they 
had influence. 
Pressures resulting from competition for space, 
initially among ranchers, and subsequently caused by 
increasing population and environmental factors, brought 
about the first attempts to gain access to the resources of 
the Blood reserve. The onset of farming and mixed farming in 
turn increased the demand for the land of the reserve. 
Competition from settlers and towns near the reserve placed 
additional pressure on the reserve's borders. By the first 
decade of the Twentieth century the reserve faced demands not 
only from non-Natives but also from the Bloods' own economic 
development objectives. The Bloods' awareness of the 
reserve's economic value also influenced their development of 
access policies. These contending forces, in one form or 
another, carried through to the end of the Great Depression. 
Properly the Bloods may be seen as important players in 
the local industries into which their land base was 
integrated. The non-Native view of the Bloods and their 
reserve was as resources which could be used either to 
relieve the growing need for more land or exploited for the 
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benefits of the White community. The Bloods' decisions, and 
those of the Department of Indian Affairs on their behalf, to 
a large degree determined the character of the ranching 
industry and later the mixed farming enterprise in the 
southern Alberta locale surrounding the Blood reserve. 
Eventually the Blood tribe, by renting their land to those in 
need of extra grazing or hay range and through attempts to 
forestall illegal access, helped determine the nature of the 
resultant economic association. 
The second theme regards decision-making by the Bloods. 
Such decisions, often communicated through their reserve 
agent and the DIA, also determined the role the reserve 
played in unfolding local circumstances. The main economic 
objective for administering Indians was to make them 
economically self-sufficient. 3 The government believed that 
the best way to achieve this end was to encourage the Indians 
to become 'peasant farmers' on forty acre lots~ and thus to 
3 For a discussion of overall policy see E. Brian 
Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott And The 
Administration Of Indian Affairs In Canada (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1986), pp. 37-59. 
4 The best discussion of this policy to date is Sarah 
Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers And 
Government Policy (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1990), especially chapters 3, 5, and 6: Sara Carter, 
"Two Acres and a Cow: Peasant Farming for the Indians of the 
North-west, 1889-1897," Canadian Historical Review 70, No. 1 
(1989), pp. 27-52. E. Brian Titley also discusses this 
policy. E. Brian Titley, "Hayter Reed and Indian 
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make more appropriate 'civilized' use of their land. The DIA 
imposed paternalistic regulations on the Bloods, and their 
land, which were often beyond the Indians' efforts to modify 
or control. 
Initial Arranqemen~s: ~he Ranching Bra 
Indians, and in the case of the Bloods, their extensive 
land holdings, have not been credited with any positive 
formative or lasting influences on ranching commerce. One 
historian remarked that the Blood Indians were, because of 
their poverty following the decimation of the plains bison, 
"probably the greatest potential danger" to early cattle 
interests. 5 During the initial phase of the ranching 
frontier, prairie Indians were regarded by the ranchers and 
their supporters as the bane of the ranching industry, on par 
with destructive and severe weather conditions. It matters, 
of course, that this danger was never realized and historians 
have generally rescued the Natives from the negative 
Administration in the West," in R.C. Macleod (ed), Swords and 
Ploughshares: War And Agriculture In Western Canada 
(Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 1993), pp. 121-123. 
5 Sheilagh s. Jameson, "The Ranching Industry of western 
Canada: Its Initial Epoch, 1873-1910," Prairie Forum 11, 
No. 2 (Fall 1986), p. 233. On this theme see also Edward 
Brado, Cattle Kingdom: Early Ranching In Alberta 
(Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre, 1984), pp. 43, 171-175; Paul 
F. Sharp, Whoop-Up Country: The Canadian-American West, 
1865-1885 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), pp. 
242-243. 
impression left by often groundless complaints of a small 
minority of ranching interests. 6 
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Among the first of the large Canadian ranching concerns 
was the Cochrane Ranche Company, headed by Senator Matthew H. 
Cochrane, who successfully convinced Prime Minister John A. 
Macdonald of the utility of his cattle raising proposals for 
the prairie grasslands. Indeed early lease regulations were 
redesigned, in 1881, around Senator Cochrane's request for 
legislation favouring ranching ventures. This legislation 
established a lease period of 21 years, with public lands 
closed to settlement except at the discretion of the 
government. Leases were set at a maximum of 100,000 acres, a 
stipulation which could be circumvented by registering in 
several names or through subsidiary companies.; These lease 
arrangements reflected the mid-1880's belief, based on 
6 David H. Breen, "The Turner Thesis and the Canadian 
West: A Closer Look at the Ranching Frontier,'' in Lewis H. 
Thomas (ed.), Essays on Western Histo~, (Edmonton: The 
University of Alberta Press, 1976), p. 149~ David H. Breen, 
The Canadian Prairie West and the Ranching Frontier 1874-1924 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 85; John 
Jennings, "Policemen And Poachers: Indian Relations On The 
Ranching Frontier," in A.W. Rasporich and Henry Klassen 
(eds.), Frontier Calgary: Town. City. and Region 1875-1914 
(Calgary: McClelland and Stewart West, 1975), pp. 88-90: 
John Nelson Jennings, "The North West Mounted Police And 
Indian Policy, 1874-96," (Ph.D., University of Toronto: 
1979), pp. 196-201. 
7 Simon M. Evans, "The Passing Of A Frontier: Ranching 
In the Canadian West, 1882-1912," (Calgary: Ph.D. Thesis, 
1976), pp. 79-80. 
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previous plains exploration, that the region was fit only for 
a grazing economy.~ 
As significant parcels of public land in the North West 
Territories were taken in leasehold demand for grazing space 
grew. The Macleod Gazette, April 28, 1893, revealed that 
1,680,964 acres was given over to grazing on the prairies. 
The numbers of stock on these lands were given at 139,283 
cattle, 20,579 horses and 86,087 sheep.') In fact, during 
their peak the four largest ranching enterprises leased 
nearly one-third of land in the southwestern prairies, 
practically all the foothills region from Cochrane south 
being held in lease or homestead. 10 
The western plains, however, were a lure to many others 
who saw their economic salvation and prosperity in the vast 
open spaces. It was certain, therefore, that the cattlemen 
could not long protect their leases from the challenges of 
farmers. It was equally certain that government policies 
would have to change in response to differing circumstances. 
Indeed a 'bitter struggle' between ranchers and homesteaders 
8 Evans, The Passing Of A Frontier, pp. 73-76. 
9 The major lease holders for the prairies were given 
as; D. McEachran, 16,391 acres; Cochrane 73,000, 60,000 and 
33,000; New Oxley Canada Ranch Co., 80,000, 62,934, 7,000, 
100,000; Waldron Ranche Co. 100,000. Macleod Gazette, April 
28, 1893. 
10 Jameson, "The Ranching Industry,n pp. 234-235. 
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for control of the public lands ensued and resulted in the 
leases being opened to settlement in 1892. 11 
By the 1890s ranchers needed no convincing that the 
increased demand for land threatened the survival of their 
operations. The hostility of farmer settlers and the public 
alike had resulted in the announcement in 1891, of the 
planned termination of all closed leases by the end of 1896.LL 
Land grants to the Calgary and Edmonton Railway, in 1892, 
both reduced and disrupted the leases 13 driving the tenants to 
seek other outlets. The election of the Liberals in 1896 saw 
the formation of a government sympathetic to both the wishes 
of farmers and the ideals of agrarian life. The Minister of 
the Interior, Clifford Sifton, actively supported the 
establishment of irrigation projects to increase settlement 
and prairie agricultural potential. 1~ Only the creation of 
stock water reserves around crucial bodies of water and the 
l l den Otter, "Adapting The Environment," p. 173. 
12 David H. Breen, "The Canadian Prairie West And The 
'Harmonious' Settlement Interpretation," Agricultural 
History XLVII No. 1 (January 1973), p. 72. 
13 Jameson, "The Ranching Industry," p. 239; Evans, 
"Spatial Aspects, '' p. 52. 
14 A.A. Den Otter, "Adapting The Environment," pp. 175, 
178. 
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prohibition of settlement ensured the continued viability of 
ranching enterprises in many areas. 
Encouraged by favourable Canadian Government legislation 
Cochrane cattle on the Bow River in late 1881. 15 This 
heralded the arrival of large cattle interests, businesses 
that leased tens of thousands of acres of land and ran herds 
of cattle numbering in the tens of thousands. These large 
concerns directly competed with the small stock holders, many 
of whom engaged in mixed farming and ran small herds of up to 
forty cattle. They now found their positions considerably 
weakened. lh The large Blood Reserve bordering the Cochrane 
lease grant on the east, but separated by the Belly River, 
must certainly have looked inviting in the face of 
competitive pressure. As a result, the reserve soon figured 
prominently in the Cochrane Company's operational planning. 
15 Breen, Ranching Frontier, pp. 16-19. On the 
regulations see Chester Martin, "Dominion Lands'' Policy 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973), p. 179. 
16 Breen, Ranching Frontier, pp. 19-20. There is no 
clear delineation between 'large' and 'small' ranching. The 
above is taken from discussion in W.M. Elofson, "Not Just a 
Cowboy: the Practice of Ranching in Southern Alberta, 1881-
1914," in Donald Akenson (ed.) Canadian Papers In Rural 
History, Volume X (Gananoque: Langdale Press, 1996), pp. 
206-212; Philip s. Long, The Great Canadian Range (Calgary: 
Bonanza Books Ltd., 1970), p. 4. On the era of the big 
ranches dominated by the 'big four' see Sheilagh s. Jameson, 
"The CPR and the Ranching Industry of the West," in Hugh A. 
Dempsey (ed.), The CPR West: The Iron Road And The Making Of 
A Nation (Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre, 1984), pp. 76-77. 
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Cochrane Ranche cattle, driven by the need for more 
land, were already grazing the Blood Reserve in 1885 after an 
informal contract was initiated with the Bloods. 17 As early 
as 1884, only three years after the arrival of the Cochrane 
herd, grazing land was at a premium as the big four carved 
out large leases and numerous other companies and individuals 
rushed to seize title to what was left. 1K The Cochrane 
Ranche, at this time the only large company with unimpeded 
access to the Bloods' land, regarded the reserve as a natural 
extension of their own grazing lease. 19 This approach was 
later taken by many settlers bordering the reserve. The 
company was also driven to extend its competitive edge in the 
17 Glenbow Alberta Institute (GAI), file 2, Diary of 
W.F. Cochrane, Cochrane Ranch, entries for January 20, 22, 
and 23, 1885. Informal for the Cochrane Ranche as there is 
no indication of written agreement. The Bloods, however, 
likely considered the agreement legal and binding. 
18 Simon Evans has expertly detailed these developments. 
Simon Evans, "Spatial Aspects Of The Cattle Kingdom: The 
First Decade, 1882-1892," in Rasporich and Klassen (eds.), 
Frontier Calgary, pp. 41-50. On American incursions see 
Simon M. Evans, "American Cattlemen on the Canadian Range, 
1874-1914," Prairie Forum, 4, no. 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 123-
126; Jameson, "The CPR," p. 77. 
19 In fact by 1885 all land bordering the reserve on the 
north and west was leased and by 1886 significant blocks to 
the east of the reserve were taken. Evans, "Spatial 
Aspects," pp. 44-51. Jameson says that government policy and 
encroachment from settlers were the main factors at work in 
killing off the Cochrane's major sheep ranching operations 
under the guise of the British American Ranche Company. 
Jameson, "The Ranching Industry," pp. 232-233. 
face of severe setbacks in the first years of operation 
brought on by poor management decisions worsened by bad 
weather.Lo 
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The first lessons were brutal and clear; the apparently 
limitless land was indeed limited and so was its cattle 
sustaining capacity. The same range could not be used for 
summer and winter foraging and it could not be used at all 
during extended dry periods or if ravaged by fire. It was an 
immediate circumstance that necessitated the initial 
arrangement with the Blood tribe namely the need to graze 
Cochrane cattle on the south end of the reserve because of 
the burned ground on the north end of the Cochrane lease. 
From the Bloods' perspective the agreement was essential 
because their attempts to keep Cochrane cattle from invading 
the unfenced reserve had been futile.n After some difficulty 
20 Sharp, Whoop-Up Country, p. 238; Jameson, "The CPR,'' 
p. 76; Sheilagh s. Jameson, .. Era of the Big Ranches," in Hugh 
A. Dempsey (ed.), The Best From Alberta Histo~ (Saskatoon: 
Western Producer Prairie Books, 1981), p. 56. Denny says 
that during the winter of 1882-83 Cochrane lost about 8,000 
cattle to adverse weather conditions and that by 1884 there 
were 40,000 range animals in southern Alberta. By May, 1885 
that number had increased to 60,000. Sir Cecil Denny, March 
of the Mounties (Surrey: Heritage House Publishing Co. Ltd., 
1994), pp. 132, 152. American historian William T. Hagan has 
discovered that some American Indian reservations were 
similarly invaded by large and small cattle interests 
determined to avail of the grazing resources the reserves 
offered. William T. Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations: 
The Reservation Years (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1990), pp. 150-53, 175-76, 236-40. 
21 GAI, File 2, Cochrane Ranche Letterbook, W.F. 
87 
caused by the absence of Chief Red Crow, one of the most 
influential chiefs, from the initial negotiations, a deal was 
struck.L2 The benefits were soon apparent, Cochrane later 
reporting that the cattle were doing well on the reserve's 
good feed.~ This arrangement eventually soured when Cochrane 
voiced suspicion that some Bloods were killing range cattle.L~ 
These setbacks did not become a permanent barrier to 
arrangements between the Cochrane Ranche and the Blood 
reserve. Cochrane cattle needed the grazing space and the 
Bloods needed the beef rations. In February, 1890, Blood 
Agent William Pocklington, initiated a meeting between Red 
Crow and W.F. Cochrane regarding an accommodation. Red Crow 
voiced no opposition to grazing Cochrane cattle on reserve 
land, and even expressed a willingness to forgo payment. He 
cited as his reason the fact that Cochrane cattle were used 
Cochrane to J.M. Browining, February 15, 1885. 
22 GAI, File 2, Diary of W.F. Cochrane, Cochrane Ranch, 
entry for January 21, 25 and 27. 
23 GAI, File 2, Cochrane Ranch Letterbook, W.F. Cochrane 
to J.M. Browning, February 7, 1885. 
24 GAI, File 2, Cochrane Ranch Letterbook, W.F. Cochrane 
to J.M. Browning, August 18, 1885; Diary of W.F. Cochrane, 
Cochrane Ranch, entries for March 26, May 11. In these cases 
the Indians were never identified but the Bloods are likely 
suspects. Relations with and attitudes towards the Natives 
varied, the Cochrane personnel being among the most frequent 
complainers. See Brado, Cattle Kingdom, pp. 171-175; Breen, 
Ranching Frontier, p. 85; Sharp, Whoop-Up Country, pp. 241-
243. 
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to supply the Blood beef rations. 5 Red Craw's understanding 
of the relationship between his people and the Cochrane 
Ranche Company, vis a vis the Department of Indian Affairs, 
is unclear. It is possible that Red Crow incorrectly felt 
that the source of the Bloods' rations came with obligations 
to the company. If Agent William Pocklington let any such 
misunderstanding influence the negotiations with the Cochrane 
Ranche, the agent was remiss in his obligations to protect 
the Bloods' interests. A s~ilar arrangement for the 
placement of two hundred cattle on the reserve was concluded 
in August of 1890, but this time the company agreed to 
purchase all the hay Blood farmers and harvesters could 
provide. Ll• By December relations with the Bloods had again 
soured and Agent James Wilson requested that the company 
remove its cattle from the reserve or face "less agreeable" 
means of encouragement to do so.a 
The value of the Blood Reserve's vast open spaces were, 
by 1891, recognized by other ranchers and illegal incursions 
onto the reserve land became frequent. When Indian 
25 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1557, pp. 444-446, W. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, February 18, 1890. 
J6 
- NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 406, w. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, August 3, 1891. 
27 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p • 643, Indian Agent to 
Manager, Cochrane Ranche Co., December 30, 1891. 
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Commissioner Hayter Reed visited the reserve Blood 
representatives complained about cattle improperly placed on 
their reservation and demanded removal. Agent Pocklington 
duly wrote the Maunsell Brothers, Macleod, to remove their 
stock, 2~ and similar requests were made of at least eleven 
others who the agent believed to be the offenders including 
the Cochrane Ranche Company. 2lJ Agent Pocklington reported 
that responses were favourable. -~1 
Such incursions were not easily prevented despite the 
assurances of the offending parties to remedy the problem. 
In the case of small stockmen and homesteaders these 
offenses, at least in the view of the offenders, were 
necessary. David H. Breen points out that, after the advent 
of the commercial ranching ventures with their large areas of 
lease, small ranchers with little capital were left with no 
option except speculative ranging on increasingly limited 
free space. 31 Homesteaders and townsfolk, in the search of 
28 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 380, w. Pocklington to 
Maunsell Bros., July 23, 1891. 
29 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558 p. 381, w. Pocklington to 
James McNab, July 23, 1891; pp. 382-390, W. Pocklington to 
Browning Brothers, July 23, 1891. 
30 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, pp. 449-451, w. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, August 31, 1891. 
31 h. . 20 h Breen, Ranc ~ng FrontJ.er, p. ; Jameson, "T e 
Ranching Industry," pp. 234-235. 
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subsistence and profits therefore lacked adequate 'free 
space' to increase the scale of their operations. Sitting on 
the borders of, in their view, the underutilized Blood 
reserve it was natural for settlers to regard the area as 
part of their sphere of exploitation. 
This certainly appears to be the rationale in the case 
of two settlers, identified only by the surname Arnold, who 
sometime in 1893, moved into the area of Boundary Creek and 
leased one hundred and ten acres. They owned about five 
hundred head of horses and cattle and, according to a 
complaint from Blood Indian Day Chief, were making 
unauthorized use of the reserve for grazing. When challenged 
by Agent James Wilson the Arnolds responded that access to 
their land could only be had across the reserve as a 
consequence of their being hemmed in by other settlers' 
fences and a cut-bank. 3z What is not clear is whether or not 
the Arnolds selected their land knowing that they would be 
forced in the direction of the reserve or simply hoped to 
make the best of the opportunities that proximity to the 
reserve afforded. Wilson detected some prevarication on the 
part of the Arnolds believing that despite their protested 
need of right of way "There is not the slightest doubt that 
32 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, pp. 498-499, James Wilson to 
Hayter Reed, October 2, 1893. 
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these men mean to hold their stock on the Reserve ••• "33 
Similarly agent Wilson had to order T. Curry, Lethbridge, to 
remove his 'large' number of cattle from the reserve or face 
having the Bloods drive them out at their convenience.~ 
Little wonder that, by 1893, Agent Wilson believed the 
area in the vicinity of the reserve was "over[run] with 
cattle." 35 Trespass frustrated many of the reserve's 
residents and they resorted to expelling cattle from the 
reserve, straining relations with ranchers and settlers still 
further and inevitably receiving the blame for cattle losses 
that could be ascribed to other factors.~ In March, 1893, 
the Gazette railed against Indians roaming the countryside 
killing cattle, and called for the implementation of a pass 
system. The Gazette was willing to see the establishment of 
33 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, pp. 498-499, James Wilson to 
Hayter Reed, October 2, 1893. 
34 NAC, RG 10, val. 1559, pp. 88-89, James Wilson to T. 
Curry, January 20, 1893. 
35 NAC, RG 10, val. 1559, pp. 546-547, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, November 13, 1893. 
36 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3894, file 97,443, Hayter Reed toT. 
Mayne Dayly, January 6, 1893. Macinnes says that the Indians 
killed cattle in protest because they strayed onto the 
reserves. I found no evidence that this was the case with 
the Bloods. C.M. Macinnes, In The Shadow Of The Rockies 
(London: Rivingtons, 1930), p. 163. On trespass see also 
NAC, RG 10, val. 1560, pp. 502-503, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, Sept. 18, 1894; p. 549, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, October 9, 1894. 
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a punitive system that restricted Native rights and liberties 
and opined that .. any Indian found off his reserve without a 
pass, ..• should be promptly arrested; ..... 37 Needless to say, 
such restrictive laws were not intended to be applied to 
White settlers. Charges of large-scale Native cattle killing 
went unproved. According to Agent Wilson there was only one 
case of cattle killing by Bloods reported in the month 
previous to March 16, 1893 •. ;M In August, however, eighteen 
Indians were committed to stand trial at Macleod for cattle 
killing . .i'} Strangely Wilson reversed his position and came to 
believe that the Indians killed three hundred and fifty head 
37 Macleod Gazette, March 24, 1893. F. Laurie Barron 
argues that the pass system had its origins in Hayter Reed's 
desire to curb the movements of the Natives. If so he struck 
on a policy that many in the ranching community agreed with. 
F. Laurie Barron, "The Indian Pass System in the Canadian 
West, 1882-1935," Prairie Forum, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 
1988), pp. 27-29. 
38 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3894, file 97,443, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, March 16, 1893. Interestingly a report 
in the Calgary Herald on the formation of an association of 
stockmen for "mutual protection" did not list Indians as a 
factor in cattle losses. Clipping in RG 10, vol. 3894, file 
97,443. See also; RG 10, vol. 3894, file 97,443, A.E. Forget 
to Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, June 16, 
1894; S.B. Steele to Commissioner, North West Mounted Police, 
June 9, 1894. 
39 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3894, file, 97,443, A.E. Forget to 
Hayter Reed, August 8, 1894. See also Hugh A. Dempsey, The 
Amazing Death of Calf Shirt: And Other Blackfoot Stories 
(Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishing, 1994), pp. 115-116. Of 
the 18, 16 were convicted and two were released in return for 
evidence against the others. John Nelson Jennings, "The 
North West Mounted Police And Indian Policy, 1874-96," 
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each year.~J There seems to be no evidence to support this 
belief and the case mentioned above was an exception to the 
fact that the Indians were not large-scale rustlers. 
At times adverse environmental conditions affected the 
reserve, as in a severe dry spell in the fall of 1894 which 
heightened Bloods ranchers' concern for their substantial 
horse herds and their rudimentary cattle interests. 41 Not 
only could the Blood ranchers not offer relief to others but 
they were themselves forced to seek off-reserve grazing; 
thereby bringing them into direct competition with settlers 
and ranchers looking for assistance from Dominion lands. The 
non-Native community•s reluctance to accept that Native 
ranchers had equal access to non-leased Dominion lands 
between the Belly and Kootenai Rivers brought Agent Wilson to 
their defense. Wilson cited hardship and expected loss of 
(University of Toronto, Ph.D., 1979), p. 304. 
40 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3894, file, 97,443, James Wilson to 
DIA, August 4, 1894. 
41 Esther Goldfrank sets 1894 as the year three 
"influential men .. exchanged ponies for twenty three head of 
cattle. Esther s. Goldfrank, .. Administrative Programs And 
Changes In Blood Society During The Reserve Period," Applied 
Anthropology, Vol. 2 (January-March, 1943), p. 19. See also 
Esther S. Goldfrank, Changing Configuration in the Social 
Organization of a Blackfoot Tribe during the Reserve Period. 
The Bloods of Alberta. Canada (Seattle: University of 
washington Press, 1966), p. 22; Dempsey, Red Crow, p. 201. 
The horse herds were substantial enough to lose 250 head in a 
winter storm in 1892. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 863, A.G. 
Irvine to Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, July 29, 
1892. 
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stock if Dominion lands were denied the Bloods. He reminded 
critics that in similar circumstances in previous years, the 
Blood tribe had generously permitted stricken Whites access 
to the reserve. Consequently the Indians could not be 
expected to forsake the only free range. In conclusion he 
summed up the Bloods' view: "the Indians all very truly say 
it will be time enough for the white people to kick after 
they have taken their cattle off the reserve ••• ".Jl 
Within the area around the Blood reserve both co-
operation and competition forged an economic relationship 
based on land use and need. From its inception, the Bloods 
had seen their reserve drawn into the pool of grazing land to 
which ranchers and settlers expected access. The treaty 
rights of the Bloods to sole utilization had been ignored, 
even under protest, as circumstances beyond the reserve 
required. Contractual arrangements, when resorted to, were 
of a nature deemed by Whites as informal, and in many cases 
no such arrangements were attempted. The Bloods complained 
and the agents, within the limits of their capacity, or will, 
acted. Attitudes and exigencies, however, mitigated against 
easy or permanent solutions. No man-made physical structure 
set the Blood reserve apart. Furthermore, non-Natives did 
not regard the Belly and St. Mary's Rivers as borders 
42 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, pp. 620-623, James Wilson to 
Superintendent, N.W.M. Police, Macleod, November 24, 1894. 
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delineating absolute separation of the reserve from grazing 
leases and the commons or land that was an open exploitable 
resource. 
Taking Control 
The first decade and a half resulted in the reserve's 
ready accommodation of the grazing needs of non-Natives. The 
results were, however, far from satisfactory, and resulted, 
in June 1895, in a shift in policy formulated by Agent James 
Wilson. The new approach attempted to deal with the 
aggravating, and sometimes serious, problem of livestock 
trespass onto the reserve. The pressure exerted on reserve 
lands by its location in a "grazing district" and the 
inability to stop encroachments, dictated that a readjustment 
in the relationship between the Bloods and their neighbours 
be attempted.~ At the limits of their endurance, and likely 
concerned about the well-being of their own small cattle herd 
established the previous year,~ Blood leaders and ranchers 
were determined to forge a more formal and financially 
rewarding relationship with those companies or individuals 
wishing to use reserve land and resources. 
43 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, pp. 948-954, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, June 10, 1895. 
44 Fraser Taylor, Standing Alone: A Contempor~ 
Blackfoot Indian (Halfmoon Bay: Arbutus Bay Publications, 
1989), p. 31. 
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Agent Wilson identified two classes of trespass; 1. 
those invading the reserve in search of feed, 2. those unable 
to confine their stock to their own lands. The former posed 
the greatest threat and chief among the villains, in Wilson's 
opinion, were the Mormon settlers at Cardston. To counter 
the problems Wilson intended charging grazing dues for summer 
and winter grazing. The levying of dues would, he 
anticipated, make owners more cautious about the whereabouts 
of their stock and substantially reduce the first kind of 
trespass. Wilson assumed that as the Bloods acquired more 
cattle of their own they would take more interest in keeping 
the stock of others off the reserve.~ Wilson had little 
trouble convincing Red Crow and his followers of the 
soundness of the plan.~ He also approached the surrounding 
settlers with the proposed policy change.~ 
The response was much as Wilson had anticipated and 
indicated a determined reluctance among ranchers and settlers 
to pay for that which they had previously acquired for free.~ 
45 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, pp. 948-954, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, June 10, 1895. 
46 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1561, PP· 395-397, James Wilson to 
The Indian Commissioner, Winnipeg, January 11, 1896. 
47 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1561, PP· 395-397, James Wilson to 
The Indian Commissioner, Winnipeg, January 11, 1896. 
48 To one settler on the Upper St. Mary's he wrote; "Red 
Crow says ••• he never gave you any authority to put your 
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Cardston's residents proved to be the most difficult. 
Initially they agreed to pay but only after striking a 
committee to meet with Wilson to discuss terms.~ In January 
1897, Charles o. Card, the leader of the Cardston settlers, 
wrote Wilson requesting an exemption from grazing dues for 
the previous season.~> This reluctance to pay was based on 
the argument that they owned mostly dairy cattle which grazed 
only during the day and therefore consumed less feed than 
range cattle. As a result the settlers believed they were 
not getting good value for their grazing dollar. Wilson, 
knowing that some of the settlers were poor, recommended to 
the Commissioner that those who could afford it be charged at 
15 cents per head for half a year, while the others would be 
cattle on [the reserve] and does not see why payment should 
be refused." NAC, RG 10, vol. 1561, pp. 501-502, James 
Wilson to Mr. Pat Masson[?], March 2, 1896. See also RG 10, 
val. 3894, file, 97,443, James Wilson to Indian Commissioner, 
January 11, 1896; RG 10, vol. 1561, pp. 527-31, Conrad 
Brothers also expressed reluctance to pay rents. James 
Wilson to Indian Commissioner, March 10, 1896. 
49 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1561, pp. 527-31, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, March 10, 1896. 
50 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1562, p. 316, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, February 24, 1897. Wilson may have, in part, 
been responsible for this situation with the Mormons as a 
result of a non-verbal agreement reached with them in 
February of the previous year when, after a meeting with C.O. 
Card and a committee, he agreed to "be as lenient as his 
superiors would let him'' and agreed to accept fifty cents per 
head per annum for grazing. D.G. Godfrey and Brigham Y. Card 
(eds.), The Diaries Of Charles Ora Card: The Canadian Years 
1886-1903 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993), 
p. 329. 
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given free grazing. 51 While awaiting approval, Wilson 
requested from the settlers the full dues levy, of fifty 
cents per head per annum, and cautioned Cardston residents 
against putting cattle on the reserve without a license. 5l 
There was also other potential for loss of grazing 
revenue. Wilson warned a resident of Kipp that since he did 
not wish to officially avail himself of the privilege of 
grazing his "large number of cattle" on the reserve he must 
remove them or have them seized under Section 22 of the 
Indian Act. 53 And there were other reluctant ranchers • .5-' The 
files reveal that 17 individuals owned 51 cattle which had 
been paid for but there were 130 cattle still to be collected 
on for a total of 181. 55 This accounting did not include 
51 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1562, pp. 387-389, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, March 17, 1897. Wilson did not indicate 
how he planned to determine who could and could not afford to 
pay. 
52 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1572, pp. 480-481, James Wilson to 
Sterling Williams, April 27, 1897. c.o. Card wrote Wilson 
regarding the matter but the nature of the response is 
unknown. Godfrey and Card (eds.), Charles Ora Card, p. 405. 
53 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1562, pp. 332-333, James Wilson to 
[?], Kipp, Alberta, March 2, 1897. 
54 NAC, RG 10, Vol. 1562, pp. 335 - 337, James Wilson 
to Mr. Smith, March 2, 1897; James Wilson to Mr. Whitney, 
March 2, 1897; p. 493, James Wilson to Indian Commissioner, 
April 30, 1897; p. 379, James Wilson to Indian Commissioner, 
March 15, 1897. 
55 See information in NAC, RG 10, vol. 1562, p. 482. 
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those owned by larger concerns such as the Oxley Ranche which 
brought the total to 968 head. 56 The easily breached reserve 
boundaries, the termination of the no settlement leases57 and 
the election of Wilfrid Laurier•s Liberal government with its 
settler friendly policies in 1896, 5M gave added impetus to the 
assault on the reserve•s integrity. 
The Bloods, however, were battling more than reluctant 
pocket books when they attempted to collect grazing dues. 
They often fell victim to the bottom line and to the 
attitudes many Anglo-Canadian settlers held towards Native 
peoples at this time. In July, 1897, Wilson successfully 
collected dues from A.R. Springett, New Oxley Ranche Company 
.. under protest. "59 In Agent Wilson • s opinion, Springett 
believed that because the reserve was unfenced the Bloods 
could not legally claim grazing dues for cattle wandering 
onto it or placed within its borders. Despite several 
56 For particulars see NAC, RG 10, vol. 1563, p. 29, 
Indian Agent to H.R. Springett, May 12, 1897; p. 30, Indian 
Agent to Glengarry Ranche, May 12, 1897. See letters from 
agent to various companies in RG 10, vol. 1563, pp. 31-34. 
The quality of the microfilm reproduction makes it difficult 
to read the names. 
57 Kirk N. Lambrecht, The Administration of Dominion 
Lands, 1870-1930 (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 
1991), p. 39. 
58 Jameson, "The Ranching Industry, .. p. 239. 
59 NAC, RG 10 vol. 1563, p. 168, James Wilson to Deputy 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, July 19, 1897. 
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conversations, Agent Wilson was unable to convince Springett 
of the legitimacy of the Bloods' request.w While he conceded 
that the lack of reserve fence contributed to the problem 
Wilson argued that Indians, unlike other settlers, were under 
no obligation to fence their land. Why he took this view is 
unclear but he was likely referring to the logistics and cost 
of fencing over five hundred square miles of land. He also 
pointed out that the Indian Act contained a section that 
protected reserves against trespass. He observed that the 
rules pertaining to stock districts contained in the North 
West Territories Ordinances did not apply to Native reserves. 
In conclusion Wilson pointed out: 
If exception were made in Mr. Springett's case 
where would the matter end? ••• The Reserve is 
surrounded by settlers and if an exception is made 
in one case then it must very soon apply to all and 
our Reserve would soon be over run ••• 
Wilson added that others in similar position to the Oxley 
Ranche preferred to pay dues to having their cattle classed 
as strays and driven from the reserve to starve somewhere 
unknown to their owners. He noted that "Mr. Springett must 
allow our right to remove cattle from the Reserve - fence or 
no fence - at any time and it is then surely a question of 
what is best for his own cattle and I have no doubt what his 
60 NAC, RG 10 vol. 1563, p. 169, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, July 19, 1897. 
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answer would be. "bl 
Blood leaders were unwillingly forced into the strategy 
of renting pasture to Whites who refused to respect the 
reserve boundaries and surreptitiously grazed their horses 
and cattle there. The annual grazing levy of fifty cents per 
head was a defensive strategy intended to make settlers keep 
their cattle on their own range or pay for the use of the 
reserve. However, Messers. Maunsell and Browning, Macleod, 
were of the opinion that living in a stock range country 
entitled them to certain privileges. Wilson refuted this 
argument claiming that .. the Indians['] Reserve is not free 
range but private property" for which use payment was 
required and threatened to have their cattle dispersed. hl 
The frequency with which the Blood agency had difficulty 
collecting legitimate grazing duesw suggests forces at work 
61 NAC, RG 10 vol. 1563, pp. 210-213, James Wilson to 
Indian commissioner, August 10, 1897. For a similar case 
also see pp. 257-258, James Wilson to Secretary, DIA, 
September 4, 1897. 
62 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, pp. 187-188, James Wilson to 
Messers Maunsell and Browning, December 27, 1898. See also 
pp. 197-198, James Wilson to E.A. Maunsell, January 13, 1899. 
On the inability to collect dues see; p. 193, Statement of 
Account with Alex McNab; p. 343, James Wilson to C.O. Card, 
June 20, 1899. 
63 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1563; pp. 371-374, James Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, October 26, 1897. See for example pp. 408-
410, James Wilson toR. Urch[?], November 10, 1897; James 
Wilson to Alexander McNabb, November 10, 1897; James Wilson 
to John [?],November 10, 1897. 
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other than the mere inability to pay. Attempts to collect 
resulted in evasion and denial of obligation. One possible 
explanation is that ranchers faced with the sodbuster 
invasion, and the attendant shrinkage of accessible Dominion 
lands, were driven to seek out alternate space and to protect 
grazing land through the setting aside of stock water 
reserves; that is land with accessable water reserved for the 
use of cattle. 
Ultimately, however, the security promised by such 
reserves proved transitory. The combination of irrigation 
technology and the science of dry land farming brought a 
"consensus among politicians, businessmen, and settlers ••• 
that the rangelands were suitable for cultivation. " 1~ 
Government policies reinforcing this belief had been put into 
place and when dry land techniques failed to meet 
expectations in years of drought, mixed farming came to be 
touted as an even better way to successfully cultivate the 
prairie. h.:l 
64 den Otter, "Adapting The Environment, .. p. 182. 
65 Paul Voisey has detailed the misplaced faith in mixed 
farming as a panacea for sure success in all areas. Paul 
Voisey, "A Mix-Up OVer Mixed Fanning: The Curious History Of 
The Agricultural Diversification Movement In A Single Crop 
Area Of Southern Alberta, " in David C. Jones and Ian 
MacPherson, Building Beyond the Homestead: Rural History On 
The Prairies (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985), 
pp. 179-206. 
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The rapidly growing population and surging economy in 
the period 1896-1913~ were, in part, due to Clifford Sifton. 
Sifton, as Minister of the Interior between 1896 and 1905, 
envisioned western agricultural development based on an 
expanding immigrant population that would eventually people 
the prairies with 15 to 20 million new citizens. 07 The 
trickle that began in the 1890s became a deluge by the first 
decade of the twentieth century.~ Americans, though not 
universally welcomed by those dedicated to the preservation 
of Canada's British characteristics, £f> figured prominently in 
66 The shifting demographics are nicely illustrated by 
R. Louis Gentilcore (ed.), Historical Atlas Of Canada: Vol. 
II, The Land Transformed 1800-1891 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993), Plate 35; Donald Kerr and Deryck w. 
Holdsworth (eds.), The Historical Atlas of Canada: Vol. III. 
Addressing the Twentieth Century 1891-1961 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1990), Plates 17 and 18. The 
Annual Mounted Police Report for Fort Macleod reported for 
1904 reported 329 entries for homesteads at the Fort Macleod 
land office from January 1 to November 30 and further 
observed that "In the Pincher Creek district, within a radius 
of twenty miles from the town, there is no land available for 
homesteading, some 200 settlers having taken up land there 
during the year." CSP 28, No. 12, 1905, p. 49. 
67 Clifford Sifton, "The Needs Of The Northwest," 
Canadian Magazine (Vol. XX, No. 5, March 1903), p. 426. 
68 Clara Middleton remembers greeting trainloads of 
settlers at the station in Crossfield Alberta. Clara and 
J.E. Middleton, Green Fields Afar: Memories Of Alberta Days 
(Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1947), p. 59. 
69 See for example Rev. Martin Holdom•s concerns about 
American immigration to the area around Castor Alberta. Paul 
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the quest for land. They, like hundreds of thousands of 
others, were lured by government advertising that promised 
"fat black land, cheap or even free, in the region of 
sufficient rainfall." in Though such promises were largely 
illusory in southwestern Alberta, immigration was a driving 
force that further threatened to displace ranchers.i1 Little 
wonder that hard pressed ranchers in the vicinity of the 
Blood reserve looked to the reserve to alleviate some of 
their growing concerns over inadequate pasture. 
Sifton's successor, Frank Oliver, removed any doubt 
about the government's vision of the future economic 
orientation of the Northwest. On assuming office in 1905 he 
took steps to cancel stock water reserves, "a complete 
reversal of departmental land policy in the grazing 
country. nil Oliver placed new emphasis on land for 
agricultural purposes as his restoration of pre-emption and 
second homestead privileges indicated.~ These policies 
Voisey (ed.), A Preacher's Frontier: The Castor, Alberta 
Letters of Rev. Martin w. Holdom. 1909-1912 (Calgary: 
Historical Society of Alberta, 1996), pp. 26, 29, 31. 
70 Theodore M. Knappen, "Winning The canadian west," 
Worlds Work (Vol. 10, 1905), p. 6598. 
?l w. McD Tait, "The New Canadian West," canadian 
Magazine (Vol. 43, No. 4,1914), pp. 349, 353. 
72 Breen, Ranching Frontier, p. 139. 
73 D.J. Hall, Clifford Sifton: Volume 2. The Lonely 
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apparently succeeded, as Alberta experienced a 412.6% 
increase in population in the decade between 1901 and 1911.;~ 
Thus the reserve came to be regarded as open territory 
to which settlers had a right without obligation. The view 
that the open expanse of the reserve was thus available 
reduced some of the anxiety and pressure caused by increasing 
settlement;5 and reinforced the notion of boundless space. 
This position was possible, however, only by the denial of 
the Blood's equality as people, and equality in possession of 
property. In this the settlers were buoyed by their own 
sense of superiority, and the Indian Act, which had 
established the legal wardship status of the Indians. 
Clearly some ranchers and settlers were determined to 
frustrate the Bloods' decision to set the agenda for reserve 
grazing privileges. They believed that the Blood tribe's 
claim to the land was not inviolate, and that they were under 
utilizing it, and therefore stood in the way of progress and 
the settlers' own pressing needs. 
Eminence 1901-1929 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1985), p. 192. 
74 w. Peter Ward, "Population Growth in Western Canada, 
1901-71," in John E. Foster (ed.) The Developing West 
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1983) p. 159. 
75 John Craig says that anxiety in the face of 
settlement led ranchers to purchase lands. John R. Craig, 
Ranching With Lords And Commons (New York: AMS Press, 1971), 
p.236. 
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The ranchers' fear and loathing of the newly developing 
agrarian frontier and its farmers illustrated the absolute 
necessity of the Blood reserve for grazing land. This was 
highlighted by the Cardston Record which observed in August, 
1898, that over 100 homestead entries had been made at the 
Cardston land office during the summer. The result was that 
once abundant grazing land was "converted into prosperous 
farms and ranches. Hundreds of miles of fence have been 
erected; hundreds of houses have been built and thousands of 
head of cattle and horses now subsist upon grass ••• "ih 
Now the cattle and horses of the homesteader, as well as 
the rancher, became a matter of concern for the Blood 
ranchers, farmers, haymakers and residents in general. 
Wilson warned local cattle owners that they would be forced 
to keep their stock off reserve land.~ There were, of 
course, occasions when horses or cattle strayed onto the 
reserve but the numbers that were continually brought to 
Wilson's attention could not simply be attributed to 
accidental straying.;s Likely the expansive size of the 
76 Cardston Record, August 13, 1898, p. 1. 
77 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, pp. 177-178, James Wilson to 
Walter Gleuse(?], December 20, 1898. For similar occurrences 
see p. 149, James Wilson to Messers Brigham and Wellman, 
November 11, 1898; pp. 179-180, James Wilson to Geo. Hauks, 
December 20, 1898. 
78 On December 24, 1898, Wilson wrote to R. Fuller of 
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reserve led some to believe that they could acquire free 
grazing either without being discovered, or before being 
eventually discovered. Homesteaders, while making the 
agrarian ethos a reality, themselves demanded land use beyond 
the boundaries of their 160 acre quarter section.~ 
By 1899 the pressure on public land caused by the 
declining acreage of open range was clear~), as was the belief 
among non-Natives of their pre-eminent right to what little 
remained. The attitude of one rancher/settler named Hillier 
Browning, Montana, about the possibility of Indian Department 
cattle or Blood Indian cattle which may have strayed across 
the border. In fairness, however, references of this kind 
were exceedingly rare in the DIA files. NAC, RG 10, vol. 
1564, p.98, James Wilson toR. Fuller, December 24, 1898; p. 
184, James Wilson to Jack Miller, December 23, 1898. 
i 9 That this was expected to be the case was recognized 
by the pre-emption clauses, though later rescinded, of the 
Dominion Lands Act. Lambrecht, The Administration of 
Dominion Lands, pp. 22-27. Paul Voisey notes "But even a 
half-section proved inadequate in the more arid southern 
parts of the prairies, and aided by mechanization, farmers 
began buying out their struggling neighbours." One must also 
consider the part played by speculation in the demand for 
land as discussed by Voisey. Paul Voisey, Vulcan: The 
Making of a Prairie Community (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 128, 33-52. The trend towards 
enlargement was also noted by Lyle Dick in his study of the 
Abernethy District of Saskatchewan. Lyle Dick, "Factors 
Affecting Prairie Settlement: A Case Study of Abernethy, 
Saskatchewan, in the 1880s," Canadian Historical Association 
(Historical Papers, 1985), pp. 23-24. 
80 h' . 1 1 0 h .. R.W. Murc ~e, Aar~cu tura Progress n T e Pra1r~e 
Frontier (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1936), 
p. 58. The Rev. Martin Holdom noted the settlement process 
and the edging out of ranchers in the area of Stettler, 
Alberta, in 1910. Voisey (ed.), A Preachers Frontier, pp. 55-
56. 
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put the issue in sharp relief. Hillier complained that 
Indians grazed their horses off the reserve, consuming grass 
essential to ranchers while keeping the reserve closed to 
non-Native owned cattle. In Hillier's view the Indians' 
stock should be confined to the limits of the reserve or 
"ranchers should have equal privileges on the Reserve, that 
the Indians have off it. ,ttu Not surprisingly Hillier did not 
see any reciprocal obligation for non-Natives to also keep 
their cattle on their own land. DIA Secretary J.D. McLean 
agreed with Hillier instructing Agent James Wilson to 
restrict Blood stock to the reserve. 82 In the interests of 
the Whites the Bloods were to be denied the use of the 
commons. 
Wilson believed, however, that the Blood right to equal 
use of public domain was protected by treaty. In a letter to 
McLean he indignantly questioned the settlers' claim to 
preferential treatment.~ Wilson's query struck a sensitive 
nerve and the resultant legal opinion bore out Wilson's 
observation that Indians had the same rights as others, but 
81 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3992, file 185,143, [Frank Oliver) 
to James Smart, June 3, 1899. 
82 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3992, file 185,143, J.D. McLean to 
James Wilson, June 7, 1899. 
83 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3992, file 185,143, James Wilson to 
Secretary, Dept. of Indian Affairs, June 7, 1889. 
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that both Indians and ranchers required a permit if they 
wished to graze their stock on government lands. "Though the 
practice of using Dominion lands be prevalent with white men 
in the Territories," Law Clerk Reginald Rimmer observed, 
"they can have no ground of complaint against the Indians 
while they themselves are wrong doers."~ 
Implementing a dues structure proved to be no panacea 
for controlling the use or abuse of the reserve. In a 
further effort to reduce conflict between the Bloods and 
their neighbours and to curb illegal cattle trespass, a 
barbed wire fence was constructed along the reserve's 
southern boundary with Cardston in 1899. The easy 
destruction of the fence,~5 along with the difficulty in 
getting the Cardston settlers to pay their grazing dues, led 
to Wilson's advice to discontinue the settlers• grazing 
privileges.&) The fence, in Wilson's view, had been 
deliberately cut to permit "stock to pass of[f] and on the 
reserve at pleasure • .,si 
84 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3992, file 185,143, Memorandum 
signed by Law Clerk Reginald Rimmer, June 28, 1899. 
85 Hugh A. Dempsey, "Story of the Blood Reserve," The 
Pioneer West No. 2 (1970) pp. 5-6. 
86 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1723, pp. 364-365, James Wilson to 
James P. Low, April 10, 1900; pp. 370-373, James Wilson to 
James P. Low, April 23, 1900. 
87 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1723, p. 371, James Wilson to James 
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The letterbook for 1902 reveals that numerous people or 
groups had reserve grazing privileges. A report on the 
leases for 1903 shows the following arrangement. 
Company 





































Wilson further observed that of these lessees Wallace and 
Hauks had not paid dues, Sergeant Hilliard had no grazing 
permit and although Wilson allowed Hilliard's cattle on the 
reserve he could not convince him to pay his dues.AA 
Considering Wilson's concern over the lessees' "habit" of 
removing stock from the reserve in contravention of the 
Indian Act,~) and their continued evasion of the 
P. Low, April 23, 1900; RG 18, vol. 1546, file 76, D. Laird 
to Col. Herchmer, Dec. 15, 1899. 
88 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1535, p.247. Unsigned and undated 
hand written account, likely by James Wilson, of cattle on 
reserve. 
89 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1721, p. 273, J. Wilson to Post 
Master, Spring Coulee, December 12, 1902; p. 275, J. Wilson 
to Post Master, Magrath, December 12, 1902; RG 10, vol. 1725, 
pp. 8-9, James Wilson to Secretary, DIA, February 24, 1903; 
pp. 30-33, James Wilson to Secretary, DIA, March 11, 1903. 
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understandings contained in grazing agreements and permits~> 
the outcome could be predicted. 
Changing Circumatances 
Once again, in response to growing problems, the Blood 
leadership changed their reserve lease policies. In 1903 
they canceled grazing permits to local homesteaders and 
ranchers, preferring instead to lease excess reserve grazing 
capacity to one or two large companies. The easier 
supervision of the land and prevention of illegal trespass 
and theft were necessary given the Bloods' own substantial 
cattle and horse interests. 91 Although clearly warranted, the 
new policy was likely to receive a poor reception from 
homesteaders bordering the reserve. 
For more correspondence on these problems seep. 387, James 
Wilson to Robert Patterson, February 28, 1903; p. 402, James 
Wilson to Alberta Ranch Co •• Pincher Creek, March 12, 1903; 
RG 10, Vol. 1721, pp. 415-417, J. Wilson to H.S. Allen, March 
21, 1903; p. 311, J. Wilson to [?], Cardston, January 19, 
1903. 
90 NAC, RG 10, Vol. 1721, p. 350, J. Wilson to Al. 
Whitney, February 12, 1903; pp. 11-14, Indian Agent to 
Messers Wallace and Co., April 8, 1902; Indian Agent to H. 
Williams, April 8, 1902; Indian Agent to W.B. Whitney, April 
8, 1902; Indian Agent to R. Urch, April 8, 1902. 
9l Dempsey counts 2,000 head of cattle by 1900. 
Dempsey, Red Crow, p. 201. Agent James Wilson reported that 
the Bloods had 3,000 horses in 1902. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1724, 
p. 497, James Wilson to Indian Commissioner, April 3, 1902. 
On theft see RG 10, vol. 1725, pp. 8-9, James Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, February 24, 1903. On horses and cattle for 
this period see Goldfrank, Social Organization, pp. 23-25. 
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Such encouragement of large leaseholders was in fact a 
return to the practices of the pre-homestead days. The 
Bloods were flying in the face of the agrarian development 
which had already taken place and were attempting to reverse 
the trend which helped bring about the end of the large lease 
era.')l The result was inevitably to threaten, or stifle, the 
ambitions of settlers with small holdings who desired to 
engage in mixed farming and to expand their cattle 
operations. The Bloods, for their part, simply wished to 
halt the plundering of their property. Anticipating approval 
of his decision to cancel grazing permits Wilson requested 
those individuals with leases to remove their stock by June 
30. ')-' 
The first agreement under the new leasing arrangement 
was with the Donald McEwan Company of Brandon. The lease 
restricted the company cattle to the east and south areas of 
the reserve and committed the company to graze a maximum of 
7,000 cattle for ten years for $5,000 a year. The lease also 
92 It was the decade after 1896 that cattlemen faced the 
full effects of homesteads. Breen, Ranching Frontier, p. 
101. A.A. Lupton says that ranching on the range in Fort 
Macleod area finished in 1903, and Lethbridge followed suit 
in 1905. A.A. Lupton, "Cattle Ranching In Alberta 1874-1910: 
its evolution and migration," The Alberta Geographer (No. 3, 
1967), p. 57. Craig briefly mentions this contest for land. 
Craig, Lords And Commons, p. 236. 
93 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1725, pp. 30-33, James Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, March 11, 1903. 
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contracted the company to purchase seven hundred tons of hay 
from Blood farmers, should they decide to supply it, and 
required that fences be kept in good repair to keep company 
and Indian stock apart. Blood cattle owners were free to 
graze their own stock as desired. This arrangement was 
exclusive to the company under the condition that it could 
not sublet.~ This contract, if effectively enforced, would 
shut others off from the legal use of the reserve and sever 
the reserve from the surrounding grazing environment for a 
ten year period. The only possible avenue open to those 
still demanding access to the reserve was an illegal 
invasion. 95 The new arrangement was also eminently more 
profitable for the Bloods than the old arrangements,% if for 
no other reason than there was unlikely to be a default on 
lease payments. 
The impact on other potential users of such an exclusive 
arrangement with the McEwan Co. was tmmediately evident and 
94 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3571, file 130, pt. 19. See 
Memorandum of Agreement, dated May 16, 1903. 
95 h' 1 . h d . f T 1s may exp a1n t e estruct1on o some reserve 
fencing. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1721, pp. 680-682, James Wilson to 
Supt. Irwin, September 25, 1903. 
96 d h h . f d' Dempsey oes argue t at t e go1ng rate or In 1an 
Department lease at this time was two cents per acre while 
the Blood lease was closer to one and one quarter cents per 
acre. Hugh A. Dempsey, The Gentle Persuader: A Biography Of 
James Gladstone. Indian Senator (Saskatoon: Western Producer 
Prairie Books, 1986), p. 26. 
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it drove some in Cardston to attempt a lease acquisition of 
three thousand acres in Townships 3 and 4, Range 24 and 25, 
West of the 4th meridian, through an appeal to the Honourable 
Clifford Sifton.l)7 The Blood tribe "absolutely opposed" 
approval of this arrangement.~ Despite the Bloods' clearly 
expressed wishes to the contrary the Department's intention 
was to grant the Cardston settlers grazing privileges~ 
without further reference to the Bloods.m1 The Bloods were 
not pleased believing that Cardston's residents had enjoyed 
years of free grazing despite Agent Wilson's repeated efforts 
to collect monies owed. 101 
97 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3571, file 130, pt. 19, J.G. Turriff 
to Clifford Sifton, November 19, 1903. 
98 NAC, RG. 10, vol. 3571, file 130, pt. 19, J.A.J. 
McKenna to Clifford Sifton, January 5, 1904. 
99 NAC, RG. 10, vol. 3571, file 130, pt. 19, J.D. McLean 
to J.A.J. McKenna, July 18, 1904. 
100 NAC, RG. 10, vol. 3571, file 130, pt. 19, J.A.J. 
McKenna to Secretary, DIA, July 22, 1904; Frank Pedley to 
Assistant Indian Commissioner, July 27, 1904. 
101 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1725, pp. 99-104, James Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, April 22, 1903. Even though not paying their 
dues the Mormons were at the same time petitioning for a 
closed lease "excluding Indians as well as others from making 
use of the land," and were even looking to the possibility of 
acquiring some reserve land through purchase. NAC, RG. 10, 
val. 3571, file 130, pt. 19, J.A.J. McKenna to Secretary, 
DIA, September 7, 1904. 
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Dissenting voices among the Bloods "complained of being 
annoyed by white men seeking to secure possession or the use 
of the land ••• " Indeed, the legitimacy of the McEwan lease 
itself was questioned,wz especially by the "self-supporting 
squad" 103 as the financially independent residents of the 
reserve were called, who apparently saw their own interests 
compromised by the influx of 7,000 lease cattle which would 
further tax the reserve's resources. Their fears were 
substantiated. The McEwan company was soon interpreting its 
lease agreement liberally and with callous disregard 
permitted its cattle to roam the reservation and threaten the 
Bloods' much needed hay supplies.u~ 
In 1903 the Blood reserve sustained cattle in numbers 
that met or exceeded Agent Wilson's estimate of capacity at 
eight to ten thousand head. The Blood cattle owners 
themselves grazed 3,000 head of horses and 3,000 head of 
102 J.A.J. McKenna hinted that Chief Crop Eared Wolf was 
bribed to consent to the lease. NAC, RG. 10, vol. 3571, file 
130, pt. 19, J.A.J. McKenna to Superintendent General, 
January 5, 1904. For machinations involved in granting the 
lease see Dempsey, Gentle Persuader, p. 26. 
103 NAC, RG. 10, vol. 3571, file 130, pt. 19, R.N. Wilson 
to J.A.J. McKenna, March 25, 1904. 
104 NAC, RG. 10, Vol. 1722, pp. 279-281, Indian Agent to 
Secretary, DIA, August 4, 1904. It appears that the reserve 
may have been overstocked. Taylor says that because of the 
large numbers "that almost the entire reserve was needed for 
pasture." Taylor, Standing Alone, p. 62. 
cattle. 105 Others grazed 6, 750 head. Of this total the 
Cochrane Ranche had 3, 000 head and the Mormons 250. Ill> 
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Wilson's capacity estimate was put to the test when on May 
5, 1904, Donald McEwan & Company began placing cattle from 
Mexico on the reserve. 10; Taking Wilson's upper estimate as a 
reasonable number, the reserve was, even before the arrival 
of the McEwan herd, overstocked by 22.5% or 2,750 animals. 
When one considers that illegal trespass was constant and 
sometimes considerableu~ it is almost certain that, except 
for short periods around roundup and sale, the reserve was 
continually overstocked. 109 Grazing regulations for the west, 
issued by the Department of the Interior in 1905, stipulated 
105 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1725, p. 103, James Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, April 22, 1903. 
106 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1725, p. 105, a listing of owners of 
cattle grazing on Blood Reserve. 
107 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1725, p. 670, Indian Agent to Indian 
Commissioner, May 19, 1904. 
108 Rancher E.F. Hagel! makes several references to 
apparently intentional and illegal trespass of stock on the 
Blood reserve. E. F. Hagel!, When the Grass Was Free 
(Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1954), pp. 13-14, 64, 74-77. 
109 Even if we conclude that with the arrival of McEwan 
cattle other stock would have been removed from the reserve 
the reserve would still be overgrazed if McEwan stocked the 
reserve to the lease limit of 7,000 and the Bloods still 
retained their complement of 6,000. The reserve would then 
be overstocked by 23 percent. 
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a ratio of one cow or five sheep per 20 acres. 1w Should 
McEwan stock the lease to the 7,000 allowable limit, the 
approximate acreage required to hold all the stock was 
395,000 acres, more than the reserve's total of approximately 
350,000 acres. 
The Bloods' move to consolidate their grazing leases 
coincided with public recognition of a shift in land use to 
mixed farming. This trend placed added pressure on declining 
grazing space and signified that the ranching era had 
peaked. 111 Touted by government, business, press and public 
alike conventional wisdom at this time held that the 
diversification in the use of a homestead's limited acreage, 
offered by mixed farming, was the key to farmer prosperity 
and the cure for the dangerous reliance on a one crop 
system. tl.! 
110 Rocky Mountain Echo, August 29, 1905. 
l l l Lupton, The Alberta Geographer (No. 3, 1967), p. 57. 
112 As Paul Voisey has pointed out although perhaps 
universally promoted mixed farming was not universally 
adopted. Paul Voisey, "A Mix-Up OVer Mixed Farming: The 
Curious History Of The Agricultural Diversification Movement 
In A Single Crop Area Of Southern Alberta," in David c. Jones 
and Ian MacPherson (eds.) Building Beyond The Homestead: 
Rural History On The Prairies (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 1985), pp. 179-180. See also Voisey, Vulcan, 
pp. 77-81, 96-97. Interestingly W.M. Elofson has argued that 
except for the initial period of ranching in the west, 
ranchers engaged in mixed farming to maximize benefits and to 
fulfill their needs. Elofson, "Not Just a Cowboy," pp. 205-
216. 
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Mixed Farming Interlude 
Despite the Bloods' recent lease to the McEwan company 
in the view of the press the 'dark years' for ranching were 
imminent. The farms and fences that dotted the stockmen's 
former grazing range were a clear indication of the ranchers' 
declining importance. Helpless in the face of the advance of 
the fence, ranchers offered an unheeded note of caution about 
the suitability of the region for farming. They pointed out 
that "If this land is homesteaded and farming is not a 
success, there is not only the one industry crippled, but 
two .. " 113 The limitations that were to restrict the 
anticipated agricultural potential of south western Alberta, 
however, were yet to occur. No amount of warning, especially 
from ranching interests, could dampen the heady expectation 
that agricultural diversification could bring the unlimited 
prosperity that wheat growing had so far denied. 114 
113 Rocky Mountain Echo, May, 1906. The stockmen had an 
argument as Gerald Friesen calls the opening of this region 
to farming settlement "a great error in Canadian domestic 
policy." Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), p. 328. 
Similar views were expressed by ranchers in the Palliser's 
Triangle. See Barry Potyondi, In Palliser's Triangle: 
Living in the Grasslands 1850-1930 (Saskatoon: Purich 
Publishing, 1995), p. 102. 
114 The Rev. Martin Holdom noted that in the area of 
Castor, Alberta, in 1910 the farmers were ruined by an early 
drought and in 1911 by early frost. The lesson to farmers, 
he said was clear; engage in mixed farming, grow an early 
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In November 1912, the Macleod Spectator expressed its 
perception of the local situation. There was a need, in the 
paper's view, for mixed farming to supplant single crop 
agriculture such as wheat, which was now passe. Large scale 
ranching was believed by the Spectator at an end and it 
accepted the idea that the success of mixed farming and 
ranching were dependent on access to the Blood reserve. This 
eventuality the local press both promoted and anticipated. 115 
The Macleod Advertiser reported that farmers of Cardston, 
Magrath, Raymond, Spring Coulee and Lethbridge districts 
wanted big cattle leases stopped and the reserve land made 
available to all interested parties through lease. This 
agitation was driven by the belief that the 350,000 acres of 
reserve was a suitable inducement to the expansion of local 
mixed farming enterprises • ttu 
The local press described the changed social order while 
envisioning a new and enduring economy that ultimately proved 
as illusory as ranching had been. 117 For the Spectator mixed 
variety of grain and do not borrow against the crop. Voisey, 
A Preacher's Frontier, pp. 114-15. 
115 Macleod Spectator, November 5, 1912, p. 3. 
116 Macleod Advertiser, May 29, 1913, p. 1. 
117 Settlers experiencing the devastating conditions of 
the dry belt in the early 1920s recalled with disdain the 
false hopes placed in mixed farming. David c. Jones, "We'll 
all be buried down here": The Prairie Dryland Disaster 1917-
1926 {Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1986), pp. 86-
120 
farming was the answer to the conundrum of ever elusive 
prosperity in 'next year country', especially now that the 
big ranches were "being cut up." According to the Spectator 
the ranching era, though grand, was waning and ranchers, 
those "exiled aristocrats", were now "few and far between." 
It was now the farmer's day.IL~ Ranching should be revived, 
the Spectator believed; but in a fashion that promoted mixed 
farming on a small diversified scale, not the large 
commercial interests of the past. The hope for prosperity in 
the future lay in a "few cows and chickens," ttl) and the 
alienation of Blood land. 
It was, therefore, with considerable shock and 
apprehension that the Macleod Advertiser greeted the news in 
June, 1912, that the Winnipeg-based company of Gordon, 
Ironsides & Fares was to take a 10 year lease on the 
available reserve land and stock it with 17,000 cattle. The 
company was a major western beef producer and packing company 
that ran tens of thousands of cattle in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan on hundreds of thousands of acres of leased 
87. The CPR encouraged mixed farming because the west 
imported large quantities of vegetables which could be grown 
locally. Ralph H. Estey, "Helping Hands in the West," The 
Beaver, vol. 77, no. 3 (June-July, 1997), p. 33. 
118 Macleod Spectator, June 4, 1912, p. 7. 
119 Cardston Globe, May 8, 1914, p. 1. 
121 
Crown land. 120 The exclusive control of the extensive lease 
area required, the Macleod Advertiser predicted, would 
seriously harm Fort Macleod's potential for growth. The 
lease to Gordon, Ironsides & Fares pre-empted, for at least a 
decade, any possibility of acquiring the reserve through a 
surrender. Hence the town would remain hemmed in from the 
east by the Blood reserve and by the Peigan reserve to the 
south west. 121 
Ignoring any benefits accruing to the Bloods from the 
lease, the Advertiser denigrated the cattle trade which they 
saw as serving eastern markets, uz while the Spectator 
trumpeted both the 'need' for mixed farming and for the "many 
thousands of (wasted) fat acres" of the Blood reserve. 
Admitting Blood opposition to the proposed surrender, and 
120 See for example Long, The Great Canadian Range, p. 
4. In 1902 the company ran 30,000 head of cattle and was 
considered a giant in the cattle industry. Ed Gould, 
Ranching In Western Canada (Saanichton: Hancock House 
Publishers Ltd., 1978), pp. 103-104. Hugh Dempsey says that 
one local firm, that of Knight and Watson, was also given a 
lease at this time. See Hugh A. Dempsey, Tgm Three Persons: 
Legend Of An Indian Cowboy (Saskatoon: Purich Publishers, 
1997), p. 67. 
lZl Macleod Advertiser, June 6, 1912, p. 1. Success in 
alienating reserve land "would mean the breaking of the 
restrictive bond which has hampered the development of the 
district to the south and east for so long." May 29, 1913, p. 
4. 
122 Macleod Advertiser, June 6, 1912, p.l. The Cardston 
Globe echoed these sentiments by reprinting the same article. 
The Cardston Globe, June 13, 1912, p. 1. 
122 
expressing the prevalent attitude that Indians were doomed to 
extinction, the Spectator suggested leasing the reserve for a 
99 year period. In the interim disease would destroy the 
Bloods as a people and thus the most substantial stumbling-
block to Fort Macleod's growth would be resolved. 1n 
The Spectator admonished readers that the government's 
efforts to encourage mixed farming style ranching deserved 
support as a suitable antidote to the 'folly of putting all 
our eggs in one basket and depending exclusively on wheat 
mining .•• "114 However, the anti large lease sentiment 
developed not only in response to the lease policy on the 
Blood reserve. It was also a backlash against cattle barons 
like Pat Burns who had cornered the Alberta beef market. His 
large leases, the paper believed, restricted the ability of 
others to get into the cattle business. 15 
There appears to have been great local demand for leased 
portions of the Blood reserve with reported applications for 
123 Macleod Spectator, June 4, 1912, p. 7. For more on 
this debate see, Macleod Spectator, October 1, 1912, p. 6; 
October 8, 1912, p. 7; October 29, 1912, pp. 4, 7; November 
5, p.J; December 31, p. 4; January 7, 1913, p. 4; January 14, 
1913, p. 7; January 21, 1913, p. 1. 
124 Macleod Spectator, November 12, 1912, p. 4. 
125 Macleod Spectator, November 19, 1912, p. 1. On this 
idea see Macleod Advertiser, June 5, 1913, p. 7. 
123 
126,000 acres of reserve land. 126 One farmer in Magrath, for 
example, wanted 15,000 acres of reserve land, just two miles 
west of his farm, to go with the 320 acres of his homestead. 
If granted a 20 year lease he planned to stock it with 
cattle, horses and sheep. The Advertiser said that 
Government officials, including Dr. w. Roche, Minister of the 
Interior, were in favour of leases being granted to local 
farmers, 1.a a contention not borne out by subsequent debate in 
the House of Commons. 128 
The agitation was, however, out of step with the desires 
of Blood leadership and band members. By 1913 they had 
accepted the fact that the large leases were preferable to 
general subletting, both for animal control and income, and 
so they rejected bids from local ranchers and the Cardston 
Agricultural Association to lease reserve land. 129 The tribe 
126 Macleod Advertiser, July 3, 1913, p. 7. See also the 
Family Herald, July 2, 1913. 
127 Macleod Advertiser, July 3, 1913, p. 7. If this was 
the case by 1915 Roche had changed his mind and was more 
inclined to follow the wishes of the Bloods in this matter. 
128 House of Commons Debates, March 22, 1915, 1323-1324. 
129 GAI, Blood Indian Agency Correspondence (BIAC), file 
62, Indian Agent to Secretary, DIA, June 13, 1913. The 
Cardston application was rejected in part because of the 
continued trespass and destruction of the reserve fence. 
NAC, RG 10, vol. 1547, p. 43, Indian Agent to the Secretary, 
DIA, July 10, 1913: BIAC, GAI, file 62, Indian Agent to 
Secretary, DIA, June 25, 1913. The Bloods also blamed 
124 
voted instead "to give all the grazing privileges possible on 
the Reserve to Gordon Ironsides and Fares. "130 Though not 
willing to lease to homesteaders bordering the reserve the 
Gordon Ironsides and Fares lease was unanimously renewed, 
with some discussion about the rents to be charged and the 
minimum number of cattle to be placed. 131 
Both suspicion and reality strained the Bloods' 
relations with their neighbours and thus affected the way in 
which local people could conduct their daily activities and 
business affairs. The relation between homesteader William 
Blackmore and the Bloods is illustrative of this point. 
Blackmore owned land adjacent to the reserve at a location 
"where the Reserve fence is practically all down" thus 
permitting his cattle to wander onto the reserve. The 
Bloods, angry at the trespass, on one occasion prevented an 
Cardston residents for the deaths of Single Rider and his 
wife who died after drinking Florida Water purchased at 
Cardston, though no conviction was made. The agent reported 
that "the Indians imagine that ••• it is a job on the Mormons' 
part to poison them all off to get the Reserve ••• " on 
trespass see GAI, BIAC, file 62 Indian Agent to W. Caldwell, 
November 13, 1913; Indian Agent to w. Blackmore, November 13, 
1913. 
L30 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1547, p. 43, Indian Agent to the 
Secretary, DIA, July 10, 1913. Emphasis added. There was 
some discussion on whether the rental should be $2.50 or 
$3.00 per head and the Bloods wanted a minimum number places 
so that the rental was never less than $10 000 pr year. GAI, 
BIAC, file 62, Indian Agent to Secretary, DIA, June 13, 1913. 
131 GAI, BIAC, file 62, Indian Agent to Secretary, DIA, 
June 13, 1913. 
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attempt to recover the strays. Blackmore was forced to have 
a lawyer intervene on his behalf and requested a permit broad 
enough to allow him to visit the reserve as necessary to 
round up his stray cattle. 132 It is unclear whether the 
permit was granted. In the meantime the agent warned 
Blackmore to keep his cattle off the reserve or face 
prosecution. 133 In the end, following charge and 
countercharge, Agent W.J. Dilworth was forced to defend his 
actions. Although not wishing to contribute to the hostility 
between the Bloods and their neighbours, he wrote, because of 
"the reputation these people bear I propose to hold them 
strictly within reasonable bounds." 13+ 
The Bloods, however, had their own objectives, and in 
1913 selected Shot-Both-Sides as chief. The new leader was a 
staunch defender of Blood traditions and of the reserve's 
territorial integrity135 and his election was attributed, as 
132 GAI, BIAC, file 62, w. Laurie to Indian Agent, 
November 12, 1913. 
133 GAI, BIAC, file 62, Indian Agent to W. Caldwell, 
November 13, 1913, Indian Agent to w. Blackmore, November 13, 
1913. 
l34 GAI, BIAC, file 62, Indian Agent to Assistant Deputy 
and Secretary, DIA, December 29, 1913. For more 
correspondence on this issue see; W.M. Blackmore to W.J. 
Dilworth, November 19, 1913; J.D. McLean to W.J. Dilworth, 
December 19, 1913. 
135 Dempsey, Red Crow, p. 216; Dempsey, The Gentle 
Persuader, p. 51. 
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the Macleod Advertiser correctly concluded, to the fact that 
the Bloods' were determined to resist any attempts to 
alienate portions of their reserve. 1~ In the face of this 
continuing Blood resistance, one local hopeful suggested 
making the reserve into a general herding ground with the 
Bloods in charge as caretakers. The added grazing capacity 
would, undoubtedly, create hundreds of jobs in the marketing 
of cattle. 137 
Though the Cardston Globe hoped that preaching would 
bring converts to the support of mixed farming, denial and 
castigation were no sure means of expelling the cattle 
barons • 138 on May 30, 1913, the Globe demanded that the lease 
held by Gordon, Ironsides & Co. be canceled and the land be 
made available for general leasing. Resolutions to this 
effect came from farmers in the communities of Cardston, 
Magrath, Raymond, Spring Coulee, Lethbridge and Orton, and 
the Bloods were said to be in favour. 139 This was wishful 
136 Macleod Advertiser, June 19, 1913, p. 7; July 3, 
1913, p. 1. 
137 Macleod Advertiser, April 24, 1913, p. 7. 
138 The Globe expressed the belief that Minister of the 
Interior, William J. Roche, was being influenced by big 
business interests, specifically meat packing plants in 
Winnipeg. See; Cardston Globe, September 5, 1913, p. 1. 
139 Cardston Globe, May 30, 1913, p. 1; Macleod 
Advertiser, June 19, 1913, p. 1. 
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thinking given the Bloods' past experience with rent 
collection and illegal trespass. Ignored and thwarted the 
locals eventually blamed their failure on the power of 
mammon: "the chiefs have been having a lot of long green 
bills of late and their attitude in opposition to the leasing 
of their lands to the small mixed farming may be explained 
thereby." In desperation the Globe predicted that the 
lessees, because of their corruption, would not carry the 
day. 140 The paper, buoyed by predictions of an estimated 7 2 
percent increase in the stock industry in the area 
surrounding the reserve, hoped that Roche would throw open 
the reserve. 1 ~1 
Despite the predictions the Bloods renewed the lease to 
Gordon, Ironsides and Fares. Dismayed, the Spectator 
reported that "not a single member of the tribe was in favor 
of the policy" of granting leases to small ranchers. 1 ~2 Given 
the previous press coverage of this matter one might expect 
the press to announce the death knell of mixed farming and 
small scale ranching. Glen Campbell, Superintendent of 
Indian Agencies, told the Spectator that the Bloods opposed 
leases to small interests because it led to endless 
14° Cardston Globe, J 1 25 1913 1 u y , , p. . 
141 Cardston Globe, OCtober 3, 1913, p. 4. 
142 Macleod Spectator, June 17, 1913, p. 1. 
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confusion. The tribe also appreciated the increasing value 
of their grazing and in the future, Campbell predicted, the 
rental would rise. 143 
The local press, however, continued to promote a 
different reality from that encouraged by the Bloods through 
large lease grants. The impression was now that the west was 
full and space was at a premium. 1~ The bounds of the 
homestead no longer sufficed to sustain a settler's financial 
ambitions and thus caused a movement towards expansion. 
Settlers on the Blood reserve's boundaries cast a covetous 
eye on its seemingly open, and neglected spaces. Just as the 
reserve had alleviated pressure on overextended cattle herds 
in the past it could now relieve the pressure on homesteads 
which were too small. The solution was for the government to 
open the Blood reserve to lease and rescue stockmen "forced 
to sell their cows and cut down their herds on account of the 
143 Macleod S S embe 9 1913 1 ==-=-==-=-~pe=c .... t=a=t=o~r, ept r , , p. • 
144 Macleod Advertiser, October 24, 1912, p. 2. A 
summary of this idea, along with the implications for large 
scale ranching, was given in the Ravmond Leader, 1915; "The 
west has settled back on its haunches so to speak, and a 
wild, untamed, limitless area, with boundless prairie to run 
at will on, has become a home for a home-building 
people ..• The homesteader and the settler, the men who dig 
post holes, string barbed wire and follow the plough are, of 
course, responsible for the change." Raymond Leader, March 
26, 1915, p. 2. 
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diminishing of the range." 145 To expect such a solution, 
however, was a denial of the history of relations with the 
Bloods and their intention not to surrender but to defend 
their own considerable interests. The Bloods' decision, in 
March 1915, to renew the Gordon Ironsides and Fares lease, 
"if they meet our terms," reminded the locals of their 
inability to influence the status gpo. 1~ 
Continued Assaults and Blood Resis~ance 
The closure of the reserve to the outside community 
through restricted lease only became apparent as settlers 
determined to get through stealth what had been denied them 
by decision. By far the largest illegal breach of the 
reserve's integrity was the constant invasion of stray 
animals, especially horses. The problem with strays dated 
back to at least 1904. Agent Dilworth reported in December, 
1914, that "With the coming of winter those ranchers living 
adjacent to the reserve on the north and east ••• as has been 
145 Raymond Leader, September 12, 1913, p. 1. On how to 
distribute the land should the reserve be opened see the 
Raymond Leader, July 4, 1913, p. 1. 
146 Cardston Globe, June 30, 1914, p. 4. NAC, R.G. 10, 
vol. 4024, file 290, 240-2A. A letter by Agent Dilworth, 
April 14, 1916, gave the terms of the lease as for $10,000 
per year for not more than 5,000 head of cattle on the 
reserves subject to a $2.00 per head penalty. NAC, RG 10, 
vol. 1537, p. 105, Indian Agent to D.C. Scott, January 25, 
1918. 
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their custom for 10 years past, have turned their horses onto 
the reserve for winter grazing ..... l~i The practice had 
apparently gone on unchecked for years and in 1913 Dilworth 
found sufficient strays to compromise the Bloods' 
interests. 1~ Again in 1914, 234 strays were rounded up with 
between 40 and 50 being eventually claimed by owners. 1~ The 
Cardston Globe's report, May 1916, of numbers of strays 
bearing the same brand suggests that some individuals were 
intentionally and illegally running their stock on the 
reserve. On this occasion the roundup netted 94 horses. 150 In 
January 1918 195 horses were captured with at least 17 
bearing the same brand. 151 Agent Dilworth caused a momentary 
outcry when he impounded both stray horses and cattle, and 
claimed a grazing fee of three dollars per head. On this 
occasion the numbers posed no apparent threat to the 
reserve's resources so Dilworth proposed accepting the 
147 NAC, RG 10, Vol. 1547, p. 238, Indian Agent to 
Assistant Deputy and Sec'y, DIA, December 2, 1914. 
148 
. . 1 h. f Albe AA . Prov~nc~a Arc ~ves o rta (P ), Access~on No. 
70.414/81, W.J. Dilworth to Provincial Live Stock 
Commissioner, December 29, 1913. 
149 Macleod Spectator, March 19, 1914, p. 1; May 28, 
1914, p. 1 
ISO Cardston Globe, May 18, 1916, p. 1. 
151 Cardston Globe, January 17, 1918, p. 5. 
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animals for a grazing fee. 152 The offenders, meanwhile, had 
managed to acquire free grazing for their animals from the 
Bloods. The cost to the tribe and savings to the owners is 
difficult to evaluate, as there is no way to accurately 
determine how long some animals were on the reserve. 1~ 
In August, 1920, 102 animals were tmpounded on the 
reserve. 1~ The Alberta Provincial Police constable w.w. 
Henderson, Cardston, reported that some individuals went to 
great lengths to surreptitiously graze their cattle on the 
Blood reserve. Although an offense under the Indian Act some 
attempted to evade detection by resorting to the use of a 
hair brand.· Henderson declared that this tactic so incensed 
the Bloods that they killed the strays. He reported that 
152 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1537, p. 105, Indian Agent to D.C. 
Scott, January 25, 1918. Dilworth estimated the reserve 
capacity at 20,000 head. The criteria he used to arrive at 
this estimation are unknown. 
153 There were occasions when offenders were ordered to 
remove their animals. Some contractors abusing their rights, 
such as E.H. Maunsell, were ordered to remove their stock. 
See for example GAI, Cross Family Papers (CFP), file 893, (?] 
to A.E. Cross, May 8, 1919; NAC, RG 10, vol. 1546, p. 48, 
Indian Agent to O.J. Stoddard, February 26, 1919. 
154 Cardston Globe, August 21, 1920, p. 4. 
*A hair brand singes the outer hairs for temporary 
identification of stock. When the hair grows back the brand 
is gone. It was generally used on cattle drives when owners 
wanted to temporarily identify animals. This information was 
provided by Hank Pallister and passed along by Douglas E. 
Cass, Senior Archivist, Glenbow. 
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three Indians were awaiting trial charged with this 
offense. 155 Meanwhile, the belief that reserve access was 
.. essential to successful stock-raising in this district" 
continued, even though continually thwarted by the Bloods. 1~ 
A 1922 report to R.H. Campbell, Director of Forestry, 
Department of the Interior, suggests that grazing land 
continued to be at a premium and that large blocks of land, 
such as the Blood Reserve, could be critical in determining 
success or failure for ventures in mixed farming and stock 
ranching. Though the report focused on the use of forest 
ranges for grazing, the conclusions were equally applicable 
to the area around the Blood Reserve. In his report Campbell 
discussed several classes of 'ranchers': those with large 
economically viable acreages purchased when land was cheap, 
'local' ranchers who mostly leased Dominion lands and who 
therefore had to live with the specter of cancellation, those 
who farmed and ranched with about two hundred head of stock 
and limited pasture, and finally farmers who kept a few head 
ISS GAI, Western Stock Grazing Association Papers, 1896-
1972, file 48. 
156 Macleod Times, April 20, 1922, p. 3. The roundup of 
strays continued on practically a yearly basis. See the 
Macleod Times, July 13, 1922, p. 7: June 28, 1923, p. 1: July 
21, 1927, p. 3: June 14, 1928, p. 1; Cardston News, June 14, 
1928, p. 6. The July roundup for 1927 netted approximately 
five hundred and eighty animals. Cardston News, July 14, 
1927, pp. 2 & 7. For 1929 see the Cardston News, June 27, 
1929, p. 2; July 4, 1929, p. 5. 
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of stock for home consumption. The general conclusion 
reached was that they all needed grazing land in addition to 
their holdings. The depressed markets, in conjunction with 
acute grazing shortages, led to intense pressure on forest 
reserves and other government lease lands. 15; 
If one were to substitute the term "Blood reserve" for 
"forest reserve" one immediately realizes that the same 
arguments had been made by all manner of ranchers and 
homesteaders living next to the Blood reserve since its 
inception. Though the report blamed the current depressed 
state of the industry on the drought beginning in 1917 and 
peaking in the winter of 1919-2 0, tss these were problems 
produced by nature, not by a perceived need or a claim to the 
right to utilization. Thus Agent J.T. Faunt summed up the 
apparent attitude of one homesteader, McGovern, charged with 
the abuse of reserve land. "He has some land just across the 
river from the Reserve & is running a herd of horses & cattle 
away out of proportion to his land holdings," Faunt wrote, 
157 GAI, CFP, file 952, Report to R.H. Campbell, Director 
of Forestry, Department of the Interior, October 24, 1922; 
CFP, file 895, has substantial correspondence on the shortage 
of feed for cattle during this period. 
lSB GAI, CFP, file 952, Report to R.H. Campbell, Director 
of Forestry, Department of the Interior, October 24, 1922. 
Breen attributes other factors such as depressed prices and 
market access. Breen, Ranching Frontier, p. 215 ff. 
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"with the result that for years his stock have been running 
on the Reserve & in fact they were practically all raised on 
the Reserve & won't stay off." 159 
According to Indian Commissioner W.M. Graham, in 1922 
there were 16 leases on the Blood reserve, not counting the 
grazing leases and three other farming leases "of which you 
are aware." Because of Graham's wording only six of these 
can be determined to have been paid up, four did not respond 
to inquiries and three had rent deferred or some owing. 1 ~) 
some lessees, such as J.E. Neilson, sought longer leases but 
Agent Faunt suspected that they wanted to graze until the 
feed was gone and then abandon the lease, a fear not 
supported by Graham. 161 Most of these leases were likely 
holdovers granted without Blood consent as a consequence of 
the amendment to Section 90 of the Indian Act in 1918. This 
amendment permitted the Government to implement its Greater 
Production Campaign, during World War I, by conscripting 
'idle' land and resources on Native reserves. The Bloods 
159 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1546, p. 273, Indian Agent to Duncan 
c. Scott, July 3, 1922. Dempsey recounts an incident between 
James Gladstone and the cattle of Knight and Watson. 
Dempsey, Gentle Persuader, p. 66. 
160 GAI, BIAC, file 131, W.M. Graham to J.T. Faunt, April 
20, 1923. 
161 GAI, BIAC, file 131, W.M. Graham to J.T. Faunt, May 
2, 1923. 
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were involuntarily inducted into this program. 162 Hugh 
Dempsey suggests that the amendment was partly precipitated 
by the Blood refusal of a land surrender. 1~ Locally, 
however, the Macleod Times still viewed securing grazing as 
"one of the vital problems of our farmers. n l&4 
A First Nations convention held at Macleod, in November 
1924, brought the matter of grazing leases to a head. The 
Indians themselves had decided, according to the Lethbridge 
Herald, that some leasing policies were an infringement of 
Treaty 7, lh.:; a view upheld by local M.P. George Coote. ttD The 
162 John Leonard Taylor, Canadian Indian Policy During 
The Inter-War Years, 1918-1939 (Ottawa: Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, 1984), pp. 15-19. 
163 Dempsey, The Gentle Persuader, pp. 51-52. 
164 Macleod Times, March 8, 1923, p. 3. The Times saw a 
glimmer of hope in a federal government decision to "grant 
grazing leases of vacant Dominion lands unfit for 
agricultural purposes in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, 
and which are encumbered by seed grain and relief 
indebtedness.,. The Macleod Times, March 22, 1923, p. 1. 
Indian farmer James Gladstone quit his efforts in 1923 when 
for three years running cattle from nearby ranches invaded 
his fields and ruined his crops. Dempsey, Gentle Persua4er, 
p. 67. On the competition for limited space see, Jones, 
Prairie Dryland Disaster, pp. 13-15, 90. 
165 To my knowledge there are no records or minutes of 
this convention extant. Lethbridge Herald, November 13, 14, 
15, 1924 in NAC, RG 10, vol. 4093, file 600,107; Mike 
Mountain Horse to J.T. Faunt, November 22, 1924. 
L66 Calgary Herald, November 14, 1924 in NAC, RG 10, 
vol. 4093, file 600,107. 
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troublesome flash point was a Blood reserve lease to the Hon. 
A.J. McLean. McLean had trouble stocking the lease to the 
maximum allowable 5,000 head of cattle and wanted the cost 
adjusted accordingly, a proposal rejected by Agent Faunt who 
demanded the full $10,000 payment. McLean also wanted to 
fence his lease, to which Blood ranchers objected because 
their own cattle tended to drift along the fence and over the 
river banks to their deaths. t67 These concerns, communicated 
to Superintendent General Charles Stewart, were dismissed as 
possibly "imaginary, " 168 rather than legitimate grievances 
resulting from the still unrepealed Section 90. L£>l) 
While the records are generally mute on the issue of 
grazing in the mid and latter 1920s, Dempsey points to the 
167 GAI, George Gibson Coote Papers, 1907-1956 (GGCP), 
file 137, J.T. Faunt to Duncan c. Scott, May 31, 1923. 
McLean also had a lease on the Peigan Reserve and was said to 
be of the opinion that the Indians consent to a lease was not 
necessary. Coote charged that McLean got the Peigan lease 
for the "ridiculously low" price of six cents per acre for 
ten years, while at the same time some lease land brought 
thirty cents per acre. McLean politically well connected was 
described by Coote as "a member of the late Stewart 
administration ••• " GAI, GGCP, file 137, G.G. Coote to the 
[Lethbridge?] Herald, n.d. (circa 1924); J.C. Caldwell to 
Deputy Superintendent General, DIA, April 17, 1924. See also 
the Lethbridge Herald, November 14, 1924; Calgary Herald, 
November 15, 1924 in NAC, RG 10, vol. 4093, file 600,107. 
lGS NAC, RG 10, vol. 4093, file 600,107, A.F. Grady to C. 
Stewart, November 18, 1924; c. Stewart to A.G. Grady, 
November 24, 1924. 
L
69 NAC, RG 10, vol. 4093, file 600,107, Joseph Mountain 
Horse to Han. W.L. Mackenzie King, February 7, 1925. 
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general prosperity of farmers on the reserve in 1927. 170 This 
suggests that reserve grazing remained good and so demand 
remained high. The reserve could accommodate some export 
demand because many of the reserve residents were employed 
outside of the reserve 1i 1 and only some of the reserve land 
was suitable for farming. By 1933, in the midst of the 
Depression the reserve was deemed, by a Department of 
Agriculture Report, to be "without a doubt, the best stock 
raising land in Western Canada" and supported more sheep per 
acre than any other part of Alberta. Still lessees tried to 
force a fee reduction from 10 to eight cents an acre on their 
leases by submitting payments based on the reduced rate. 
Though Blood leadership and the DIA determined not to give 
in 11L eight different leaseholders were in arrears by August, 
1933. 173 As the leaseholders changed, or encountered economic 
170 Dempsey, Gentle Persuader, p. 71. 
171 Dempsey, Gentle Persuader, p. 62. 
172 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), M. 
Christianson to Secretary, DIA, May 29, 1933; Harold w. 
McGill, June, 1933; A.F. MacKenzie to M. Christianson, June 
17, 1933. 
173 See itemized statement in NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, 
file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1) Arrears totaled $3,353.56. The 
total lease amount was for $4,973.28 so payments were 67% in 
arrears. 
difficulty the problem with collecting rents was 
compounded. 17 ~ 
138 
Historical experience, reserve politics and 
environmental conditions combined, in 1933, to cause official 
hesitation to accommodate the needs of the non-Native 
community. In November the DIA was approached by the Jenkins 
Brothers, Fishburn, Alberta, for a lease of 10 years on a 
southern portion of the reserve in order to ensure winter 
range: "it makes it very hard for us to carry on with our 
cattle if we are not sure of winter range for them." To this 
point, the Jenkins Brothers indicated, their arrangement with 
the Indians had been both cordial and satisfactory. 175 
Inspector of Indian Agencies M. Christianson's response 
regarding the 6,000 acre lease was not encouraging. Although 
several ranchers had been given leases to winter cattle on 
the reserve in 1932, in the interim environmental conditions 
on the reserve had deteriorated. Agent J.E. Pugh thus 
reported that the chief and headmen were "absolutely opposed" 
to further leases in the southern portion of the reserve 
174 on the inherent confusion see; NAC, RG 10, vol. 
12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), M. Christianson to J.E. Pugh, 
February 28, 19[33]; J.E. Pugh toM. Christianson, March 4, 
1933. 
175 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), 
Harold w. McGill to J.E. Pugh, November 8, 1933. 
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which was the tribe's essential grazing range and hay land. 170 
Although the reserve was a significant factor in determining 
the stock policy of off-reserve individuals, or groups, the 
Bloods were unwilling to compromise future grass reserves. 
Agent Pugh summed up his view of the basic economic 
conflict that existed in the demands placed on the reserve by 
the whi·te community. "Are we as a reserve," queried Pugh, 
"to be more or less tentatively responsible for the carrying 
of outside ranchers, who wish to protect their range in 
winter for summer, at the expense of the Indians" while he, 
as agent, was obliged to protect the Blood's interests for 
the same reason. 1~ It was clear that reserve land was 
regarded by local stock raisers as critical to their success. 
Stock raising in the area adjoining to the reserve could not 
thrive without access to more grazing land than was available 
outside the reserve's borders. 
Beginning in 1933 there was an apparent attempt by some 
Bloods and cattle owners to circumvent the power of the agent 
and the DIA. Becoming entrepreneurs in their own right some 
Bloods engaged in personal leasing contracts with White stock 
176 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), M. 
Christianson to Harold w. McGill, November 13, 1933; J.E. 
Pugh to M. Christianson, November 14, 1933. At this time 
there were twelve separate applications for grazing leases in 
the area. 
177 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), J.E. 
Pugh to M. Christianson, November 14, 1933. 
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owners to graze outside stock on individually fenced land. 178 
Christianson thought this policy wrong as it would encourage 
others to follow suit. He predicted that such actions would 
result in a reserve overrun with stock "and the whole 
management of the agency will simply 'go up in smoke. • " 17l) 
Despite such reservations twelve such agreements were 
eventually concluded. 180 
Christianson was aware that the survivability of the 
reserve was at stake if overgrazing occurred. He was equally 
aware that this new direction in managing grazing on an 
individual contract basis posed a severe challenge to DIA 
authority. Certainly there was potential for serious 
management confusion but Christianson was flying in the face 
of reserve and regional economic history when he speculated 
that "The only system that we can adopt is to keep the 
Indians from trucking and trading with outsiders. tt 181 In 
attempting to stifle such commercial exchange Christianson 
178 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), J.E. 
Pugh to M. Christianson, November 14, 1933. 
179 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), M. 
Christianson to J. E. Pugh, November 16, 1933. 
180 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), J.E. 
Pugh to M. Christianson, November 14, 1933. 
181 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), M. 
Christianson to J. E. Pugh, November 16, 1933. 
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was advocating an impractical policy that had existed only in 
the overzealous minds of Department bureaucrats. Although 
official government policy had at least ideally been aimed in 
this direction, the history of grazing contracts, and the 
demands and expectations of the Bloods' neighbours, had 
mitigated against such a policy ever becoming reality. 
Depression and Drough~ 
Through deliberate arrangements and enforcement of 
policy in the past the Bloods and their agents had managed to 
keep control over the reserve's grazing land and hay. The 
onset of the Depression, however, along with the devastating 
environmental crisis increased both the settlers' need for 
land and their determination to have it. As a result, the 
DIA became more responsive to the needs of non-Natives living 
in the area of the reserve and attempted to improve the 
crisis at hand. Ultimately what control the Bloods had been 
able to gain during the previous decades was slowly eroded 
away. LSL 
Economic and financial conditions in the Great 
Depression played a significant part in the desire for the 
use of Blood reserve land and determined the attitudes 
182 Perhaps the best illustration of this is the 
difficulty collecting lease rents. NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, 
file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA, October 
24, 1933. (Table 2). 
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lessees exhibited once the land was leased to them. The main 
point of contention was whether or not the lease terms 
granted the lessee right of exclusive use. The case of W.T. 
McCaugherty, Lethbridge, illustrates this point. In 
November, 1935, this man complained to Agent Pugh about 
certain Indians camped on his lease. Pugh reminded him that 
a clause in the lease provided for removal of land from a 
lease if desired by "those Indians living on the lands 
leased. " 1 ~3 This McCaugherty could not, or would not, accept 
and he threatened the Indians with "criminal action ••• for 
trespassing ••. " 1~ 
The McCaugherty problem came to a head in January, 1936, 
with his assault on an Indian and resulted in Agent Pugh 
raising serious questions about leasing technicalities and 
procedures. He particularly questioned the consequences for 
the Bloods of the omission of reserved portions from leases. 
Despite the fact a lease was a "conditional surrender" Pugh 
recognized that ejecting the Indians from leased land in 
favour of the lessee would result in much bitterness and 
183 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to W.T. McCaugherty, 
November 12, 1935. The matter was further complicated by the 
fact that some Bloods were pressing for 600 acres to be 
withdrawn from the lease although they had not been living on 
the leased portion of the land when the lease had been 
granted. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA, 
November 22, 1935. 
184 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, W.T. McCaugherty to J.E. Pugh, 
November 20, 1935. 
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disaffection among them. 1~ McCaugherty, however, was unmoved 
and furthermore believed that legally the lease permitted him 
to treat the Bloods as "trespassers" on his leased land. U~b 
Pugh • s attempts at mediation failedl87 leading the Department 
to conclude that McCaugherty was "unreasonable" in his 
assumptions.'~ Tribal members, of course, did not accept 
Pugh's explanation that by not being resident on the leased 
portion of the reserve prior to the granting of the lease 
they had "forfeited all rights to the lease lands. "lStJ 
The abuse of individual Blood property and individual 
rights, at times, went to such provocative extremes as 
185 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA, 
January 13, 1936. 
186 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, w.s. McCaugherty to J.E. Pugh, 
November 23, 1934. 
187 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA, 
January 13, 1936. 
188 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, A.F. Mackenzie to J.E. Pugh, 
January 23, 1936. 
189 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2, (pt. 1), 
J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA, January 13, 1936. The problems 
here, in part, stem from a lease transfer. This original 
lease had been with the now defunct Cardston Grazing Co. and 
had stipulated that "The leasing of the above land will not 
interfere with the rights of the Indians at present residing 
within the limits of the proposed lease, nor will it 
interfere with the going to and from of the Indians of the 
reserve.~~ For similar problems see; J.E. Pugh to Secretary, 
DIA, June 24, 1937; J.E. Pugh to Messers. Smith & Kearl, July 
14, 1937. See also J.E. Pugh to Secretary DIA, May 16, 1938; 
J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA., July 14, 1937. 
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permitting sheep to invade Indian homes during their absence. 
In another case an Indian was lassoed and dragged around by a 
lessee. Such incidents, Christianson said, were "too 
numerous to mention .... " 1lxJ The attitudes engendered by such 
bahaviour magnified the already negative aspects of the 
leasing system. The behaviour of lessees such as McCaugherty 
dictated that such leasing arrangements should have properly 
been discontinued. llH 
By 1935 conditions on the reserve suggested an 
environmental catastrophe of major proportions, and sound 
management practices dictated that leasing be ended, or at 
least temporarily delayed. According to Pugh 145,000 acres 
of range (approximately 41% of the reserve) on the north end 
lgQ NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), M. 
Christianson to J.C. Caldwell, January 21, 1936. 
l 9 l . '1 . ' 1 . 19 h h A s~~ ar s~tuat~on, a so ~n 35, occurred w en t e 
Town of Cardston raised objections to a portion of its 
desired lease being removed at the behest of Blood Indian Joe 
Devine who wished to live on the land. For details see 
correspondence in NAC, RG 10, vol. 12649, file 103/32-1-2, 
(pt. 2). At least one scholar seems to suggest that the 
Bloods behaviour with regard to lease land was suspect. 
Lawrence E. Kindt, "The Sheep Ranching Industry of Canada," 
(Ph.D., The American University, Washington, D.C., 1939), p. 
106. Indeed the agreement between the Bloods and the DIA 
stipulated that the lease agreements expire in 1934, but in 
1935 they were still in effect. The extension was made 
necessary because of rent arrears in 1931 and that new 
contracts expired in 1937. Pugh observed that the latest 
contracts had to be reviewed by the Bloods in 1936 to allow 
for the mandatory one year notice to lessees before 
cancellation. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to M. 
Christianson, December 16, 1935. 
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of the reserve was in serious condition from soil erosion due 
to drought and overgrazing. Land to a depth of four miles 
from the rivers was 'beyond restoration' unless grazing was 
halted. The effects of stress on the land are indicated by 
the fact that one lease of 4,627 acres, with a stocking 
capacity of 250, had in excess of 500 cattle.~z The 
inevitable consequence of such conditions was intense 
competition for grass with the result that lessees had 
resorted to the illegal and chaotic practice of invading each 
other's ranges. 1'>3 
This inevitably resulted in a great deal of 
dissatisfaction among the lessees and also among the Bloods. 
Blood ranchers and farmers found their movement and access to 
their own land continually restricted as lessees, driven by 
harsh environmental conditions, neglected the spirit of their 
leases and interpreted the letter of the lease to their own 
benefit. The Bloods, at the end of their patience, wanted 
the leases ended. Pugh supported that sentiment when he 
recommended that, based on grass conditions, the leases be 
canceled. 1'l4 
192 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA, 
March 14, 1936. 
193 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to M. Christianson, 
December 16, 1935. 
194 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh toM. Christianson, 
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Despite the informed opposition of the Bloods and Agent 
Pugh, ttJS the Department chose to ignore the weight of evidence 
and opinion and proceeded to implement its own agenda. The 
Bloods' cancellation of the Town of Cardston lease, in 1936, 
for example, was based on environmental concerns and 
"economics", while Whites needed the land to expand their 
operations. llJh The DIA, however, decided to renew Cards ton's 
lease for another year. llJ/ The rationale for the renewal, as 
explained to Pugh, was that in the Department's estimation 
"the Town of Cardston will continue to require these 
pasturage privileges." l'JS The only remedial action taken by 
the Department was to remind the town to be more appreciative 
of the use of the Bloods ' property. 1l)'J One might assume that 
the Department believed that the financial benefits accruing 
to the Bloods from the lease took precedence over the Bloods' 
December 16, 1935. 
195 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, A.D. Wymbs to J.E. Pugh, 
January 20, 1936. 
196 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA, 
April 27, 1936. 
197 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, A.F. MacKenzie to J.E. Pugh, 
April 28, 1936. 
198 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, A.F. MacKenzie to J.E. Pugh, 
May 27, 1936. 
199 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, H.W. McGill to Secretary-
Treasurer, Town of Cardston, April 30, 1936. 
desires to use the land themselves and preserve its 
integrity. Such a view assumes that the Department's 
bureaucrats were well meaning and selfless, a generous 
perception indeed given the circumstances. 
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The Bloods, however, saw nothing magnanimous in the 
Department's gesture. This became abundantly clear when, in 
a vote taken on May 26, 1936, "on the question of renewal of 
Grazing lease granted by the Blood Band of Indians in 1924" 
they voted 186 to four for cancellation. Lm 
Environmental conditions, however, continued to 
deteriorate and although the DIA often ignored the wishes of 
the Bloods, it could not ignore the condition of the land. 
In June Agent Pugh estimated that 60,000 acres of the reserve 
were affected by drought and grasshoppers, threatening both 
current lease use and winter grazing prospects. LOI Lessees, 
of course, did not want to pay for land ravaged by 
grasshoppers. As a consequence some lessees were both 
unwilling and unable to carry on with their agreements. In 
200 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, Copy of vote; J.E. Pugh to 
Harold w. McGill, May 29, 1936. Pugh also noted that "the 
voters list carries 340 names, of these 322 were entitled to 
vote, 4 were incarcerated in jail, 14 were resident away from 
the reserve. A number of those who for sickness etc. were 
unable to attend sent in notes to express their vote, this 
was not allowed ••• " 
201 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-l-2 (pt. 1), J.E. 
Pugh to Harold w. McGill, July 7, 1936; NAC, RG 10, vol. 
1538, J.E. Pugh to Harold w. McGill, July 7, 1936. 
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September, for example, Agent Pugh reported that Christian 
Jensen and W.T. Passey, Magrath, holders of lease No. 133 and 
131 respectively, wished to relinquish their holdings. ''The 
reason for vacating in the Jensen case,~~ Pugh wrote "is 
because of shortage of grazing, due to drouth rsic1 and this 
lease being very heavily hit by locusts. In the case of 
Passey, I think it is a matter of inability to carry such a 
large acreage." Llll It is highly likely that Passey's ability 
to carry his "large acreage" was adversely affected by 
climatic conditions. At least one lessee, the Pitcher Sheep 
Co. went out of business .l<H 
When Pugh received petitions for the continuation of 
leases in August he advised the Department against it because 
conditions had worsened to such an extent that the reserve 
could not sustain the stock. In fairness, and because of the 
Indians' decision in the recent vote, Pugh recommended that 
the leases be ended and that lessees be given final 
notification. 104 Christianson was noncommittal, Los agreeing 
202 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to Secretary, DIA, 
September 18, 1936. 
203 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, J.E. Pugh to Representative of 
the Treasury, DIA, September 23, 1936. See also J.E. Pugh to 
Secretary, DIA, September 30, 1936. 
204 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), J.E. 
Pugh to H.W. McGill, August 3, 1936. 
205 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538, M. Christianson to J.E. Pugh, 
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only to cancel one troublesome lease which had no grass and 
from which the owner drove his cattle onto Indian pasture 
ruining it. LLXJ 
The problems faced by the local homesteaders, and their 
impressions of how to best gain relief, were well illustrated 
by M. E. Ririe, Magrath, and his accomplices who inquired 
about lease land in August 1935 to Lethbridge M.P., J.S. 
Stewart. They told Stewart that the lessees were in dire 
straits and they resented having to purchase hay outside of 
their leases from the Indians. Ririe was set straight when 
told that the money from haying was practically the only 
income for some Bloods and that hay land could therefore not 
be leased.loi It is hard to escape the conclusion, however, 
that Ririe felt that he had a right to the wealth and 
convenience of the reserve as if it were public domain. He 
was likely encouraged in this view by the increasingly 
December 3, 1936. 
206 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), 
Billy Heavy Runner to Dr. McGill, September 21, 1936; J.E. 
Pugh to Secretary, DIA, October 15, 1936; J.E. Pugh toM. 
Christianson, November 18, 1936; L.E. Fairbairn to J.E. Pugh, 
November 30, 1936, RG 10, Vol. 1538. In 1938 a request for a 
sheep lease was turned down on the basis of the poor 
condition of the grazing land and the constant "encroaching 
upon the Indians in one way or another" and "the Agent is 
very nearly run off his feet at times trying to adjust 
disputes between the lessees and Indians." See N.E. Tanner 
to Agent Pugh, April 26, 1938; J.E. Pugh to N.E. Tanner, May 
3, 1938; M. Christianson to Secretary, DIA, May 10, 1934. 
207 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), M. 
Christianson to General J. S. Stewart, August 23, 1935. 
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difficult circumstances which, historian James Gray says, 
would have driven ranchers out of southern Alberta could they 
but have extricated themselves • Los 
At the end of 1935 the Department acknowledged the 
Indians' frustration with the leases and their desire to 
cancel the lease agreements about to expire in 1936 and 1937. 
The matter was urgent in that the lessees had to be given 
proper notification. The existing arrangements meant that 
some 145,000 acres of the north end of the reserve were 
alienated in lease contracts. Admittedly the income from the 
leases had been uncertain and now there was the issue of 
environmental damage that further reduced the value and use 
of the land to the Bloods • .ltJl> 
Despite this, in December 1936, the Department 
contemplated leasing 70,000 acres of Blood reserve land.l10 
The only consideration given to the Bloods' feelings was to 
stipulate ten basic provisions for the lease. Among the most 
important were that the land could be used only for grazing, 
wood or timber could not be cut, and that the lease could not 
208 James H. Gray, The Winter Years (Toronto: MacMillan 
of Canada, 1966), p. 109. 
209 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), J.E. 
Pugh to M. Christianson, December 16, 1935; J.C. Caldwell to 
M. Christianson, January 17, 1936. 
210 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), J.E. 
Pugh to M. Christianson, December 8, 1936. 
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be sublet. The lease further stipulated a stock limit of one 
sheep to 10 acres, one cow to 24 acres, and one horse to 20 
acres. Lessees were also prohibited from working private 
business deals with individual Indians without the express 
permission of the Bloods. Given previous experiences the 
most important provision was likely number 10: ltThat if in 
the lessee's area Indians reside thereon, their property 
shall at all times be protected from the lessee's stock, and 
that the Indians shall be permitted to retain their live 
stock holdings on the undefined reservation within his 
lease. uLII 
The Department's determination to lease was probably 
triggered by the desire to reduce growing relief bills. The 
problem of relief expenditures bolstered the perception that 
the Indians had large unproductive land holdings which should 
be more aggressively used by Natives in the furtherance of 
self-support. Inspector of Agencies c. Schmidt believed that 
the benefit of an increase in cattle and grain production 
accrued only to the small minority who had cattle or who 
farmed, while at the same time relief costs increased. The 
Department's response was to encourage the Inspector to 
convince the Indians to lease their 'idle' lands. Ltl 
211 See NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1). 
212 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), C. 
Pant. Schmidt, December 17, 1937; c. Pant. Schmidt to John E. 
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By late 1938, however, it appears that leases were being 
closed out and related issues were being wound up.LB Despite 
new requests for leasing the DIA determined that given the 
condition of the land, and considering the needs of "our 
Special Welfare I[ndian] D[epartment] Herd" the granting of 
new leases was inadvisable. !14 The Department' s perception of 
the well-being of the Bloods and their land, if not the 
Bloods' wishes, now appeared to be uppermost in determining 
the new policy •. us 
Conclusion 
One can only conclude that the absolute defining 
motivation for the leasing system was the general view that 
Pugh, December 17, 1937. For similar details and concerns 
see NAC, RG 10, val. 12648, file 205/32-1, M. Christianson to 
C.P. Schmidt, November 26, 1937. 
113 
- There was no correspondence in this file regarding 
leases for the year 1939. 
21 ~ NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), C. 
Pant. Schmidt to Secretary, D.I.A., March 25, 1941. 
215 NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), 
Anthony McMillan to c. Pant. Schmidt, September 24, 1942; C. 
Pant. Schmidt to J. E. Pugh, August 23, 1944; A. McMillan to 
Harold W. McGill, March 27, 1942; NAC, RG 10, vol. 12648, 
file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), J.E. Pugh to C. Pant Schmidt, 
February 8, 1940; NAC, RG 10, val. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 
(pt. 1), T.R.L. Macinnes, to c. Pant. Schmidt, February 20, 
1940; NAC, RG 10, val. 12648, file 103/32-1-2 (pt. 1), T.R.L. 
Macinnes to c. Pant. Schmidt, March 3, 1941. 
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unleased Indian land was wasted land. llh Perhaps there was no 
uniform approach that could cater to the variety of 
conflicting agendas that emerged over time. The Bloods based 
their decisions on their perceived needs for use of their 
land and for income and their desire to control their own 
affairs. The agent, caught in a difficult situation, had to 
take into account the Bloods• desires, his duty to protect 
their interests and the application of the Department•s 
dictums. The Department, an arm of the government of White 
Canada, held the Bloods in legal and paternalistic wardship 
and was generally responsible to the direction of the non-
Native population. Riled ranchers and homesteaders 
petitioning Frank Oliver, circa 1902, summed up the enduring 
economic and political reality of the west: that the Indians 
were wards of the government and the government .. servant of 
the people .. and the Indians were, therefore, in a position to 
be coerced according to the will of the White man • . ni 
The unpredictable environment and the demands of local 
ranchers and homesteaders further militated against the 
216 Helen Buckley, From Wooden Ploughs To Welfare: Why 
Indian Policy Failed in the Prairie Provinces (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen·s University Press, 1992), p. 57. 
217 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1535, pp. 188-89, Petition for the 
keeping of Indian Horses on their own reserve, E. Hillzer, G. 
Pearson, E.J. Muldoon, Alf. H. Anderston, Geo. Anderton, John 
Smith, J.R. Allan, R.O. Sykes, John George Brown to Hon. 
Frank Oliver, nd. 
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smooth functioning of the bureaucratic machine. Little 
wonder that the Bloods' needs were often placed last on the 
agenda. It was generally the case that those in charge of 
administering the Bloods' affairs felt that they knew best 
what the Bloods wanted and needed. One historian has stated 
that protecting the integrity of Indian land "is perhaps the 
principal purpose of the Indian Act. " 21 ~ In the case of the 
Blood reserve and the lease system, both the Act and the 
government failed to fulfill that mandate. 
Many agents, however, took their guardianship of the 
Bloods seriously and did their utmost to protect Native 
interests, even to the point of disagreement with officials 
in Ottawa. This behaviour is very much at odds with the 
stereotype of corrupt and dictatorial Indian agents lording 
it over their wards. The Bloods, in conjunction with these 
agents were, at times, able to set and control the reserve 
land agenda. They deliberately chose to integrate their 
reserve into a larger community land base. It was not, 
however, always easy to enforce the limits of this 
integration as they defined them or wished them to be. Too 
often the White clients of the Bloods sought to evade their 
legitimate responsibilities. 
218 11 d" dm" . . A an G. Harper, "Canada's In ~an A ~n~strat~on: 
The ' Indian Act' , " America Indigena (Vol. 6, No. 4, October, 
1946), p. 307. 
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The Department of Indian Affairs brokered the 
relationship between the Bloods and their neighbours and in 
the end satisfied neither. But business carried on driven by 
the need for a scarce commodity of much value and in great 
demand, accessible land. By an ironic twist the Bloods, 
though dispossessed of their vast traditional land holdings 
by treaty in 1877, now possessed a large area of reserve land 
which had become a most valued commodity in the agrarian-
based culture of southern Alberta. It was this inheritance 
that both encouraged and determined the nature of the 
economic dynamic between them and their neighbours. The 
Bloods possessed land for which their neighbours had a real 
and imagined need. However, because the Bloods' powers to 
protect the reserve's integrity were limited, an economic 
cooperation developed between the Bloods and their 
neighbours. For those individuals driven to, or inclined to, 
the use of the Blood reserve, its availability was a critical 
factor in their future planning for which no suitable 
alternative existed. Treaty 7, by taking Indian land 
surrenders, had laid the basis for the establishment of the 
ranching and agricultural frontiers. But by setting out the 
principles for institutionalizing the Blood reserve, the 
treaty had determined there would be economic interplay 




'Selling to Outsiders•: Marketing Coal, Bay and Freighting 
Services 
Introduction 
Many historians have accepted the premise that Native 
Canadians have participated little in the national economy 
and thus their activities in local economic environments have 
been largely ignored as an area of study. 1 Where attention 
has been directed to examine the inclusion of Indians in the 
work place, the conclusion has been that, hamstrung by 
bureaucratic indifference to their needs and interference in 
their plans, they have not been able to overcome Anglo-
Canadian competition for available resources.! There is, 
1 Walter Hildebrandt has observed that "for Native 
people, inclusion in the national and international economy 
had not been carefully planned at all." Walter Hildebrandt, 
Views from Fort Battleford: Constructed Visions of an Anglo-
Canadian West (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 
1994), p. 49. Hildebrandt gave little attention to the Cree 
around Battleford. Hana Samek paid scant attention to 
Canadian Blackfoot economic interaction with the communities 
surrounding the various reserves generally viewing the 
reserves in isolation. Hana Samek, The Blackfoot Confederacy 
1880-1920: A Comparative Study of Canadian and u.s. Indian 
Policy (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 
pp. 70-86. 
) 
- See for example Anthony G. Gulig, "Sizing up the 
Catch: Native-Newcomer Resource Competition and the Early 
Years of Saskatchewan's Northern Commercial Fishery," 
Saskatchewan HistohY (Fall, 1995), pp. 3-12. Complaints 
about native competition in the market place led to the 
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however, an emerging consensus among social scientists that 
Native peoples were participants in, and contributors to, the 
capitalist economy, even in an era of perceived 
'irrelevance'.~ This finding should not be surprising, 
imposition of the permit system restricting off-reserve sales 
of Native produce. Sarah Carter, "Two Acres And A Cow: 
'Peasant' Farming for the Indians of the Northwest, 1889-97," 
Canadian Historical Review Vol. LXX, No. 1 (March, 1989), pp. 
36-37; Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve 
Farmers And Government Policy (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1990), pp. 156-157; Samek, The Blackfoot, 
p. 77; Robin Fisher, Contact And Conflict: Indian-European 
Relations In British Columbia. 1774-1890 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1980), pp. 109-111; 
Jane Gibson, "Native Responses To Bureaucratic Farm 
Management In Western Canadian Indian Reserves, 1880-1920," 
The western canadian Anthropologist, Vol. 7, Nos. 1 and 2 
(1990), p. 77. 
3 Steven High, "Native Wage Labour," pp. 243-44. The 
'era of irrelevance' is the period from the end of the fur 
trade in the mid nineteenth century to World War II. For a 
recent and detailed analysis of Native participation in local 
and extended economies see Frank Tough, 'As Their natural 
Resources Fail': Native Peoples And The Economic History Of 
Northern Manitoba, 1870-1930 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1996); John Lutz argues that natives 
"were the main labour force of the early settlement era, 
essential to the capitalist development of British Columbia." 
John Lutz, "After the fur trade: the aboriginal labouring 
class of British Columbia 1849-1890," Journal of the CHA, 
1992, p. 70. See also Frank Tough, "Buying Out The Bay: 
Aboriginal Rights and the Economic Policies of the Department 
of Indian Affairs after 1870," in David R. Miller et. al. 
(eds.), The First Ones: Readings In Indian/Native Studies 
(Piapot Indian Reserve #75: Saskatchewan Indian Federated 
College Press, 1992), p. 405; Notable exceptions to the above 
are Stuart Jamieson, "Native Indians and the Trade Union 
Movement in British Columbia," Human Organization, Vol. 20, 
No. 4 (Winter 1961-2), pp. 219-225 and Rolf Knight, Indians 
At Work: An Informal History Of Native Indian Labour in 
British Columbia 1858-1930 (Vancouver: New Star Books, 
1978). None of these studies emphasize circumstances in 
158 
especially for the southern Alberta region. The close 
proximity of Native groups to Anglo-Canadian settlements and 
the destruction or altering of the pre-White settlement 
environment occurred to such an extent that traditional 
economic behaviours were practically rendered obsolete. The 
Bloods, like their non-Native neighbours, faced basic 
problems of survival. The search for solutions dictated 
participation in the local economies to which various Native 
groups found themselves attached. For many, the only means 
of acquiring credit, currency and merchandise was through 
providing a market commodity in the form of goods or 
services, the latter often in the form of labour depending on 
the season. From the 1890s to the 1930s, especially during 
the early decades, some Bloods immersed themselves in 
economic activities in response to local economic needs. 
The western Canadian economy was laid on a foundation of 
agriculture and basic extractive industries such as coal 
mining. Both of these were labour-intensive, mining 
requiring a continual supply of labour and agriculture 
requiring seasonal workers especially during the fall 
harvests. From the beginning the west was plagued by labour 
shortages which drew immigrants to work the coal fields and 
harvest crops in southern Alberta and British Columbia. 
Indeed, harvest excursions encouraged by the government and 
southern Alberta. 
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railways witnessed yearly migrations of workers from eastern 
Canada, the United States and Europe to labour in the fields 
were a response to perennial labour problems.~ 
This situation increased market opportunities for the 
Blood entrepreneurs and labourers. The growing population of 
immigrants determined to make their homes on the prairies 
combined with seasonal floods of itinerant workers created 
demand for the Bloods' products and labour. Thus they became 
participants in the market economy offering the commodities 
they produced and competing with others engaged in coal 
mining, haying and freighting. Through their efforts the 
Bloods provided both commercially viable products and labour 
service which lessened the market impact of competitors. 
By the early 1890's most Bloods had come to grips with 
changed circumstance such as the loss of the buffalo and the 
4 John Herd Thompson, "Bringing in the Sheaves: The 
Harvest Excursionists, 1890-1929," The Canadian Historical 
Review (Vol. LIX, No. 4, December 1978), p. 468; W.J.C. 
Cherwinski, "A Miniature Coxey's Army: The British 
Harvesters' Toronto-to-Ottawa Trek of 1924," Labour/Le 
Travail (Volume 32, Fall 1993), pp. 140-141; W.J.C. 
Cherwinski, "Wooden Horses and Rubber Cows: Training British 
Agricultural Labour for the Canadian Prairies, 1890-1930," 
Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers 1980, p. 
133; For particulars on the 1908 harvest season see W.J.C. 
Cherwinski, "The Incredible Harvest Excursion of 1908," 
Labour/Le Travailleur (Vol. 5, Spring 1980), pp. 57-80; 
Danysk, Hired Hands, pp. 24, 85; John Herd Thompson, The 
Harvests Of War: The Prairie West, 1914-1918 (Toronto: 
McClelland And Stewart Ltd., 1978), pp. 62-63; R. Bruce 
Shepard, "The Mechanized Agricultural Frontier of the 
Canadian Plains," Material History Bulletin, 7 (Spring, 
197 9) , p. 15. 
160 
restrictions imposed by reserve life. Realizing that their 
reserve could not immediately provide a livelihood for all, 
many Bloods adopted strategies suitable for survival in the 
new economic setting. Agents, responsive to the DIA's dual 
goals to both economize and to make Natives self-supporting 
citizens, actively tried to place Bloods in off-reserve 
occupations. Although the program was never fully realized 
some 292 individuals of approximately 1,200 people left the 
Blood reserve for work in 1899-1900. The work opportunities 
were varied: logging, freighting, mail cartage, scouting for 
the police, day labour and seasonal participation in fairs 
h . . . 5 and ex ~b:Lt~ons. It is not clear who these individuals were 
or the length of their absence. If this is a reference only 
5 Fraser Taylor, Standing Alone: A Contemporary 
Blackfoot Indian (Halfmoon Bay: Arbutus Bay Publications, 
1989), p. 31-32. Commentary on Indian involvement in fairs 
and exhibitions tends to focus on social and cultural aspects 
of the events. Little information is contained in the public 
record of the financial or economic arrangements. On fairs 
and exhibitions see E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan 
Campbell Scott And The Administration Of Indian Affairs In 
Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1986), Chapter 9; Keith Regular, ''On Public Display," 
Alberta History, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), p. 1; Daniel 
Francis, The Imaginary Indian: The Image of the Indian in 
Canadian Culture (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1992), PP. 
97-108; Donald G. Wetherell with Irene Kmet, Useful 
Pleasures: The Shaping of Leisure in Alberta 1896-1945 
(Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1990), p. 328. 
Blood Indian Mike Mountain Horse, among others did scout work 
for the Mounted Police. He also spent considerable time off 
the reserve living among White society. Mike Mountain Horse, 
My People The Bloods (Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Institute, 
1979), pp.v-xi. 
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to working males then a substantial percentage of the male 
working population of the reserve worked away during this 
brief period and is a clear indication of the Bloods' 
economic significance. It is likely that some of these men 
were accompanied by family which added to the percentage of 
reserve absentees. 
For those wishing to stay on the reserve coal mining, 
haying, cattle ranching and agriculture, some in support of 
White entrepreneurial initiatives, were the occupations of 
choice.(! The focus of this chapter will be on the economic 
interaction of the Bloods with the local community. Emphasis 
will be placed on their roles as coal and hay merchants and 
as freighters because these were significant points of 
interaction between the Bloods and their neighbours. These 
offered, for the Bloods, the greatest opportunities for both 
employment and the sale of reserve resources. This work was 
encouraged by the agents and the DIA as training in the ways 
of 'civilization' that would ultimately lead to the Bloods' 
economic independence. It will become clear, however, that 
as the non-Native economy developed, the Bloods' attachment 
to and participation in the local economy was deliberate and 
considerable and changed with time and circumstance. 
6 Taylor, Standing Alone, p. 31-32. 
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Market Activities 
One of the first commodities offered for sale by the 
Bloods was coal which they began mining in 1890. The first 
coal mine was small. The coal was dug initially with pick 
and shovel from a coal seam, likely of a non-coking 
bituminous or sub-bituminous variety,i located in a cutbank 
about twenty miles from the agency. Afterwards the 
assistance of two or three men was all that was required to 
work the seam. However, the operator, Heavy Gun was 
ambitious and opened a tunnel and laid rails for a car in 
which to bring coal to the surface.~ Eventually two rooms 
were opened with an air course, shoot and screen for cleaning 
the coal and a loading bank.') 
As a commercial venture mining was hampered by lack of 
quality and inconsistency of output. Though limited the 
operation was in part driven by the prospect of "selling to 
7 C.B. Beaty, "Geomorphology, Geology and Non-
Agricultural Resources," in F. Jankunis, (ed.), Southern 
Alberta: A Regional Perspective (Lethbridge: The University 
of Lethbridge, 1972), p. 18. 
8 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, July 20, 1894. 
9 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Extract from copy 
of letter dated Blood Agency Macleod, December 6, 1895. 
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outsiders," that is "marketed by the Indians themselves."ltl 
Agent James Wilson, however, believed that opportunities for 
off-reserve sales were limited by low quality and 
competition. The coal seam, he reported, was divided into 
three layers with slate between each. Mixed with the coal 
was also a large amount of white mineral "which causes a 
large accumulation of ashes and keeps the coal from burning." 
This condition made it both expensive to mine and reduced its 
value. However, Wilson did believe that the mine could 
supply reserve needs for the hospital, mission and agency. 11 
Though experiencing some initial success the mine 
operated with difficulty and Wilson felt that some of the 
problems were due to the absence of 'white' expertise. 12 The 
work remained generally unsupervised, except for the 
lO NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, A.E. Forget to 
Deputy of the Supt. Gen'l of Indian Affairs, June 21, 1890. 
For other commentary see RG 10, vol. 1557, pp. 575-576, W. 
Pocklington to Indian Commissioner, June 12, 1890. See 
letter dated June 30, 1890; A.E. Forget to Deputy of the 
Supt. Gen'. of Indian Affairs, January 21, 1892; RG 10, vol. 
1557, pp. 721-722, w. Pocklington to Indian Commissioner, 
August 30, 1890. See also pp. 694-696, w. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, August 12, 1890; RG 10, vol. 1558, pp. 
92-94, w. Pocklington to Indian Commissioner, December 1, 
1890; Hugh A. Dempsey, Red Crow: Warrior Chief (Saskatoon: 
Western Prairie Producer Books, 1980), pp. 198-199. 
11 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, August 22, 1893, pp. 422-425. 
12 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, December 24, 1896. 
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involvement of the agent, until the accidental death of 
Mistaken Chief at the mine in 1930, and thereafter operations 
were more closely supervised by "a coal mining expert." 13 
Generally while it operated, however, the Blood reserve coal 
mine was solely a Native operation, jealously guarded by the 
Bloods and the only White participation was in an advisory 
capacity. 
Despite its limitations the Blood reserve mine 
intermittently produced marketable coal, though in small 
quantities. Having their own transportation and being 
closely situated to Fort Macleod and the surrounding area 
made the Blood coal mine competitive. In February, 1894, the 
Macleod Gazette announced the arrival of Blood reserve coal 
in the town but dismissed the rumor that the coal was 
superior to that produced by the Galt mines at Lethbridge. 1 ~ 
Regardless of the Gazette's disclaimer the mine produced 200 
tons of coal in 1894, 130 for use of the agency, 50 for the 
boarding school and 20 tons for White settlers in Macleod and 
district. 15 Hugh Dempsey reports that an additional 100 tons 
13 NAC, RG 10, val. 7632, file 18103-1, Deputy 
Superintendent General to J.E. Pugh, December 18, 1933. 
1-t NAC, RG 10, val. 7632, file 18103-1, News clipping, 
Macleod Gazette, February 16, 1894. 
15 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, pp. 321-325, James Wilson to 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, August 1, 1894. 
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of reserve coal were sold to the Galt mining company. 1u 
Though perhaps not significant enough to affect the supply or 
price of coal on the local market there was at least a market 
presence. Black Horse, who had taken over the mine 
operations by 1894, approached the business with enthusiasm 
producing approximately 260 tons in the following year, for 
both reserve and public needs. 17 
Though production from the reserve mine was spotty its 
significance is perhaps suggested by the fact that local 
entrepreneurs expressed occasional interest in acquiring the 
mine operations or commercial mining rights on the reserve. 
However, periodic inquiries about coal rights evinced no 
interest from the Department or from Blood leadership. 1s One 
16 Dempsey, Red Crow, p. 199. I have been unable to 
determine why the Galt Company would need to purchase this 
coal. The need to fill a small contract during a temporarly 
coal shortage is, perhaps, an explanation. 
17 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Extract from 
copy of letter dated December 6, 1895, signed by Jas. Wilson. 
Because of the quality of the coal eventually the Mounted 
Police refused to accept it for use at their posts. NAC, RG 
10, val. 7632, file 18103-1, A.E. Forget to Deputy of the 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, February, 17, 1896; 
James Wilson to Hayter Reed, Sept. 17, 1896. 
IS NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, R.N. Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, June 30, 1909; John Harvie to Secretary, DIA, 
January 17, 1907; J.D. McLean to John Harvie, January 30, 
1907; GAI, BIAC, file 63, Indian Agent to A.G. McGuire, July 
15, 1911; Agent to A.G. McGuire July 31, 1911. 
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inquiry made in 1911 was based on a predicted increased need ll} 
likely tied to an ongoing coal strike in southern Alberta 
since April of that year. 20 By January, 1913, this prediction 
had come to pass and the Raymond Leader reported shortages in 
Raymond because Lethbridge's Galt mine could not keep up with 
local demand.n Agent s. Swinford recognized the potential 
for Blood coal sales in light of the rapidly expanding local 
economy when he reported, "To have coal there would be worth 
a lot and be a tremendous advantage not only to those on the 
Reserve but it could be sold to all the settlers across the 
Belly River and would give those Indians who cares to work a 
chance to make a good living all winter long."L! However, 
with too many 'domestic' coal producers and with the seasonal 
nature of the demand for fuel, such expressions of hope were 
misplaced • .!:i 
Fuel shortages occurred intermittently during the next 
several years increasing the value of potentially productive 
19 GAI, BIAC, file 63, A. G. McGuire(?] to William Hyde, 
July 27, 1911. 
20 Lethbridge Herald, June 15, 1911, p. 1. 
2l Raymond Leader, January 23, 1913, p. 4. 
22 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1547, pp. 153-154, S. Swinford to 
Secretary, DIA, October 3, 1913. 
23 . DavLd J. Bercuson (ed.), Alberta's Coal Industry 1919 
(Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1978), pp. viii, x. 
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coal seams on the Blood reserve. This was particularly so 
during World War I when demand was high and labour was in 
short supply. For example, the desire by local individuals 
to open and operate coal seams led to a minor squabble in 
1917 when Frank Bruce and N.X. Hansen, Hill Spring "entered 
into a contract with some Indian residing in the Blood 
Reserve". They subsequently opened a vein with the intention 
of supplying their own community and Glenwoodville (Glenwood) 
with coal. When the small mine became productive, however, 
the Bloods refused permission to mine causing the men to seek 
legal advice. Their attorney, z.w. Jacobs, Cardston, 
attempted to persuade the Honorable C.A. Magrath, Fuel 
Controller, Ottawa, that as a result of the thwarted coal 
production "the people in that locality are experiencing 
considerable difficulty in obtaining fuel ••• "24 The Fuel 
Controller's Office pointed out that as the greatest possible 
coal production was important in wartime the matter should be 
looked into with a view to allowing mining to resume.~ 
Permission was granted only "on the distinct understanding, 
however, that this is not to form a precedent," the 
24 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, z.w. Jacobs to 
C.A. Magrath, January 3, 1918. 
25 NAC, RG 10, val. 7632, file 18103-1, c.w. Peterson to 
D.C. Scott, January 10, 1918; Duncan C. Scott to W.J. 
Dilworth, January 12, 1918. 
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Department in this instance considering only "the existing 
exceptional circumstances. nlG 
Although some elected politicians might express regret 
that Natives competed with White enterprise, 17 senior 
Department officials were faced with the agent's plans for 
the Indians and the need to balance the books. 2~ As a result, 
the desire to have Indians pay their own way overcame 
reservations about market place competition. For example, 
Agent J.T. Faunt, in the face of complaints from local 
producers, affirmed his belief in the Bloods' right to market 
coal and indicated that they were certainly competitive 
locally. He estimated that the Bloods sold at least 200 tons 
in December 1920. Faunt further observed that the mine had 
been in operation for over three decades and that in 1921 
~~more coal has been taken out than usual, as I have been 
encouraging the Indians in this work, as on account of the 
26 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Deputy 
Superintendent General to W.J. Dilworth, January 21, 1918. 
Dilworth subsequently noted his belief that there was no coal 
shortage in the area. 
)-
_, Frank Oliver, an independent Liberal from Alberta, 
was of the opinion that "educating these Indians to compete 
industrially with our own people" was a "very undesirable use 
of public money •.• " House of Commons Debates, 1899, Cols. 
5725-26, June 22, 1899. 
28 D.J. Hall, "Clifford Sifton And Canadian Indian 
Administration 1896-1905," Prairie Forum, Vol. 2, No. 2 
(1977), p. 130. 
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crop failure at the North end of the Reserve, this appeared 
to me as a means of putting some of them through the winter 
. h ~ w~th no expense tote Department."- D.C. Scott reinforced 
Faunt's position and stressed that Blood coal producers were 
not to be interfered with in their usual practice of selling 
their coal on the open market. 30 
In this case the DIA justified Blood competition in the 
market place because of the savings it produced for the 
Department. This was certainly the case in 1934 when 
Inspector M. Christianson reported: 
..• as long as the Indians of this band had nothing 
to work at during the winter we would be called on 
from time to time to issue rations to them ••• In 
1919 we had a total crop failure on this reserve: 
everything was burned off - even the grass. We 
lost about 40% of our cattle herds during the 
winter of 1919-1920 ••• on the Blood Reserve, if we 
have not grain or livestock to sell the Indians are 
not able to make a living and we simply have to 
call upon the Department for assistance. That is 
why I have been so anxious to get a coal mine going 
as that seems to be the only natural resource on 
this reserve that there is any chance of 
developing. 31 
29 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, J.T. Faunt to 
Secretary, DIA, February 25, 1921. The coal was being sold 
at $8.50 per ton. 
30 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Duncan c. Scott 
to c.s. Finnie, March 14, 1921. 
31 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, M. Christianson 
to Doctor McGill, January 29, 1934. 
170 
On at least one occasion, however, when the Bloods were 
not able to supply sufficient product to meet local demands 
permission was given to Whites to enter and remove resources 
from the reserve. Despite the fact that Blood miners were 
already working a coal area in 1934 Agent Pugh issued over 
200 passes for farmers from Glenwoodville and Hill Spring to 
enter the reserve and take coal from the river bottom. There 
is no indication what charge, if any, was made for this coal. 
Christianson did believe that demand was such that a new 
Blood mining operation could be profitable during the winter 
as farmers, temporarily idle, had the resources and time to 
purchase and haul coal provided they could acquire the fuel 
at a reasonable price. 3l Clearly, there were times when the 
official policy and the aims it envisioned were not 
applicable to local circumstances. The policy was then 
modified to suit local situations. 
The coal venture on the reserve, though having 
occasional market influence, never established a definitive 
market presence. Operations continued sporadically during 
the 1920s and 1930s. In November 1933, Blood miners and 
freighters were hauling coal to the Raymond sugar factory and 
the factory had been given permission to haul from the 
reserve. Prospecting for coal on the reserve also 
32 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, M. Christianson 
to Doctor McGill, January 29, 1934. 
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continued.·'-' It is likely that Blood reserve coal mining 
became unprofitable over time due to poor quality,~ 
inadequate capacity, competition and shifts in market demand. 
Like coal, the cutting, sale and hauling of hay afforded 
Blood hay producers opportunities to compete in the local 
market. It is difficult to determine how much of the reserve 
acreage was dedicated to hay at any one time. Production, as 
with other crops, was determined both by climatic conditions, 
especially rainfall, and natural disasters such as fire. 
Yield per acre, therefore, varied. In 1876 one settler in 
the Red River area estimated that each acre of prairie could 
yield three to four tons of hay. -~5 The yields on the Blood 
reserve varied from year to year and such variations were 
caused by changes in the numbers of acres given to hay as 
33 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Extract from a 
latter by J.E. Pugh, November 30, 1933. 
34 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, J.E. Pugh to 
H.W. McGill, December 22, 1933; F.W. Steel to H.W. McGill, 
January 12, 1934; H.W. McGill to The Superintendent General, 
January 16, 1934. 
35 Barry Kaye, "'The Settlers' Grand Difficulty'": 
Haying in the Economy of th~ Red River Settlement," Prairie 
Forum, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 7. 
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well as to the impact of climatic conditions. 
Haying was done in summer and employed both men and 
machinery. Initially the haying crews utilized basic tools 
such as scythes, mowers and forks. From about 1900 the 
introduction of hay loaders eased the toil of loading wagons 
and the development of overhead horseforks and slings 
simplified stacking. Eventually mechanical mowers, side 
delivery rakes and hay tedders increased both capacity and 
efficiency but these also required more expert personnel. _,h 
When machinery was used a crew was required to run and 
maintain the equipment through to the end of the haying._,; 
With hay production, just as with coal, the Bloods' own 
needs took priority over market sales. In 1890, for example, 
although Agent Pocklington encouraged Blood producers to 
supply the NWMP detachments of Big Bend and Stand Off he 
declined to contract 250 tons for Lethbridge, claiming a 
*If the maximum four tons is taken as an average then 
2,500 acres of land were needed to grow the 10,000 tons of 
hay harvested in 1914. 
36 Tony Ward, "Farming Technology and Crop Area on Early 
Prairie Farms," Prairie Forum, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1995), 
p. 25. 
37 With grain, for example, fifteen or twenty men were 
needed for a harvesting crew. Ernest B. Ingles, "The Custom 
Threshermen In Western Canada 1890-1925," in David c. Jones 
and Ian MacPherson (eds.), Building Beyond The Homestead: 
Rural History On The Prairies (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 1985), pp. 138-140. 
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shortage of hay on the reserve and in the district.Ax 
Therefore, in seasons of scarcity considerable effort was 
required to fill contracts. Chief Moon, for example, had to 
haul hay 20 miles to fill the terms of his contract with the 
North west Mounted Police. Jl) When the season was over agent 
Pocklington concluded that, in future, such contracts should 
be declined unless the Indians received more transport and 
more machines with which to do the work.~ 1 
In July, 1891, Pocklington succeeded in securing the 
contract to supply 40 tons of hay to the Stand Off Police 
Detachment and, despite the poor season, fulfilled the 
contract in October. Other reserve residents entered into 
other arrangements such as cutting hay on a share basis with 
local White settlers adjacent to the reserve. These 
agreements, as described by Agent Pocklington, had Whites 
supplying the machinery and horses and the Bloods the labour. 
The Bloods then sold their share of the hay to the Whites. 
An added bonus to this arrangement, in the eyes of the agent, 
38 The price for the hay was at fifteen dollars per ton. 
NAC, RG 10, vol. 1557, pp. 631-33, w. Pocklington to Indian 
Commissioner, July 10, 1890. 
39 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1557, pp. 723-25, J. Wilson, farmer, 
tow. Pocklington, August 27, 1890. On hay shortages see 
also pp. 680-682, w. Pocklington to Indian Commissioner, 
July 31, 1890. 
~0 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1557, pp. 730-33, w. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, September 4, 1890. 
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was that Blood farmers had become familiar with the operation 
of agricultural machinery which the Department was so anxious 
to deny them. 41 
At the same time Heavy Gun, who had overcome 
departmental resistance and acquired his own machinery, was 
cutting for himself and two others and was putting up hay for 
a beef contractor, 4l likely the Cochrane Ranche. According 
to Pocklington the Indians put up 68 tons of hay for the 
contractor for which they were paid $3. 00 per ton.,._; The 
agricultural tabular statement of December, 1891, shows that 
the Bloods harvested 168 tons of hay both individually and on 
share agreements with Whites.~ It is likely that the 
Indians' sale of their portion of the harvest was an agreed 
upon part of the share arrangement. It is not clear whether 
or not they could withhold their hay for their own needs in 
the event of hay shortages. There was, for example, a hay 
shortage in July, 1892, and on this occasion the agent, on 
4
l NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 370-71, w. Pocklington to 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, July 22, 1891; p. 
405, w. Pocklington to Indian Commissioner, August 3, 1891. 
42 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 370-71, p. 405-06, W. 
Pocklington to Indian Commissioner, August 3, 1891. 
43 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, pp. 449-51, w. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, August 31, 1891. 
44 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 650, S. Swinfords to Indian 
Commissioner, December 29, 1891. 
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behalf of Blood farmers, declined a contract to supply the 
police.~ 
In another case during the 1893 season Agent James Wilson 
thought it advisable not to attempt to fill a hay contract 
for the St. Mary's Detachment, citing the difficulty in 
securing the quality and quantity desired by the police 
because of a very poor growing season.~· Wilson did feel that 
he could supply 15 tons to the Big Bend Detachment, and the 
same for the Kootenai Detachment "as hay in the neighbourhood 
of these places is good and plentiful." Wilson wanted six 
dollars per ton and he pointed out to Inspector Sam Steele 
that a White man would oversee the work to ensure that the 
quality of the hay was satisfactory.~ Eventually Wilson 
agreed to provide 135 tons of hay to all the various 
detachments ~ At the same time other Bloods were contracting 
45 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 370-71, p. 842, S. 
Swinfords to Inspector Begin, July 20, 1892. 
46 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, p. 373, James Wilson to R. 
Burton Deane, July 13, 1893. 
47 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, pp. 387-88, James Wilson to 
S.B. Steele, July 25, 1893. 
48 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, p. 390, James Wilson to S.B. 
Steele, July 27, 1893. The contract for Big Bend and 
Kootenai would bring $5.50 per ton of 600 cub. feet. See p. 
394, James Wilson to S.B. Steele, August 2, 1893. 
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with White settlers.~ Wilson also actively sought a contract 
to supply hay to the New Oxley Ranche Company. 50 
Wilson, however, did not always calculate the needs of 
the reserve correctly and in his enthusiasm to find 
employment for some Bloods may have, in 1893, oversold the 
reserve's hay. When approached by Father Legal for 10 tons 
of hay to see the two hospital cows through the winter Wilson 
refused and confessed to the likelihood of a winter shortage. 
He requested departmental permission to purchase hay from any 
Indians who had extra for sale. ~ 1 
During times of shortage the agent's permission to sell 
reserve hay to outsiders was refused and unauthorized sales 
discouraged. In 1899, for example, Agent Wilson requested 
police assistance to stop hay sales in Lethbridge. In cases 
where individuals were caught attempting such sales the 
police were requested to seize the Indians' hay and sell it, 
remitting the proceeds to Wison. With reserve farmers 
complaining that much needed hay was being spirited away at 
49 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, p. 400, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, August 3, 1893. 
50 NAC, RG 10, val. 1559, p. 407, James Wilson to A.R. 
Springett, August 18, 1893. 
51 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, pp. 495-97, James Wilson to 
[Indian Commissioner], October 2, 1893. 
night Wilson•s concern was for winter shortage. 52 
There were some legitimate hay sales to locals, 53 
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however, as Wilson, guided by circumstances, continued his 
efforts to gain market advantage for Blood farmers in 
securing contracts to supply the Mounted Police with hay. In 
June 1899, he inquired as to whether his tender to deliver 
hay for the police would be accepted without a deposit as in 
the past, even though others were required to do so.~ The 
tender that Wilson eventually submitted was for hay delivered 
to the Kootenai, Stand Off, and Kipp Detachments. 55 Wilson 
also secured a contract for the delivery of oats to the Stand 
Off, St. Mary•s, Kootenai, Big Bend, and Cardston 
52 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, p. 437, James Wilson to 
Commanding Officer, NWMP, Lethbridge, Sept. 21, 1899. 
53 On October 18, 1899, Wilson billed w.s. Anderton of 
Macleod for $250.96 for hay delivered. It is unclear whether 
or not this hay originated with the reserve or was just 
freighted under contract from some other source. NAC, RG 10, 
val. 1564, p. 470, James Wilson to w.s. Anderton, October 18, 
1899. See also pages 471 and 473. 
54 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, p. 336, James Wilson to R. 
Burton Deane, June 12, 1899. 
55 NAC, RG 10, val. 1564, p. 347, James Wilson to 
Superintendent Commanding, NWMP, Macleod, June 27, 1899. For 
1899 the Bloods put up 2,269 tons of hay of which 1,186 tons 
were sold to the NWMP, Cochrane Ranche and settlers bringing 
approximately $5,900. See CSP No. 27, 1900, p. 138. 
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Figure 4.1 - Adapted by author from the Lethbridge Herald February 24, 
1976 , 
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Detachments. 5h (Figure 4. 1) What special consideration, if 
any, was given to Wilson to secure this contract is unclear 
but special favours from one government Department to another 
is a likely explanation. It is also possible that Wilson 
managed to underbid others because Blood producers were 
willing to contract their produce and services for less. 
Whatever the circumstances, nonetheless, the Bloods' 
presence in this market did affect supply and price. In 1901 
the Lethbridge News reported that the reserve sold over 1,000 
tons of hay "in filling police and ranchers' contracts, to 
livery stables and citizens of Macleod and Lethbridge ... s; 
P.C.H. Primrose, Mounted Police, reported from Macleod that 
hay was very expensive in 1903 because the Indians were not 
selling as much as before. 5H By 1906 Blood producers were so 
56 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, p. 474, James Wilson to R. 
Burton Deane, October 25, 1899. 
57 Lethbridge News, March 7, 1901, p. 7. The agent's 
report for 1901 notes that "Situated as the reserve is, near 
to Macleod, Lethbridge, and Cardston, a good demand is always 
had for hay in these places, and at fairly remunerative 
prices, while the larger ranches along the rivers and 
boundary lines also look to the Indians to put up their 
supply." CSP, No. 27, 1902, p. 128. See also NAC, RG 18, 
vol. 218, file 469, H.S. Casey to Officer Commanding 'K' 
Division, N.W.M.P., August 8, 1901; Joseph Howe to 
Commissioner, N.W.M.P., August 30, 1901. 
58 CSP, 28, No. 11, 1904, p. 73. It is difficult to 
determine the accuracy of this statement. The agent's report 
for 1903 states that the Bloods put up a total of 3,500 tons 
of hay and sold 1,200 tons to the police and local settlers 
for prices ranging from $4.50 and $7.50 per ton. This range 
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prominent with their hay sales that the Macleod Gazette 
called them the "hay maker[s] of southern Alberta." The 
Gazette reported the Bloods were taking large contracts to 
supply livery stables and local ranchers "usually filling the 
contracts in short order." 5'' 
The making of hay both for on and off-reserve continued 
to be an important source of income for Blood farmers. Agent 
W.J. Dilworth reported in 1914 that "nearly every adult puts 
up every year a large quantity of hay for sale. "hll During 
August, 1914, the Bloods put up more hay than ever before 
providing 1,353 tons for agency consumption plus 4,000 tons 
for their own use. They had also provided 300 of a 1,500 ton 
lessee contract as well as contracts to provide 242 tons to 
various Mounted Police posts, and additional contracts for 
500 tons. The agent reported that "No difficulty has been 
experienced in getting them to do this work. nhl 
in prices suggests that the Bloods may have been withholding 
hay from the market or from the police, because of 
unhappiness with the price. The Bloods harvested 
approximately the same &~aunt of hay in 1901, at 3,451 tons. 
See CSP, No. 27, 1904, p. 141 and CSP, No. 27, 1902, p. 128. 
59 Macleod Gazette, February 27, 1906, p. 2. 
60 CSP, No. 27, 1914, p. 70. 
61 The previous year total contracts called for only 170 
tons and haying was not completed until Oct. 1st 1913. NAC, 
RG 10, val. 1547, p. 222, Unsigned letter, August 22, 1914. 
Agent Dilworth's report for 1914-15 stipulates that the 
Bloods harvested 10,000 tons of hay for which they realized 
$30,000. CSP, No. 27, 1915, p. 77. 
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Blood hay makers were certainly a market presence and it 
is only sensible to conclude that besides being competitive 
in pricing labour, they did good work and delivered a high 
quality product which helped them to sustain their market 
share. A copy of a 1915 hay contract between the NWMP and 
Agent Dilworth indicates that the police were exacting in 
their specifications. The contract called for 108 tons of 
hay delivered to Barracks at Macleod between October 1914 and 
June 1915 with the specification being "That the hay shall be 
Upland Bunch Grass Hay No. 1 quality of this year's crop, 
well cured, free from weeds, dirt and old bottom that it 
shall be subject to inspection and rejection as delivered ••• " 
The Bloods were to be paid $12.00 per ton. Interestingly, 
section four of the contract requiring the bidder to deposit 
five percent of the value of the contract was deleted. 
Should the Indians fail in their contract with regard to 
quality or quantity the contract stipulated that other 
sources would be sought to make up the remainder, with the 
Bloods liable for the difference in price. hl When it became 
clear in May that they would default on their contract, 74 
tons of more expensive hay had to be purchased elsewhere at a 
62 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7595, file 10103, pt. 2; Contract 
between RNWM Police, Macleod and W.J. Dilworth, Blood 
Reserve, August 21, 1914. 
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loss to the government of $131.10. The Police comptroller 
deducted this from the amount due the Indians.w 
There is little comment on the haying activities of the 
Bloods in later years, but one suspects that some hay sales 
continued, much as they did for the Blackfoot, for example, 
in subsequent decades.l~ Leasing to Whites continued on the 
reserve well beyond the period of study and it is likely that 
the Bloods continued to supply hay on at least an occasional 
basis, if not more often. Grazing lands also continued to be 
leased, offering a different approach to the sale of hay. 
Freighting 
Freighting also brought for some Bloods lucrative market 
involvement. It provided opportunities for employment off 
the reserve and was also required to transport the reserve's 
63 There is no indication why, in this instance, the 
Bloods could not furnish the contract. NAC, RG 10, val. 
7595, file 10103, pt. 2, Laurence Fortescue to Duncan c. 
Scott, May 12, 1915; J.D. McLean to Laurence Fortescue, May 
15, 1915. The Bloods themselves, however, could also be 
demanding in their contract specifications. Their 1915 hay 
contract with Gordon Ironsides and Fares, under the terms of 
the company's lease with the Indians, stipulated that the 
company purchase from the Bloods not less than 700 tons at 
the rate of $5.00 per ton. The Bloods, however, were under 
no obligation to supply that amount. When the company wanted 
to break or alter the terms of this agreement the agent 
responded that he was determined to "see that these Indians 
get a square deal." See GAI, BIAC, file 36, Indian Agent to 
Messers. Gordon Ironsides and Fares, August 24, 1915. 
64 Valerie K. Jobson, "The Blackfoot Farming Experiment 
1880-1945," (Calgary: M.A. Thesis, 1990), p. 104. 
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resources to market. This work likely appealed to the Bloods 
because of their involvement with horses, which many of them 
owned. Freighting also offered some flexibility as one could 
accept work when needed or desired. The basic requirements 
were simple; a man needed a wagon and horses, usually 
consisting of two or four horse teams, the latter appearing 
to have been most common. During the appropriate seasons the 
haulage teams could be very busy with as many as fifty three 
freighters operating at any one time.(n This was a 
substantial commitment of men, wagons and horses. 
Freighting for the Bloods took place along well traveled 
routes. Generally the Indians were engaged in hauling 
reserve coal to the various locations needed on the reserve 
as well as into towns such as Fort Macleod. Among the more 
traveled routes were those connecting the various mines, 
especially at Lethbridge, with the Mounted Police posts in 
southern Alberta. (See Figure 2.5) Also important were the 
routes connecting the reserve and area haylands with the 
local farmers and the ranches, such as the Cochrane Ranche. 
There were also lesser routes taken when Blood freighters 
were engaged in incidental freighting for businesses or 
worked on construction projects such as the irrigation works 
around Cardston. Clearly there was significant opportunity 
65 See list in NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1. 
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for the utilization of the Blood reserve's resources and 
people in the local economy. 
In the case of freighting, the Blood freighters' 
invasion of the market place was based on two simple 
strategies, competitive pricing and influence. They were 
often willing to freight commodities from the various mines 
to the customer at the cheapest rate. Under these 
circumstances they were self-employed with Agent Wilson 
arranging contracts for their services. In 1893 Wilson 
reported that the Galt Coal Company would provide him coal 
for the police contract, at the mine for $3.25 per ton. It 
was Wilson's opinion that the district market would support a 
price of $7.50 a ton and he was hoping for a 100 ton delivery 
at that price to the various Mounted Police posts.l•• The 
$3.25 per ton difference would be clear profit for the 
individuals engaged in this work. 
October of that year proved to be a very busy time for 
coal hauling as preparations were made for getting in a 
winter supply. Agent Wilson reported 20, four horse teams and 
one, two horse team hauling coal to the various police posts. 
The 100 ton contract for the police was completed inside of 
two weeks. Wilson anticipated that this prompt delivery 
66 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, p. 372, James Wilson to Hayter 
Reed, July 13, 1893. 
185 
would result in a larger share of future police contracts. 07 
Clearly Wilson counted on Blood freighters winning contracts 
away from local non-Native haulage contractors. 
In February 1898 the Indians were busy filling their 
coal contract with the NWMP having delivered 280 tons of a 
600 ton contract. hS Wilson also reported that "A number of 
Indians were also engaged [in] purchasing coal on their own 
account and taking it to Macleod for sale" for 11 dollars per 
load. h') He noted in January, 1897, that 49 Bloods earned 
$1,895.96 freighting coaf;-o which compares favourably with the 
$7,510.11 of total earnings declared for 1896.~ 1 The Bloods 
delivered 115 tons of coal to the police at Macleod in late 
1898 and earned $650.00. In requesting speedy payment Wilson 
67 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1559, pp. 535-37, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, November 3, 1893. 
68 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1563, pp. 625-26, James Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, February 11, 1898; RG 10, vol. 1562, pp. 175-
76, James Wilson to Indian Commissioner, December 31, 1896. 
69 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1563, pp. 617-19, James Wilson to 
Commissioner, February 10, 1898. 
70 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1562, p. 258, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, January 27, 1897. See also statements of 
payment on pages 256-57. 
71 Esther s. Goldfrank, Changing Configurations In The 
Social Organization Of A Blackfoot Tribe During The Reserve 
Period: The Blood of Alberta, Canada (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1966), p. 21. 
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pointed out that the "Indians are hard up for money at 
present to purchase winter clothing, extra food, etc ••• "72 
By 1898 Wilson had abandoned any prospect of the Blood 
coal mine being able to produce commercial quality or 
quantities of coal but he continued to obtain delivery 
contracts. In September he gave the police quotations for 
coal delivered to the various southern Alberta detachments.-:-:~ 
His plan was to purchase the coal from other companies and 
resell it, adding a delivery charge. Although police 
Inspector R. Burton Deane tried to drive a hard bargain 
Wilson was inflexible and pointed out to Deane that; besides 
increased coal prices, a shortage of labour in the freighting 
-...~. business placed upward pressure on value.' Wilson, as the 
Bloods' representative, was intent on exploiting prevailing 
market conditions and maximizing returns to Blood freighters 
for the services they provided. 
72 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, James Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, January 12, 1899. With regard to the 
delivery of coal to the police see also James Wilson to 
secretary, DIA, February 15, 1898; Fred White to J.D. McLean, 
April 15, 1898; Fred White to J.D. McLean, April 28, 1898; 
Fred White to J.D. McLean, May 13, 1898; James Wilson to 
Secretary, DIA, June 1, 1898. 
73 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, p. 79, James Wilson to Ross 
Cuthbert, Sept. 19, 1898; p. 430, James Wilson to R. Burton 
Deane, Sept. 12, 1899. 
74 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, p. 457, James Wilson toR. 
Burton Deane, October 6, 1899. 
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The fact that the Mounted Police was the Blood reserve's 
biggest non-agency customer came to the attention of the 
Lethbridge News, which reported, in March 1901, that the 
Bloods in an obviously efficient operation, had delivered 120 
tons of coal to the police in just three days. As well "a 
large quantity of coal" was delivered to the Cochrane Ranche, 
and to a variety of Agency institutions.i5 
The News observed that Blood freighters were significant 
players in the freighter-for-hire marketplace: 
The Indians are very eager to get freighting, but 
although the agent never misses a chance to procure 
it, either in single loads or in large contracts, 
he [the agent} cannot keep them regularly employed. 
This, however, is not surprising: they can turn out 
one hundred and thirty four-horse teams, instantly, 
upon receiving notice that they are wanted. :-~t 
Such communal effort was a significant factor in the Bloods' 
ability to secure freighting contracts and caused White 
freighters and suppliers some concern over the loss of work. 
When shortages of freighting services occurred the 
Bloods were sought out by businesses needing haulage teams. 
The agent noted in his yearly report for 1898 that freighting 
was a principal occupation of the Bloods, including 
freighting for the agency, the NWMP, local ranchers, local 
merchant houses as well as on one occasion freighting lumber 
75 Lethbridge News, March 7, 1901, p. 7. 
76 Lethbridge News, March 7, 1901, p. 7. 
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for the construction of an irrigation canal undertaken by the 
Mormons at Cardston.~ 
After 1901, little detail of the freighting activities 
of the Bloods is available. It is reasonable to assume, 
however, that the Bloods continued to take advantage of 
freighting opportunities offered by local farmers, businesses 
and works projects. In 1914, for example, they were reported 
doing "a large amount of freighting" for local farmers iM and 
during the 1916 harvest season usome 150 teams and 200 men 
availed themselves of the labour at remunerative wages and 
with satisfaction to their employers."''> It is likely that 
Blood freighters were involved in the large irrigation 
projects going on in southern Alberta at this time. As the 
Bloods acquired motor vehicles they could take advantage of 
opportunities farther from the reserve.~) Though treaty 
promises to protect the traditional economy were seldom 
honoured, the Bloods, through their own and their agents' 
initiatives, secured alternative sources of income. 
I I CSP, NO. 14, 1899, 133. p. 
78 CSP, No. 27, 1915, 70. P· 
79 CSP, No. 27, 1917, 73-74. PP· 
80 Hugh A. Dempsey, The Gentle Persuader: A Biography 
of James Gladstone 1 Indian Senator (Saskatoon: Western 
Producer Prairie Books, 1986), P· 85. 
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The Special efforts of Agent Wilson 
When Hayter Reed became Indian Commissioner in 1888, he 
took advantage of existing legislation81 to control or 
regulate Native participation in local economies by isolating 
Indians on reserves and turning them into 'peasant farmers'. 
This was to be accomplished through the use of the 'pass' and 
'permit' systems. A pass gave an Indian the agent's official 
permission to be away from the reserve. The permit granted 
Indians the legal right to dispose of their goods or produce 
in the market place. Evidence shows that some agents were 
very rigid in applying the policy in an attempt to restrict, 
as much as possible, Indian involvement in the market place 
on the one hand, and to encourage the husbanding of the 
reserve's resources on the other.sz In the case of the Bloods 
81 The pass system originated with the 1885 rebellion and 
was intended as a temporary measure to monitor the movement 
of Natives leaving their reserves. It was likely maintained 
following the rebellion because the Department of Indian 
Affairs recognized it as an expedient method of control over 
many aspects of Native cultural life and other activities. 
See Blair Stonechild and Bill Waiser, Loyal till Death: 
Indians and the North-West Rebellion (Calgary: Fifth House 
Ltd., 1997), pp. 216, 250-253. 
82 Commentary on the efficacy of the pass and permit 
systems is mixed. For the Indian view of this system see 
Treaty Seven Elders and Tribal Council, et. al., The True 
Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: MeGill-
Queen's University Press, 1996), pp. 136-7, 146-7, 150-1, 
152,155. For other commentary about its intent and scope 
see: J.R. Miller, "OWen Glendower, Hotspur, and Canadian 
Indian Policy,n in David R. Miller, et. al., The First Ones: 
Readings In Indian/Native Studies (Piapot Reserve #75: 
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the pass and permit systems failed to meet the Department's 
expectations for two basic reasons. The first was the 
complicity of reserve and departmental officials in 
undermining the legislation by generally encouraging and 
permitting the Bloods to leave the reserve to work. The 
second was the obvious need and/or desire of the Bloods to 
work off the reserve. 
By the 1890s Blood farmers, in keeping with advancing 
trends in farm mechanization, had become acutely aware of the 
value of machines as labour saving devicess3 and sought to 
acquire them in order to be more productive. Efforts in this 
Saskatchewan Indian Federated College Press, 1992), pp. 253-
254; F. Laurie Baron, "The Indian Pass System in the Canadian 
West, 1882-1935," Prairie Forum, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 
1988), pp. 34-37, on permits see pages 38-39; Rebecca B. 
Bateman, "Talking With The Plow: Agricultural Policy And 
Indian Farming In The Canadian And u.s. Prairies," The 
Canadian Journal of Native Studies, XVI, 2 (1996), pp. 217, 
220. On the Indians as peasant farmers see Sarah Carter, 
.. Two Acres and a Cow: 'Peasant' Farming for the Indians of 
the Northwest, 1889-97," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 
LXX, No. 1 (March 1989), p. 27; Arthur J. Ray, I Have Lived 
Here Since The World Began: An Illustrated History of 
Canada's Native People (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1996), 
p. 256. 
83 Tony Ward, "Farming Technology and Crop Area on Early 
Prairie Farms," Prairie Forum, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), 
p. 25. Shepard says that the awareness of mechanization was 
such that "The early development of the Canadian Plains ••• 
could be called a mechanized agricultural frontier." R. 
Bruce Shepard, "Tractors and Combines in the Second Stage of 
Agricultural Mechanization on the Canadian Plains," Prairie 
Forum, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), p. 254. Machinery came 
increasingly into use with the advancing settlement of the 
west. Ernest B. Ingles, "The Custom Threshermen In Western 
Canada 1890-1925," in David c. Jones and Ian MacPherson 
(eds.), Building Beyond The Homestead: Rural History On The 
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direction were met with little sympathy from the Department 
as they ran counter to commissioner Hayter Reed's desire to 
tie Canada's western Native 'peasant farmers' to the soil.~ 
As expected, Reed's response was that reserve farmers were 
"not to be assisted in the purchase of labour saving 
machines." At the same time Agent William Pocklington noted 
that non-Natives were not to be permitted to cut hay on the 
reserve, instead the Bloods were to be encouraged to cut and 
market the hay themselves. 85 The Department appeared to 
ignore the contradiction of wishing the Blood farmers to 
market a commodity in an increasingly mechanized agricultural 
setting without mechanical assistance.~«'> It is unclear 
whether Pocklington was advising or simply reiterating the 
point made by the Department. But with the Bloods desperate 
for both money and work it is inconceivable that Pocklington 
would grant permits to outsiders to cut reserve hay, in any 
case. 
Prairies (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985), pp. 
136-137. 
84 Sarah Carter, "Two Acres and a Cow: Peasant Farming 
for the Indians of the North-west, 1889-1897," Canadian 
Historical Review 70, No. 1 (1989), p.1 256. 
85 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 208, w. Pocklington to 
Indian Commissioner, March 18, 1891. 
86 R. Bruce Shepard, "The Mechanical Agricultural 
Frontier of the Canadian Plains," Material History Bulletin, 
7 (Spring, 1979), pp. 2-3. 
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But even during Reed's tenure local circumstance and 
cost considerations sometimes took precedence over uofficial" 
policy. Before 1894, for example, the Blood hay producers 
had enjoyed special consideration with regards to the 
granting of government contracts in that the usual 10 percent 
deposit was dispensed with in favour of the Indians. The 
rules for government contracts, however, were altered in that 
year, and not in favour of the Bloods.M7 In June, agent James 
Wilson wrote Superintendent Sam Steele, NWMP, that he could 
put up the hay at the Stand Off Detachment for eight dollars 
per ton instead of the earlier agreed nine.~ The reason for 
this reduction he made clear in a subsequent letter. The 
granting of DIA contracts to Indians was to be placed on the 
same footing as others: to be awarded to the contractors with 
the lowest bids. Wilson petitioned the Indian Commissioner 
to approach the Police Commissioner to secure an agreement 
that 25 percent of the police contracts be held for the 
Indians as was previously the custom. In the meantime he was 
87 It is not immediately clear why the method of letting 
contracts was changed. It could have been in response to 
public pressures or may simply have been a part of efficiency 
measures. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1557, p. 635, w. Pocklington to 
Inspector Steele, July 14, 1890. 
88 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, p. 243, James Wilson to S.B. 
Steele, June 29, 1894. 
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forced to lower his bid to secure work.~~> 
The Bloods' impact on market conditions often depended 
on the agent working on their behalf. In this respect Agent 
James Wilson stood out for his unceasing and untiring 
efforts. In July 1894, for example, the ever aggressive 
Wilson agreed to have the Bloods deliver coal to NWMP 
detachments at Macleod, Kipp and Stand Off from any of the 
Galt, Sharon or Hauk's mines for $7.00, $6.50 and $6.00 per 
ton respectively. •x) On this occasion, however, Wilson· s bid 
to secure the Police contract for Macleod failed and he 
approached W.O. Barclay, Lethbridge, who held the contract, 
with the idea of sub-contracting about 200 tons of the 
contracted amount. If this were not possible he wished to 
have the Bloods hauling coal to Barclay's agents in Fort 
Macleod. Wilson was ostensibly driven by his desire to have 
"some work for these Indians to do during the next month or 
two ... ·li 
89 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, pp. 244-45, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, June 29, 1894; p. 313, James Wilson to 
S.B. Steele. 
90 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, pp. 416-17, James Wilson to 
Superintendent in command, Macleod, August 31, 1894; p. 316, 
James Wilson tow. Stafford, July 30, 1894; p. 317, James 
Wilson to Manager, Galt Mines, July 30, 1894. 
91 NAC, RG 10, val. 1564, p. 446, James Wilson to W.O. 
Barclay, September 5, 1894. 
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Success for the Bloods, as for the remainder of the 
community, also depended upon the vitality of the local 
economy. In January, 1895, Wilson reported that during the 
previous month little outside work was done except for 
minimal freighting of hay and coal. With regard to the 
latter, "sales are hard to make at any price in Macleod at 
')I present ... " -
As a result of Wilson's efforts, however, and their 
willingness to accept whatever contracts were available, a 
number of Blood freighters remained busy. Wilson reported in 
October, 1895: 
The freighting of lumber etc. is quite a serious 
affair at the present moment and I have just 
completed arrangements with Major Steele to haul 
other rsicl 75 tons of coal to Stand Off detachment 
before the middle of the next month and I have also 
made a contract with the Cochrane Ranche Company to 
deliver 40 tons of coal and 4000 bricks. All this 
coal and brick must be hauled from Lethbridge which 
is distant from Stand Off 35 miles and 47 from the 
Cochrane Ranche. 'J:i 
Similarly, Wilson's request that departmental officials 
use their influence to secure work for the Bloods bore fruit. 
92 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, p. 691, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, January 4, 1895. Wilson did not explain the 
difficult circumstances but it may have been due to the ample 
supply of coal in the region. See A.A. den Otter, Civilizing 
the West: The Galts and the Development of Western Canada 
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1982), p. 320. 
93 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1561, pp. 187-89, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, October 7, 1895. 
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Indian Commissioner Hayter Reed wired agent Wilson that "If 
you can freight six hundred tons coal police require at 
Macleod at five ninety five I shall get contract for you ••. u'H 
Reed also wanted the reserve mine to supply various other 
police outposts. lJ5 The Bloods said they could deliver on the 
request."" Although they secured the police contract'>i the 
arrangement collapsed. The police, complaining of the 
quality, refused to accept coal from the Indian mine. lJH The 
Blood teamsters then turned to delivering coal from 
Lethbridge under contract. Although, in this case, 
contracting their haulage equipment to deliver a competitors' 
94 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Hayter Reed to 
Indian Agent Wilson, August 29, 1896. 
95 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Hayter Reed to 
Indian Agent Wilson, Sept. 15, 1896. 
96 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Dean Freeman to 
Deputy Supt. Genl. Indians Affairs, Sept. 5, 1896. 
97 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, James Wilson to 
Hayter Reed, Sept. 8, 1896. 
98 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, James Wilson to 
Hayter Reed, Sept. 17, 1896; A.E. Forget to Deputy of the 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, February, 17, 1896. 
This same source indicates that there was also a fall off in 
demand for Blood coal from the locals at Macleod because of 
problems with quality. 
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coal left the reserve mine without delivery capacityl)lJ it was 
a sensible alternative and secured both work and income. 
What is most interesting about Hayter Reed's involvement 
in acquiring off-reserve employment for the Bloods is that it 
was, as he knew, in direct contradiction to both the spirit 
and letter of "official" departmental policy. liM• Why then did 
he acquire work for the Bloods that was so likely to bring 
them to public notice? As a DIA official Reed was certainly 
aware that the pass system had no legal basis and that the 
North West Mounted Police were reluctant to enforce it. 101 
99 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, Extract from 
Agents Wilson's October Report, November 24, 1896. 
100 On the pass system see: E. Brian Titley, "Hayter Reed 
and Indian Administration in the West," in R.C. Macleod 
(ed.), Swords And Ploughshares: War And Agriculture In 
Western Canada (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 
1993), pp. 117-118; F. Laurie Barron, "The Indian Pass System 
in the Canadian West, 1882-1935," Prairie Forum, Vol. 13, No. 
1 (Spring 1988), pp. 27-30: John Jennings, "The North West 
Mounted Police and Indian Policy after the 1885 Rebellion," 
F. Laurie Barron and James B. Waldram (eds.), 1885 And After: 
Native Society in Transition (Regina: Canadian Plains 
Research Center, 1886), pp. 228-230; Katherine Pettipas, 
Severing the Ties that Bind: Government Repression of 
Indigenous Religious Ceremonies on the Prairies (Winnipeg: 
University of Manitoba Press, 1994), pp. 111-112. On permits 
see Barron, Prairie Forum, p. 39; Carter, Lost Harvests,pp. 
156-158; Peter Douglas Elias, The Dakota of the Canadian 
Northwest: Lessons for Survival (Winnipeg: University of 
Manitoba Press, 1988), pp. 88-89, 94. 
101 K h ' ' . h T" h B' d at er1ne Pett1pas, sever1ng t e 1es t at 1n : 
Government Repression of Indigenous Religious Ceremonies on 
the Prairies (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1994), 
pp. 111-112; J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A 
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Making the pass system work, therefore, was both a difficult 
and legally dicey business. A possible explanation is that 
the policy was, in part, a public relations ploy for the 
benefit of local settlers and never envisioned as absolute. 
One also suspects that the policy was very idealistic and 
thus easily forsaken in the face of financial considerations. 
It was, therefore, a way to pay lip service to those 
occasional complaints of unfair Native competition which were 
inevitably followed by public demands that the Indians have 
only restricted access to local economic opportunities. If 
the policy, however, could be circumvented without too much 
public outcry, and such evasion presented the promise of 
reduced departmental expenditure, then Native involvement in 
the marketplace was encouraged. 
Complaints 
The Department's, and especially the agent's, aggressive 
activity on behalf of the Blood freighters and producers was 
bound to lead to resentment from locals intent on protecting 
their livelihood. When Agent James Wilson tendered for the 
delivery of 400 tons of coal to the police barracks at Fort 
Macleod and other detachments, in August 1895, he warned the 
Commissioner: 
History of Indian-White Relations in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1991), pp. 191-192. 
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as there is a considerable amount of feeling among 
the white people in this district about Indians 
doing such work I would ask you to kindly see the 
Commissioner of the Police on this matter and do 
what you can to obtain a share of this work for the 
Indians. I am afraid a good deal of pressure may 
be put upon the Commissioner to try and prevent us 
getting any. ml 
Clearly Wilson expected a backlash against the Bloods' 
freighting activities and wished to pre-empt any attempt to 
cut them out of the lucrative work. 
Wilson also wished to reduce the uncertainty of winning 
freighting contracts during the yearly bidding competition. 
He suggested to the Indian Commissioner that perhaps in 
future it could be "arranged that a certain part (say one 
half) of the coal supply should be held back for the Indians 
to deliver without putting it to open tenders ••• If this was 
done it might tend to lessen the feeling that the Indians 
were taking away the living of the white men." 103 It is 
difficult to see how the removal of one half of the business 
opportunities afforded by these important contracts would 
lessen White resentment against the Bloods, unless it was a 
case that half a loaf was considered better than none. 
Wilson's action not only reveals concern for the well-being 
of his charges but suggests that, through the auspices of the 
102 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1561, pp. 93-94, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, August 14, 1895. 
103 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1561, pp. 93-94, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, August 14, 1895. 
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agency, the Bloods had considerable influence in tendering on 
contracts. 
Clearly the Bloods were not reluctant participants in 
the marketplace. Nor was the pass and permit systems were 
designed to prevent market access and the squandering of 
reserve resources, an unqualified success. Inevitably 
competition from the Bloods, and other Indians, led to 
complaints. A letter to the editor of the Macleod Gazette 
from 11 Freighter" bluntly stated the case against Indian 
competition. It criticized those perceived as "not only 
permitting, but assisting the Blood Reserve Indians to 
compete with the White settlers and laborers in the putting 
I up I and sale of hay." The basis of the complaint was that 
the Bloods had secured large contracts through underbidding 
the Whites. "It is bad enough to allow these Indians to put 
up hay on outside contracts," the writer observed "but when 
it comes to their bringing it into town for sale in large 
quantities, as they are doing now, it is carrying the thing a 
little too far." The crux of the matter, as this particular 
complaintant saw it, was that all the material and resources 
placed at the Indians' disposal was supplied by the 
government giving them a competitive edge. "Because their 
machines, wagons, grub and every other thing necessary for 
the business are provided for them," the writer protested, 
"and because, in order that: these things may be provided, the 
very men with whom they compete pay dollar for dollar the 
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same money as others in Canada into the fund, out of which 
the machines, wagons, etc., used by these Indians are 
purchased .. it was hardly fair. 11 ~ Competition was no problem, 
as long as equity prevailed. 
The Gazette supported this complaint and observed that 
.. The only apparent argument that can be used in favor of the 
present system seems to be that the Indians have not been 
very successful in their other pursuits, and that putting up 
hay seems to be one of the very few things that they can do." 
The Gazette railed against the government's expensive and 
futile effort at making Indians self-sufficient. The paper 
also charged a certain unfairness in that the peoples' wards 
were being financed in undercutting their beneficiaries: 
It is submitted that these Indians are earning a 
certain amount of money by putting up hay with 
implements supplied by the government; by hauling 
supplies with wagons obtained from the same source, 
and by getting out (under a white man) and hauling 
coal, in all of which occupations they compete with 
hard working white men, does not indicate any 
advance toward independent self-support. 105 
Blood producers, however, were simply availing 
themselves of market opportunities presented by Whites 
L04 Macleod Gazette, July 26, 1895. For complaints 
against Indian competition see Carter, C.H.R. (March, 1989), 
p. 36; Carter, Lost Harvests, pp. 184-190; J.R. Miller, 
Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens, p. 201; Anthony G. Gulig, 
Saskatchewan History (Fall, 1995), pp. 6-7. 
105 Macleod Gazette, August 2, 1895. 
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looking for a bargain. There were bargains to be had as the 
Bloods, among other things, freighted supplies, hauled coal, 
hunted wolves and cut logs and did herding and other work for 
settlers.w(J They were especially successful with the 
production and sale of hay, and in 1896 exceeded the agent's 
"most sanguine expectations .. 107 and again in 1898 they sold a 
considerable amount of hay in Fort Macleod. 11 ~ Indeed prices 
were so good, and the market so brisk, that Agent Wilson was 
concerned about the possibility of Blood farmers selling hay 
that they needed for their own cattle. In July he requested 
that the police at Lethbridge warn the public that the 
purchase of hay from Bloods not possessing a duly authorized 
penni t to sell left the purchaser open to prosecution. lf)lJ He 
l06 CSP, 14, Vol. XXXI, No. 11, 1897, p. 135. 
l07 CSP, 14, 1897, p. 155. The bulk of this hay was 
supplied to the Cochrane Ranche Company, North West Mounted 
Police and for Agency needs. Interestingly the agent noted 
that the 109 tons required for the agency farmers' horses and 
cattle, for the agency horses and cattle and for the hospital 
cows was hauled free of charge as it had been done in the two 
previous years. CSP, 14, 1897, p. 156. 
108 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1563, pp. 875-76, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, May 16, 1898. The hay brought ten to 
twelve dollars per ton. The amount sold was not given. The 
agent's report contained in the Sessional Papers states that 
1139 tons was sold for approximately $5,695. At the minimum 
of ten dollars per ton this should have netted $11,390. See 
CSP, No. 14, 1899, p. 133. 
109 The license system was not in place to protect whites 
but to enable the agent to properly protect the property and 
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did note that "A great deal of talk had been going on among 
the White men [freighters] in Macleod district about the 
Indians doing freighting work and if I am to put in tenders 
for police hay and coal then I will require to cut down low 
to secure them and that will cause them [freighters] to kick 
more than ever." Consequently Wilson did succeed in getting 
the contracts for the Stand Off and Big Bend detachments, 
because the Bloods had the competitive edge. 110 
Complaints against the Bloods fluctuated with time and 
economic conditions. The 'exceptional circumstances' created 
by World War I and a 1917 coal strike, for example, shut down 
most of the coal mines in western Canada. 111 By 1921, 
however, market conditions had returned to normal so 
complaints were received about Blood reserve coal competing 
in a restricted market environment. G. Finnie, the Chief 
Inspector of Mines for Alberta, notified the Department of 
Indian Affairs of complaints from operators in Magrath and 
resources of the Indians. RG 10, vol. 1564, pp. 39-40. 
James Wilson to Corporal in Charge Town Patrole, Lethbridge, 
July 23, 1898. Indians were not legally permitted to sell 
reserve resources without the permission of the agent. For a 
discussion of the permit system see Helen Buckley, From 
Wooden Ploughs To Welfare: Why Indian Policy Failed in the 
Prairie Provinces (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1992), pp. 53-54. 
110 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, pp. 244-45, James Wilson to 
Indian Commissioner, June 29, 1894; p. 313, James Wilson to 
S.B. Steele, July 28, 1894. 
I I I Bercuson (ed.), Alberta's Coal Industry 1919, p. x. 
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Raymond in particular. Local producers expressed 
dissatisfaction because the Blood sales presented unfair 
competition because Blood miners did not have to pay leasing 
dues and royalties. Thus the right of the Bloods to sell 
coal on the open market was challenged but without effect. 
In an open market situation complaints from competitors who 
believed themselves at a disadvantage were bound to occur. 112 
Conclusions 
The Bloods participated in the local market place as 
volunteers with the assistance and encouragement of the local 
agent and often the Department of Indian Affairs. Coal 
mining occurred because some Bloods saw it as profitable and 
because the agents encouraged this activity despite, at 
times, some misgivings about its viability. This activity 
fitted nicely into the local economic infrastructure. There 
was a constant demand on the reserve for coal and often from 
those in the vicinity. Both the Bloods and the DIA were 
cautious with regard to the management of this resou=ce and 
so it was never allowed to come under the control of Whites, 
outside of occasional advisory services. 
Haying illustrates the interactive exploitation of a 
Blood reserve resource. The share-crop agreements regarding 
ll2 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7632, file 18103-1, G. Finnie to 
D.C. Scott, February 13, 1921. 
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the harvesting and sale of hay is indicative of mutually 
beneficial resource use, the reserve provided a product for 
which there was much demand in the surrounding community. 
Farmers, ranchers, the Mounted Police and the Bloods 
themselves placed great reliance on hay in this particular 
period when horses were a major source of agricultural power 
and transportation, and cattle were a chief source of food. 
Freighting or shipping activities brought the Bloods 
into most direct conflict with non-Native economic agencies. 
This work was separated, in the public mind, from other 
activities which originated on the reserve. The perception 
was that, whereas the Bloods owned the coal and hay, they did 
not own the freighting and there was great concern that the 
livelihoods of non-Natives be protected through assured equal 
access. Non-Natives were well aware of the Bloods' special 
status as wards of the state and saw any advantages accruing 
to them as a result of that status as unfair competition. 
Despite public perceptions, however, there is no evidence 
that the government made any attempts to curb the Bloods' 
participation in freighting activities. 
The willingness to exploit on and off-reserve 
opportunities likely made the difference between marginal 
survival and abject poverty, a fate that faced many of the 
Bloods' contemporaries, both Native and non-Native. The 
Macleod Times, of July 21, 1920, reported that both Bloods 
and Peigans were digging bones from the south bank of the 
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Oldman River, and selling them for fertilizer, one endeavour 
that the Times estimated earned the Indians several thousand 
dollars. 1 u In his memoir, amateur historian Bud Spencer 
reported Blood teams engaged in hauling wheat some twenty 
miles to Cardston for local farmers. 11 -+ In 1927, the Bloods 
shipped over 2,000 "canner" horses to Great Falls, Montana, 
for 40 to 50 cents per hundred weight. 115 By 1928 the Bloods 
were granting oil leases on the reserve. lib 
Some individuals like James Gladstone, the future 
senator, sought economic security for his family, wherever 
opportunity presented itself. Gladstone shared in the 
"general prosperity., of the 186 Blood reserve farmers during 
the latter years of the 1920s, 117 and in the unexpected and 
devastating collapse of grain prices in 1929. 11 ~ Despite the 
economic hardships of the 1930s he established a small 
113 Macleod Times, July 21, 1920, p. 1. Amateur 
historican Bud Spencer also recalled this activity. Bud 
Spencer, Go North, Young Man. Go North!: My Life's Story 
(nd.), p. 14. 
114 Spencer, Go North, p. 14. 
115 Cardston News, March 3, 1927, p. 1. 
116 Cardston News, August 23, 1928, p. 1. 
117 Dempsey, Gentle Persuader, pp. 70-71. On Gladstone 
and others leaving the reserve for work see pp. 78-80. 
118 Dempsey, Gentle Persuader, pp. 73-76. 
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trucking outfit on the reserve and secured contracts hauling 
wheat, coal, and cattle, eventually acquiring contracts from 
the Department of Indian affairs. As business developed the 
tiny company was able to expand and provide Gladstone and his 
family with some financial security. 11 l1 
Despite the sometimes overwhelming management control of 
the agent and DIA the Bloods' economic activities were self-
motivated. They opened and worked the mines and sought out 
contracts. They instigated the share-crop arrangements with 
local farmers and ranchers and they mustered their horses and 
wagons to ensure efficient delivery of coal, hay and other 
commodities under contract. It was the Bloods who laboured 
to ensure their own livelihoods. Their evident motivation, 
perhaps, ensured the willingness of the DIA to, at times, 
adjust its policies to local circumstances. It also ensured 
the behind-the-scenes work of the various agents currying 
favour from one government agency or another. This was 
sufficient to secure for the Bloods a periodic, profitable, 
and sometimes influential market presence, especially in the 
supply of coal, hay and freighting services. Criticism from 
the non-Native public seems to have had little impact on 
curbing the Bloods' desire for some economic independence. 
119 Dempsey, Gentle Persuader, p. 85. 
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Chap~er 5 
'All the Indians have gone to the Beet': Blood Labour in ~be 
RaymoDd Sugar Bee~ Fields 
Introduction 
The local industry that offered the Bloods the greatest 
opportunity for the sale of their labour was the sugar beet 
industry at Raymond. However one rationalizes the Bloods' 
presence, it is clear that in their case Blood labourers were 
vital to sustaining the industrial process during the first 
phase of its operations from 1903 to 1915. They appear to 
have played a minor part in the industry after that. Though 
studies of the Bloods have paid little or no attention to 
their participation in the sugar beet fields this work was, 
in many ways, central to both the industry and the Blood's 
livelihood for more than a decade. 1 
1 Hana Samek in her study, The Blackfoot Confederacy, 
has taken a unidimensional view of the Blood Reservation 
economy as based solely on agriculture, both crop agriculture 
and cattle raising. True, the sugar beet industry was not 
reserve driven, but it was important enough to the Bloods to 
merit attention. The work could be seen as an extension of 
the reserve economy when one considers that the Bloods left 
the reserve in large numbers and the work was often arranged 
under contract by the reserve agent. For discussion of the 
reserve economy see, Hana Samek, The Blackfoot Confederacy 
1880-1920: A Comparative Study of Canadian and U.S. Indian 
Policy (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 
chap. 4, pp. 70-104. John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager 
briefly mention Indian involvement in the sugar beet 
industry. See John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, ''Workers, 
Growers and Monopolists: the 'Labour Problem' in the Alberta 
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The Industry: Local Bvolution 
Sometime around 1900 Jesse Knight, a Mormon from Provo, 
Utah, with some encouragement from Elliot Galt, chose a site 
east of the Blood reserve, at Raymond, to establish a sugar 
beet processing plant. 2 The site was regarded by local 
settlers as fit only for hay land but Knight believed it had 
great potential for the cultivation of sugar beet. The 
Raymond Rustler later defined the sugar beet business as: "an 
industry requiring a great amount of labor and the investment 
of a large sum of money." Interestingly it pointed out that 
the two main requirements of money and manpower "were not 
obstacles but incentives." It was so attractive that Knight 
hastily put down a $50,000 deposit as security in an 
Beet Sugar Industry During the 1930s," in Michie! Horn, 
(ed.), The Depression In Canada: Responses to Economic 
Crisis (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1988), p. 32. 
Curiously Ronald F. Laliberte states that from the beginning 
of the industry in the early 1900s "most of the hand labour" 
in the fields was done by immigrants from Europe and this was 
the situation up until the Second World War when that supply 
of labour was cut off. He does not recognize that the Bloods 
had any place in this industry. Ronald F. Laliberte, "The 
Canadian State And Native Migrant Labour In Southern 
Alberta's Sugar Beet Industry," (Saskatoon: University of 
Saskatchewan, MA Thesis, 1994), p. 66. 
7 
- A.A. den Otter, Civilizing the West: The Galts and 
the Development of Western Canada (Edmonton: University of 
Alberta Press, 1982), pp. 229-230. See also Edward Brado, 
Cattle Kingdom: Early Ranching In Alberta (Vancouver: 
Douglas & Mcintyre, 1984), p. 138. The plant itself was not 
of new manufacture but was a plant at Sunnyside, Washington 
that was dismantled and moved to the Raymond site. See Fred 
G. Taylor, A Saga of Sugar: Being a story of the romance and 
development of Beet Sugar in th Rocky Mountain West (Salt 
Lake City: Desert News Press, 1944), p. 175. 
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agreement with the North West Irrigation Company and The 
Alberta Railway and Coal Company, to purchase the 52,000 
acres of land needed for his enterprise. 3 Knight believed 
that, with suitable land and plenty of available labour, the 
outlook was exceedingly promising for an industry that could 
fill an insatiable consumer demand for a product entirely 
imported from outside the region.~ The Raymond area stood to 
reap great benefits as an estimated one hundred and fifty 
people would have continuous employment in the factory and 
others would be "employed continuously by the company in 
their own fields, as experts[,] managers and office hands",:;; 
to say nothing of the farmers and workers who would be needed 
to grow beets. 
Initially the company hoped to cultivate enough of its 
beets to meet its needs. This failed and by 1904 the 
company's production methods changed with the enlistment of 
local farmers to grow beets under contract/> an arrangement 
3 Raymond Rustler, May 31, 1911, p. 7. 
4 
on the growing importance of sugar in western society 
see Ken Cruikshank, "Taking the Bitter with the Sweet: Sugar 
Refiners and the Canadian Regulatory State, 1904-20," 
Canadian Historical Review, Vol. LXXIV, No. 3 (September 
1993), pp. 369-371. 
5 Raymond Rustler, May 31, 1911, p. 7. 
6 Dawson says that the company "was never able to secure 
more than 22,000 tons of beets a year, and in some years the 
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which was to be continued. The Cardston Alberta Star 
revealed that the company planned to have 4,000 acres in 
beets, 3,000 cultivated by the company directly, with local 
farmers cultivating 1,000 acres. The new arrangements 
promised to pay farmers $5.00 per ton and divided with the 
farmers the government bounty on sugar manufactured bringing 
the price paid to the farmer to $5.35 per ton. 7 Although 
appearing lucrative, contract beet growing never solved the 
company's perennial beet shortages. 
Shortages became so severe that by 1913 J.W. Evans, 
Agricultural Superintendent of the Knight Sugar Co., tried to 
induce more local farmers to plant sugar beet by promoting 
both the agricultural and financial benefits of beet culture. 
Beet cultivation, he argued, brought a number of benefits 
including the encouragement of crop rotation and an increased 
yield for other crops. The industry also created a demand 
for labour thus making possible the employment of children 
who otherwise, in his opinion, provided no economic benefit. 
Beet cultivation also offered price stability, since growers 
knew the price of their product before planting. The fact 
that beets could be grown by farmers of small means was also 
tonnage dropped as low as 8,000." C.A. Dawson, Group 
Settlement: Ethnic Communities In Western Canada (Toronto: 
The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1936), p. 233. 
( Alberta Star, Cardston, April 2, 1909, p. 8. 
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touted as an attraction. 8 Instructions were given in the 
Leader on how to prepare the land for planting in 1914. 9 In a 
last ditch attempt at persuasion Evans waxed poetic, "Then 
let us raise the SUGAR BEET, No question bout the pay 'Cause 
if we work the balance sheet Will show a better day.'"lll 
In case there were still skeptics Evans went on to argue 
"A comparison of a ten ton crop of sugar beets with a forty 
bushel crop of wheat assumed to be grown on summer fallowed 
land" yielded a net profit per acre of $18.70 for beets 
compared with $14.05 for wheat or a difference of $4.65 in 
favour of beet growing, and "In addition to this the beet 
tops are worth from $5.00 to $10.00 for feed. " 11 He also 
admonished the local population to support this native 
industry, "If it is true, ••• that ten pounds of imported sugar 
are used in Lethbridge to one of Raymond, we as citizens 
ought to be heartily ashamed of ourselves ••• Lethbridge coal 
is good enough for us. So is Raymond Sugar. " 11 The reported 
payroll of over $10,000 during the run was money kept in the 
8 Raymond Leader, July 25, 1913, 1. P• 
9 Raymond Leader, June 17, 1913, 4. P• 
10 Raymond Leader, January 23, 1914, 1. p. 
1 1 Raymond Leader, July 31, 1913, 4. P· 
12 Raymond Leader, July 31, 1913, 4. p. 
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community, and the employment of about three hundred men when 
other work was scarce 13 was also calculated to tie the Knight 
Sugar Company fortunes to the general well-being of the 
community. 
By December, 1914, it was evident that the appeal to 
local loyalty, and the highlighting of benefits for the local 
economy, were not enough. In December 1914 the Leader 
reported that the Knight Sugar factory was planning to move 
its operation close to Great Falls, Montana.'* With 
relocation imminent, the locals marshaled their influence and 
enthusiasm with a public meeting on December 20, 1914, to 
protest the move and attempt to secure "a guarantee of 2,000 
acres of beets next year," the minimum required to bring 
about a reconsideration of the proposed move. 15 It was too 
late and by January 8, 1915 the Leader had to admit that, 
"Beets talk and 1, 800 acres isn't very strong language." Hl 
Consequently, on January 15 the paper announced the loss of 
13 Raymond Leader, October 17, 1913, p. 1. 
14 Raymond Leader, December 18, 1914, 1. p. 
15 Raymond Leader, December 24, 1914, 1. p. 
16 Ra~ond Leader, January 8, 1915, 1. See also The P· 
Ra~ond Leader, December 24, 1914, p. 1. 
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the sugar plant to Layton, Utah. 1; It was an ignominious end 
to an enterprise which had seemingly held out such promise. 
The Bloods' Significance 
There is no direct evidence that Jesse Knight had the 
Bloods in mind when he chose the site for his sugar factory. 
However, they quickly became so important to the sugar 
company's operations that it is inconceivable that Knight was 
not aware of the benefits of tapping the potential labour 
pool of the Blood reserve and its 1,200 inhabitants 1M directly 
to the west of the factory site. In its early stages of 
development sugar beet agriculture was labour-intensive and a 
readily available source of dependable cheap labour was 
essential. 
In southern Alberta the sugar beet season generally 
began in April with seeding, with the all important thinning 
occurring in June. Throughout the growing season hand 
cultivating and weeding were essential. Weather permitting, 
17 On local developments immediately following this see; 
Raymond Leader, January 15, 1915, p. 1; January 22, 1915, pp. 
and 4; February 26, 1915, p. 1; March 5, 1915, p. 4; March 
12, 1915, p. 1; March 26, 1915, p. 1; Cardston Globe, January 
7, 1915, p. 4; January 14, 1915, p. 1; March 11, 1915, p. 1; 
Leonard J. Arrington, Beet Sugar In The West: A History of 
the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 1891-1966 (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1966), p. 188. 
lS CSP, vol. XXIX (No. 11, 1905), p. 203. 
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the beets were ready to harvest by the end of October. 
Harvesting required the pulling and topping of the beets, 
with sugar making beginning when the beets were delivered to 
the factory. Thinning and harvesting both required back-
breaking intensive labour. Thinning in particular forced the 
worker to crawl on hands and knees through the field. The 
weather, especially during the fall harvest season, was often 
cold and wet and this added to the physical discomfort of 
working in the fields. 
The Bloods, permanently resident in the area were an 
ideal source and, perhaps, Knight had them in mind when he 
claimed that acquiring sufficient labour was no hindrance. 19 
One fact is clear, there was no other identifiable body of 
potential labour in such close proximity. Where else could 
one hope to find hundreds of workers available at a moment's 
notice? When the opportunity was available and the 
conditions suitable many Bloods left the reserve each fall to 
labour in the Raymond beet fields. 
In anticipation of a smooth start up for the 1903 
processing season, Knight began arranging for labour to work 
the fields and the first place he apparently turned to was 
the Blood Reserve. In November, 1902, well before the first 
beet planting, company representative, H.S. Allen, wrote 
Blood Indian Agent, James Wilson, of the company's need for 
19 Raymond Rustler, May 31, 1911, p. 7. 
215 
"A great number of hands ••• to weed and thin beets ... Allen 
hoped Blood labourers could be hired for this ~-:~rk. In an 
effort to get good value for the company's dollar, Allen 
attempted to give Wilson a lesson in Native work habits 
pointing out that, in his opinion, women and children would 
do work as good as or better than "bucks" and should they 
prove willing "large numbers" would be employed. 20 
In January, 1903, company manager, E.P. Ellison, 
approached Wilson once again to arrange for the Bloods' 
assistance with the fall harvest. Although Wilson promised 
Ellison help in any way possible he refused to guarantee any 
specific number of Bloods for the work because he feared that 
they might not be able to perform this new and specialized 
labour. 21 By March, however, Wilson again promised, keeping 
Allen's reservations about male labour in mind, to encourage 
the employment of women and children in the beet fields. 22 By 
late October, however, any labour shortage had been resolved. 
For example, Agent Wilson was unable to find teams to deliver 
hay to Lethbridge owing to the fact that "all the Indians 
20 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1535, document 214, H.S. Allen to 
Wilson, Nov. 28, 1902. 
21 NAC, RG 10, val. 1724, pp. 947-48, James Wilson to 
E.P. Ellison, January 30, 1903. 
22 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1721, p. 399, James Wilson to E.P. 
Ellison, March 10, 1903. 
have gone to the Beet rsicJ cutting and hauling at 
Raymond, ••• ".u This arrangement with the Bloods was so 
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rewarding that the company expressed a desire to contract 
Blood labourers, by the acre or on a daily basis, to thin, 
hoe, dig and top six hundred acres of beets from May to 
October of the following year. However, still lacking 
confidence in the Bloods' abilities, Wilson advised that they 
be restricted to thinning activities and that Whites be 
employed for the other tasks.L4 The company was so impressed 
with the Bloods' work that it hoped to use Blood labourers to 
also put up hay. 5 
Initially the use of Blood labour was beneficial for all 
concerned, and in the opinion of the new Blood Agent, R.N. 
Wilson, the business relationship of the Blood reserve with 
Knight Sugar and the Raymond citizenry was worth encouraging. 
The new agent was also more aggressive on the part of the 
Bloods, and more confident of their suitability for beet 
work. Responding to a Department inquiry about Indian labour 
in the beet fields Wilson wrote: 
23 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1721, p. 707, J. Wilson to Geo. 
Houks, October 22, 1903. 
24 GAI, BIAC, file 18, E.P Ellison to James Wilson, Jan. 
20, 1903; H.S. Allen to James Wilson, September 28, 1903. 
25 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1535, p. 254, E.P. Ellison to J. 
Wilson, May 15, 1903. 
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there is nothing in connection with the growing of 
beets that may not be learned by our Indians, and 
as the work appears to be profitable enough I am of 
the opinion that we should encourage some of them 
to go to Raymond when required by the Sugar 
Company. Other points in favor of the scheme are 
the fact that women and children can materially 
assist in the occupation ••• zr, 
Wilson also noted that the nature and timing of the work 
in the beet fields did not interfere with the Bloods' yearly 
)-
round of activities on the reserve.-' In the one case where 
they conflicted with the issuance of treaty annuities, the 
Department was willing to consider an adjustment of the 
payment schedule, so as not to interfere with the beet 
harvest or with the Bloods' opportunity to earn extra income. 
This was an important consideration in the Department's 
desire to turn Natives into self-supporting independent 
workers on the theoretical White model.l~ 
The increased sugar beet acreage resulted in greater 
demand for Blood labour at various critical times during the 
26 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1725, p. 716, Indian Agent to 
Secretary, DIA, July 6, 1904. 
27 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1725, p. 716, Indian Agent to 
Secretary, DIA, July 6, 1904. 
28 o.J. Hall, Clifford Sifton: The Young Napoleon. 
1861-1900, Volume I (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1981), pp. 269-270; D.J. Hall, Clifford 
Sifton: The Lonely Eminence 1901-1929. Volume II 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), p. 
43; D.J. Hall, "Clifford Sifton And Canadian Indian 
Administration 1896-1905," Prairie Forum, Vol. 2 No. 2 
(1977), pp. 128-129. 
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growing season. A query from the Home-Seekers Association, 
Cardston District, wondered whether the organization was at 
liberty to hire Blood labour "as we wish. "~N The DIA 
officials, however, were not about to let the Bloods be hired 
on an individual basis, perhaps to ensure that fair hiring 
practices were followed and that pay equity prevailed. 
Indian Affairs official, Frank Pedley, stipulated that Native 
labour be paid at the same rate as Whites, in cash, and that 
accommodation be provided to workers if they were not 
expected to provide their own • _m 
By the 1905 growing season it was evident that Knight 
Sugar had come to rely on the Bloods as the main labour 
source for their beet production. That fall manager Ellison 
once again asked for Bloods at Raymond and reminded the agent 
that they would be paid "what it is worth .... H Blood workers, 
in turn, began to count on the employment at Raymond as an 
29 GAI, BIAC, file 17, J.P. Jardine to R.N. Wilson March 
19, 1904; Home-Seekers Association to R.N. Wilson, March 31, 
1904. 
30 Both Pedley, and earlier, Wilson expressed a 
preference that the Bloods be hired for certain tasks only, 
and these generally were outside activities. Perhaps this 
has to do with the Darwinistic belief that Indians needed the 
outdoor freedom. As for wages; "It is stated that from $1.00 
to $1.75 per day can be made ••• " NAC, RG 10, vol. 1147, p. 
87, Frank Pedley to J.H. Gooderham, April 29, 1904; also GAI, 
BIAC, file 17. 
31 GAI, BIAC, file 17, E.P. Ellison to John W. Jowett, 
May 12, 1905. 
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important source of yearly income. Depending on the numbers 
employed, the sugar beet work was profitable. 32 In fact this 
work became so profitable that the Bloods avoided less 
remunerative work. For example, they delayed the delivery of 
25 tons of hay requested by George Skelding of Macleod 
because most of the Bloods and their teams were in the 
Raymond beet fields. 33 
In 1906, the Calgary Herald recognized both the Bloods' 
capacity for work and the skill acquired after three years of 
experience with all aspects of sugar beet cultivation. The 
writer noted: "One likes best to watch the Indians at work; 
they make their long, rapid strokes with inimitable grace and 
the utmost nonchalance. When the whites are listlessly and 
laboriously getting in the last hours of a long, hot day, 
[the Indians] seem quite as unexhausted as in early dewy 
32 The Department reported that "Some of the Blood 
Indians ••• earned over $2,000 in topping and hauling beets 
" CSP, 27, No. 11, 1905, Vol. XXIX, page 203. Dempsey says 
that the Bloods earned $2,182.25 for the 1905 season. Hugh 
A. Dempsey, The Gentle Persuader: A Biography of James 
Gladstone, Indian Senator (Saskatoon: Western Producer 
Prairie Books, 1986), p. 26. 
33 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1548, p. 561, Acting Indian Agent to 
Geo. Skelding, October 7, 1905. In fact the exodus of the 
reserve was so complete that on October 23, the agent was not 
even able to arrange delivery of a load of sawdust because of 
a lack of freighters and equipment. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1548, 
p. 580, Acting Agent to Peter McLaren, October 23, 1905; NAC, 
RG 10, vol. 1548, p. 595, Indian Agent to Peter McLaren, 
October 30, 1905. 
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morning. "·4 The acquired skill and dedicated labour did 
indeed bring its rewards. The company estimated that about 
$12,000 was paid out to Natives in wages in 1905. Although 
the company had to estimate what was paid by local farmers 
and did not know if all the labourers were Bloods, 35 it is 
fairly certain the vast majority of workers were Bloods from 
the reserve. 
In the fall of 1906, with a fourth harvest imminent, the 
importance of the Bloods' contribution to the Raymond sugar 
beet industry was obvious. One local farmer using Blood 
labour wrote Agent Wilson in the hope that the coming annuity 
payments could be delayed so as not to interfere with the 
harvest. To impress upon Wilson the urgency of his request 
he added: "If you can arrange this for them it will be a 
great favor to the Knight Sugar Co. and us as we are 
34 Calgary Herald, January 6, 1906, p. 8. The above 
description and the preceding evidence does not entirely 
support the contention that one of the main dissatisfactions 
with Indian labour was that they damaged beets during the 
thinning stage. John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, 
"Workers, Growers, And Monopolists: The 'Labour Problem' In 
The Alberta Beet Sugar Industry During The 1930s," in Michiel 
Horn (ed.) The Depression In Canada: Responses to Economic 
Crisis (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1988), p.32. 
35 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1536, p. 105, E.P. Ellison to R.N. 
Wilson, August 5, 1906. The agent's report for the year 
ending March 31, 1907 gave a total income of $37,373.38 for 
the Bloods of which $9,000.00 was earned from work at the 
Raymond sugar beet fields. CSP, No. 27, 1907, p. 161. 
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depending on them to harvest the crop. rdu 
On October 24 E.P. Ellison made the case for Knight 
Sugar with the same urgency. He pointed out that Blood 
workers had employment until December 1, and requested a 
deferment of annuities for 30 days. 3i The request was 
accommodated but this was later found to be a mistake as the 
poor weather cut the harvest short. Wilson wrote, with some 
irritation and concern, that the delay in treaty payments had 
left many of the Bloods short of funds to purchase necessary 
winter clothing. When weather or culture did not dictate 
otherwise the Bloods were dedicated workers. Agent Wilson's 
report for 1908 observed that during the previous spring 
"several hundreds" of the Bloods secured a month's employment 
thinning beets "and in the month of October practically the 
whole population of the reservation was busy harvesting beets 
in the same fields .... ;s 
An apparent exception to the general practice of Bloods 
as workers, Prairie Chicken, driven by the entrepreneurial 
spirit, grew beets for Knight Sugar on contract. The factory 
rented him 10 acres, ploughed it for 20 dollars, disced and 
36 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1539, 145, J.T. Smellie to R. P· 
Wilson, October 16, 1906. Emphasis added. 
37 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1539, 146, E.P. Ellison to R. P· 
Wilson, October 24, 1906. 
38 CSP, No. 27, 1908, p. 168. 
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leveled it for 10, furnished seed and planted it for 18, 
supplied needed water for six, and charged him 35 dollars for 
rent, for a total investment of 89 dollars. The company 
agreed to purchase his beets at five dollars a ton delivered 
to the factory (a distance of one and one half miles) and 
speculated that, "with good care he should get from 8 to 10 
tons per acre from the land .. "3lJ The ever cautious Agent 
Wilson sanctioned this contract on the understanding that the 
payments were to be deducted from the sale of the beet crop 
and that the Department would in no way be responsible should 
the joint venture fail.~ 1 Prairie Chicken experienced some 
initial success as he was reportedly thinning his 10 acres of 
beets in July.~1 However, the results of his efforts remain a 
mystery. ~L 
39 GAI, BIAC, file 16, T.J. O'Brien to James Wilson, 
March 8, 1906. These rates seem to be in keeping with rates 
charged in 1907 as indicated in a contract between Knight 
Sugar Company and Thos. Bennett. In fact Prairie Chicken may 
have had a better deal considering that the contract with 
Bennett stipulated that he was to pay one dollar per acre 
rent and two dollars per acre ploughing. Bennett was to be 
paid $4.50 per ton for the beets but was to pay the company 
$2.35 per acre for the haulage of beets to the factory. GAI, 
Knight Sugar Company Papers (KSCP), labour contract between 
Knight Sugar Company and Thos. Bennett, May 18, 1907. 
40 GAI, BIAC. file 16, Indian Agent to T.J. O'Brien, 
March 31, 1906. 
41 GAI, BIAC, file 21, T.J. O'Brien to R.N. Wilson, July 
7, 1906. 
42 Given the minimum estimated harvest above Prairie 
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En masse or individually, the Bloods' contribution to 
the sugar beet industry was significant. Royal North West 
Mounted Police Commissioner, A.B. Perry believed the Bloods• 
participation critical due to the large numbers involved, and 
because of the scarcity of White labour. Officer J.O. 
Wilson, Lethbridge, felt it was impossible to carry on the 
beet industry except for the Indians.~-; This work was so 
difficult that it was considered "too tedious for the white 
man, the yellow labor was tried, but without success. The 
work was then given to the Indians, who, with their stolid 
natures, have proved to be the most successful ... 44 Given 
prevailing attitudes about the nature of the work, and the 
belief that it was unsuited to Whites, Natives were 
especially desired for both the thinning and harvesting 
phases of the operation. 
Sporadic attempts to import labour for the beet fields 
had no permanent impact on the industry, and in the fall of 
1911 Knight Sugar once again anticipated the Bloods entering 
into their employ. Clearly Blood labourers were needed and 
Raymond Knight implored agent Julius Hyde, "we would like if 
Chicken stood to gross $400.00 on the sale of his beets for 
an initial outlay of $89.00. 
43 CSP 28, Vol. XLII, 1907-8, p. 65, 82. 
44 Raymond Rustler, May 31, 1911, p. 7. This was 
referred to as 'stoop labor' and in the u.s. was given to 
Chinese and Japanese Labourers because white farmers refused 
to do it. Arrington, Beet Sugar In The West, p.23. 
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possible for you to let all the Indians come that you can 
spare, thinking that it will both benefit ourselves and the 
Indians also. "45 Almost a month later Knight Sugar urgently 
requested a deferral of treaty payments so as not to hinder 
harvesting and immediately stated the crux of the company's 
problem. The Bloods' presence at Raymond was essential "as 
we are very short of help, and will likely lose a lot of our 
beets unless the Indians remain to help us."~ 
Industry Problems 
Although the Bloods were critical to the industry they 
did not view sugar beet harvest labour as essential to their 
own survival. Sometimes they had an aversion to the taxing 
work and found other income opportunities more appealing 
while on other occasions they were indifferent to the 
benefits of the income earned. These attitudes proved a 
source of great frustration to Knight Sugar. According to 
Agent James Wilson in October 1903 about one hundred and 
fifty Bloods were engaged in filling hay contracts and were 
therefore not available for sugar beet labour. He sensibly 
enough concluded that the trip to Raymond was too difficult 
45 GAI, BIAC, file 41, Ray Knight to W. Julius Hyde, 
September 22, 1911. 
46 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1539, p. 273, J.W. Crane? to Mr. 
Hyde, October 19, 1911; 
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for the aged who were available.~ It was only several weeks 
later, with their other work completed, that the harvest at 
Raymond received their attention.~ 
Many Bloods were willing to work in the beet fields; but 
only if the times they were required meshed with their own 
needs, in other words, when obligations did not dictate their 
presence elsewhere. They were certainly unwilling to become 
a captive labour pool. 
The company had difficulty accepting that the Bloods 
were unwilling to adapt themselves to the company's seasonal 
needs. J.W. Woolf, a company manager, wrote Agent Wilson in 
apparent frustration, in September 1903, that the sugar 
factory was prepared to hire up to 400 Bloods at the White 
labour rate of eight dollars per acre for topping and 
throwing the beets into a collection wagon. There was a 
warning, however, that should Wilson fail to convince the 
Bloods to appear at Raymond, he, Woolf would be "compelled to 
bring in foreign labour. "4l) Here, perhaps, is an indication 
of the White attitude to the labour-intensive work. Woolf's 
47 NAC RG 10, vol. 1721, pp. 685-86, J. Wilson to E. 
Ellison, Oct. 2, 1903. 
48 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1721, p. 707, J. Wilson to Geo. 
Houks, October 22, 1903. 
49 GAI, BIAC, file 18, J.W. Woolf to James Wilson 
September 29, 1903. Likely Woolf's threat of foreign labour 
was a reference to Japanese labour from B.C. 
promise to pay at the White labour rate suggests that 
initially, the Bloods had been paid less. 
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In 1904 Knight Sugar wanted about 50 Bloods to work its 
fields, but stipulated that they needed a guarantee that 
their contract would be fulfilled. 50 This proviso grew out of 
an unhappy experience in the fall of 1903 when "a large 
number" of Blood workers, not unexpectedly, abandoned the 
beet harvest to receive their treaty payment. Aware of the 
problem the Department expressed the desire that arrangements 
be made so that, in future, the one activity might not 
interfere with the other. 51 
That said, however, Agent Wilson was unwilling to offer 
the guarantees that Knight Sugar wanted: that the Bloods 
perform stated amounts of work. His argument was that the 
beet work was •• 'new to them and they must acquire 
considerably more familiarity with it than they now possess 
before being in a position to sign contracts .... Wilson added 
for good measure .. Our Indians are not Chinamen to be farmed 
out by bosess rsic] ... ~ 
50 GAI, BIAC, file 17, E.P. Ellison to James Wilson, 
June 11, 1904. 
51 GAI, BIAC, file 17, J.D. McLean to R.N. Wilson, June 
29, 1904. 
52 NAC, RG 10, vol., 1725, p. 716, Indian Agent to 
Secretary, DIA, July 6, 1904. 
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He also took the opportunity to comment on what he 
perceived as the double standard applied by the Company in 
the employment of Indian labour: "When harvesting beets in 
the fall the hauling in, one of the most profitable jobs, is 
done by White men, Mormons, and as our Indians have lots of 
wagons and horses we should insist upon the Indians being 
permitted to haul in all the roots 'lifted' by themselves. " 53 
Wilson's observation may in part explain the Bloods' 
willingness to abandon the backbreaking labour in the fields 
at treaty payment time. Free money certainly had more 
allure, especially when one recognized, as Blood beet workers 
surely did, that the least physically demanding and best 
paying work was reserved for Whites. 
It is also possible that the avoidance of work in the 
beet fields by some Bloods was an effort on their part to 
break the agent's control over their economic decisions. The 
agency's attempt, in 1904, to have Knight Sugar garnishee the 
wages of Bloods in debt to the Department succeeded only in 
finding one of those on the list working for the company. 
Manager E.P. Ellison speculated that the remainder worked for 
local farmers and at any rate he doubted if the agent's 
53 NAC, RG 10, vol., 1725, p. 717, Indian Agent to 
Secretary, DIA, July 6, 1904. To my knowledge nothing came 
of this idea. 
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request could be granted.~ 
The 1906 growing season brought strain to relations 
between the Blood labourers and individual contractors at 
Raymond, the result of an apparent bid by contractors to 
force down the costs of Blood field labour. By late November 
the sugar beet crop still remained unharvested resulting in 
an urgent request from one contractor, J.T. Smellie, to 
Wilson for some 200 Bloods to work his 70 acres, and 300 
acres belonging to Knight Sugar as soon as the weather proved 
favourable. Agent Wilson's response, however, contradicted 
Smellie's view that only inclement weather was responsible 
for the delay. Although the weather was, at the time, too 
cold and wet to allow for outside work Wilson stated: 
Should such a thing occur as a warm spell I will be 
glad to send over any Indians who can be found that 
are willing to go but I have serious doubts of your 
being able to get any further material assistance 
from here this year. Those to whom I have 
mentioned the matter ridicule the idea of returning 
and blame the beet farmers for the present 
situation. They say that they were at Raymond 
quite long enough to lift the whole crop had they 
not been delayed by attempts to force down the 
price and other vexations. If a period of mild 
weather does come such as to encourage an attempt 
to dig beets you had better come over and see what 
you can do yourself with the Indians. 55 
54 GAI, BIAC, file 17, E.P. Ellison to John W. Jowett, 
October 7, 1904. 
55 GAI, BIAC, file 16, Response to above letter dated 
Blood Agency Dec. 5, 1906. 
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The Bloods' abandonment of the harvest was frustrating 
for the industry and there was likely some temptation to 
criticize their work habits. But there were none more 
interested than the Department and Agent Wilson in having the 
Bloods perform productive labour for which they received cold 
hard cash. Wilson's comments and concern leaves no doubt 
that, on this occasion, the beet harvest, with its exposure 
to the elements, was beyond sensible human endurance. 
Suitable and comfortable housing was needed for shelter and 
warmth and warm clothing were required against the chill of 
the fall damp and snow. It is difficult to blame the Bloods 
for abandoning the beet work when common sense dictated such 
a course of action. 
The Bloods also brought with them to the beet fields 
particular habits that frustrated their employers. When J.S. 
Smellie was approached by two Bloods for work in February of 
1907 he indicated a willingness to employ one, provided he 
"would consent to stay steady during the season ••• but they 
[Indians] must make up their minds to stay with it and only 
go to town Saturday afternoons." For this they would be paid 
20 cents an acre with the expectation of making three or four 
dollars per day if they were dedicated. 56 Similarly Ellison 
wrote the reserve agent hoping to recruit 15 teamsters 
SG GAI, BIAC, file 16, J.S. Smellie to R.N. Wilson, 
February 20, 1907. 
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willing to work, not for days, but for months, at 40 dollars 
a month without board. Getting along with the Bloods was not 
easy and Ellison queried Wilson on "how we can best handle 
the Indian labor in the Beet fields. "57 The labour-intensive 
nature of the work, employee and employer relations, and the 
weather all contributed to produce a less than ideal 
experience for the Bloods. Few of them showed up in the 
fields for the thinning operations in June, 1907, because 
Fourth of July celebrations in Montana were more attractive 
than thinning beets at Raymond. 58 Regarding the Bloods' 
attitude towards the beet harvest he observed: "the Indians 
will drop it and come home as soon as the weather gets too 
cold for such work no matter what quantity happens to be 
still in the ground. nSI) 
Some problems encountered with Blood labourers, however, 
were rooted in the nature of the industry and were more the 
making of the employer. For example, the Bloods were often 
affected by the restrictive and demanding agreements between 
contractors and Knight Sugar. A contract between Knight 
57 GAI, BIAC, file 16, E.P. Ellison to R.N. Wilson 
February 25, 1907. 
58 GAI, BIAC, file 60, Indian Agent to J.O. Wilson, June 
27, 1907. 
59 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1539, p. 195, Indian agent to Indian 
Commissioner, Sept. 16, 1907. 
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Sugar Company and Thos. Bennett, for example, indicates that 
Bennett tied himself to specific obligations that included 
the requirement that his beets test at 12 percent saccharine 
and 80 percent purity.~1 Bennett also had to rent and keep in 
good repair the company boarding house.u1 Little wonder that 
contractors such as Bennett felt themselves squeezed between 
Knight and their hired labour. They had to agree initially 
to costs and wages based on a sugar beet whose quality and 
quantity they could not guarantee or predict. 
The 1907 season brought the first public admission that 
the industry was not achieving its expected potential and 
that the whole venture was in trouble. The Raymond Chronicle 
reported in May that beet seeding had begun late and that 
beet acreage was down from the previous year because of fewer 
contracts. The paper attributed this shortfall to 'labour 
scarcity' and stated that "although Indian labor will be 
60 Among the conditions of the contract was that Bennett 
tied himself to a specified tonnage of beets, accepted the 
expense for the preparation of the land including rental of 
$1.00 per acre, ploughing at $2.00 per acre, $0.85 per acre 
for smoothing, seed at a rate of $1.35 per acre, planting at 
$0.40 per acre, $0.80 per acre for cultivating twice, 
ploughing up the beets at $1.25 per acre, and $2.35 per acre 
for the haulage of beets to the factory. GAI, KSCP, Labour 
Contract between Knight Sugar Company and Thos. Bennett, May 
18, 1907. 
61 GAI, KSCP, agreement between Knight Sugar Company and 
Thomas Bennett, May, 1907. 
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available as far as it can be made to go, the drawback being 
that there is not enough of it. ,Gl 
The accuracy of the Chronicle's assumption about the 
shortage of labour is difficult to gauge. Farmers have 
always planted their crop without assurance of harvest labour 
and fluctuations in availability, including shortages, are 
common to the history of agriculture in the west.{d One never 
knew how this situation would change from one season to the 
next. Perhaps in this period of increasing harvest costs 
contractors unwilling to accept the risks as being worth the 
effort turned their fields to crops that were less labour 
intensive and therefore cheaper to harvest. 1H 
62 Raymond Chronicle, May 10, 1907, p. 1. 
63 John Herd Thompson, "Bringing in the Sheaves: The 
Harvest Excursionists, 1890-1929," The Canadian Historical 
Review (Vol. LIX, No. 4, December 1978), p. 468; W.J.C. 
Cherwinski, "A Miniature Coxey's Army: The British 
Harvesters' Toronto-to-Ottawa Trek of 1924," Labour/Le 
Travail (Volume 32, Fall 1993), pp. 140-141; W.J.C. 
Cherwinski, "Wooden Horses and Rubber Cows: Training British 
Agricultural Labour for the Canadian Prairies, 1890-1930," 
Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers 1980, p. 
133; For particulars on the 1908 harvest season see W.J.C. 
Cherwinski, "The Incredible Harvest Excursion of 1908," 
Labour/Le Travailleur (Vol. 5, Spring 1980), pp. 57-80; 
Danysk, Hired Hands, pp. 24, 85; John Herd Thompson, The 
Harvests Of War: The Prairie West. 1914-1918 (Toronto: 
McClelland And Stewart Ltd., 1978), pp. 62-63. 
64 Adelman says that a period of increased harvest wages 
began in 1907 and that 11 Wages rose by almost 60 percent 
between 1907 and 1912." Jeremy Adelman, Frontier 
Development: Land, labour. And Capital On The Wheatlands of 
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There is no doubt, however, that Knight Sugar believed 
labour to be the main problem as later in the month the 
Chronicle reported that Manager Ellison had returned from a 
business trip east in which he had made arrangements to 
ensure adequate workers for the approaching season. 
According to the Chronicle "Labors [sicl agencies and 
emigration bureaus were brought into requisition and we are 
assured labor will be shot in here in such quantities that a 
scarcity will not again occur. nbS This new source of labour 
was likely calculated to arrive for the fall harvest as the 
Chronicle reported an "Indian Influx" completing the June 
thinning activity. "These nimble fingered 'bloods' are 
hailed" the Chronicle said "as the salt of the situation who 
will save the crop. "t(l Without the Bloods the beet industry 
would indeed have been in dire straits, its very survival 
doubtful • ll! 
In 1908 another solution to the labour shortage appeared 
with the report that Knight Sugar had entered into contract 
Argentina And Canada. 1890-1914 (Oxford: Claredon Press, 
1994), p. 165. 
65 Raymond Chronicle, May 17, 1907, P. 1. 
66 Raymond Chronicle, June 14, 1907, p. 1. 
67 For their efforts in the 1907 season they earned 
$9,000. Esther s. Goldfrank, Changing configurations In The 
Social Organization Of A Blackfoot Tribe During The Reserve 
Period: The Blood Of Alberta Canada (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1945), p. 24. 
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to have its lands operated by a Japanese .. syndicate ... This 
new arrangement, along with the importation of labourers from 
B.C., were, the Alberta Star said, essential to the survival 
of the beet business at the present time. ll8 On October 9, the 
Star reported the Raymond beet harvest to be on in earnest 
with the best crop in some years. No report was made of 
Japanese or Indian labourers at work on the 1908 beet 
harvest. h') 
The continual preoccupation with the need to import 
labour was based on the view that the Blood labourers were 
undependable. In the fall of 1911, for example, there was 
concern that looming treaty payments, an occasion for which 
the Indians were not willing to be absent from the reserve, 
would leave the beet fields short of essential labour. On 
October 12, agent Hyde warned Raymond Knight to expect an 
exodus of Bloods from the area for treaty payment. Hyde 
agreed, however, even in the face of the Bloods' objections, 
to arrange treaty payments at an earlier date so as not to 
68 Cardston Alberta Star, April 18, 1908, p. 1. The 
reports on labour shortage are not in keeping with Agent 
Wilson's report that practically the whole Blood reservation 
were engaged in the beet fields during the 1907 season 
discussed above. 
69 Cardston Alberta Star, October 9, 1908, p. 5. The 
respite was brief. Although beet acreage reached a height 
during the 1908 season of 5,200, it decreased annually 
thereafter. Thompson and Seager, "Workers, Growers and 
Monopolists," p. 31. 
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compromise the company's harvest interests. ~~ Anticipating 
the beet harvest would be finished by the end of October Hyde 
set treaty days for November 7 and 8. 71 A fall storm 
curtailed the harvest and left the company facing the 
prospect of having to leave half its beet crop in the ground 
as the planned dates loomed. Hyde was then asked to postpone 
the new treaty payment date to November 20. 72 Despite urgent 
appeals Hyde's hands were tied and only a few Bloods worked 
the company's fields in the fall harvest of 1911. 73 To make 
matters even more uncomfortable for the company there was a 
rumor that the agent wanted the Indians to demand "$8.00 per 
acre for pulling and topping beets" or they would quit. If 
true, this would present a serious problem as the industry 
claimed that this work was only worth $5.00 an acre.~~ That 
70 . Roger's Sugar Company Arch~ves (RSCA), Vancouver, 
B.C., W.J. Hyde to Raymond Knight, October 12, 1911. *I am 
indebted to Joanne Denton, Museum Co-Ordinator, Roger's Sugar 
Company Archives, for this and subsequent references from 
Roger's Sugar. 
71 RSCA, W.J. Hyde to Raymond Knight, October 17, 1911. 
72 RSCA, Knight Sugar Co. to W. Julius Hyde, October 26, 
1911. 
73 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1539, p. 307, J.W. Crane to Indian 
Officer, Blood Agency, January 13, 1912. 
74 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1539, p. 274, J.W. Crane to Mr. 
Hyde, October 19, 1911; RSCA, W.J. Hyde to Knight Sugar Co., 
October 23, 1911. Adelman notes that between 1907 and 1912 
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there were problems with Knight Sugar operations is 
illustrated by the fact that the company acquired 23 men from 
Utah to help with sugar manufacturing in October. 75 
Labour shortages were again apparent in the fall of 1912 
when the company requested "about fifty Indians ••• at once" 
for beet field labour. 76 The difficulty with recruitment this 
time, however, was because the Bloods had found more 
profitable employment elsewhere and so the company faced 
stiff competition for hands. Although some of the Bloods 
agreed to go, Hyde advised that because of the demand for 
"Indian labor" many of the Bloods had already departed the 
reserve for Lethbridge and so Knight Sugar was directed there 
in its search for more field hands.~ 
Another aspect of the company's difficulty recruiting 
sufficient Blood labour may have been of its own doing, its 
willingness to surrender an individual's wages to the agent 
at his request. Thus in 1913 the company garnisheed the 
wages of one Hind Bull sending Agent Hyde $14.55 for the 10 
the cost of Labour rose by nearly 60 percent. It may have 
been in response to this that Crane was commenting on the 
farmers' ability to pay. Adelman, Frontier Development, p. 
165. 
75 Raymond Leader, October 27, 1911, p. 4. 
76 RSCA, Knight Sugar Co. to W.J. Hyde, October 12, 
1912. 
77 RSCA, W.J. Hyde to The Knight Sugar Company, October 
17 1 1912 • 
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and one half days worked. 78 The unfortunate Hind Bull had 
earned only $15.55 in total of which one dollar went for 
horse feed. -;"l) The end result was that Hind Bull pocketed 
nothing for his efforts, a result not likely to endear the 
company to him or to encourage his working in their fields if 
employment was available elsewhere. 
Retrospective And Conclusions 
Critics then, and historians since, have attempted to 
explain the failure of the Knight Sugar Company in 1915. On 
April 26, 1917, in a retrospective, the Cardston Globe 
presented its version of this "most unfortunate chapter of 
Raymond's history," and correctly observed that acrimony 
between Knight Sugar and local farmers was the problem. "The 
latter could not understand the attitude of the company," the 
Globe observed, "while they in turn seemingly would not cater 
to the wishes of the man on the land. The result was ill 
feeling, non-cooperation and finally-no beets." The 
troubles, the Globe believed, began with minor grievances, 
the farmers wanting concessions - the nature of which the 
paper did not explain - which the company did not give, so 
78 GAI, BIAC, file 96, Jas. E. Ellison toW. Julius 
Hyde, May 31, 1913; Indian Agent to J.E. Ellison, June 6, 
1913. 
79 RSCA, Knight Sugar Co. to W.J. Hyde, May 31, 1913. 
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farmers abandoned beet cultivation. The company then 
undertook beet growing on its own account, and "A certain 
class [Bloods?] of outside labor was imported but it was not 
a success. Then another race [Japanese?] was brought in but 
they were unable to grow sufficient beets to make the running 
of the factory profitable." The Globe stated that the fault 
was not with the country, which was well suited to the 
growing of sugar beets, and "not in the ability of the 
farmers to grow beets but in his ability to overlook the 
shortcomings of the Sugar company."~, Thus the failure of the 
industry was put to the failings of man, not the land. 
John F. Sweeting, Industrial Commissioner for the C.P.R. 
had, in 1914, investigated the industry at Raymond. In a 
presentation before the Western Canada Irrigation Congress, 
which met in Kamloops British Columbia, in July, 1916, 
Sweeting argued that the history of sugar beet cultivation 
made its 'unlimited' potential self evident; but it "remains 
a question of capital and labour to extend production up to 
market requirements. ntH Sweeting did not give details about 
labour but his contention was supported by another beet 
80 Cardston Globe, April 26, 1917, p. 8. 
81 Western Canada Irrigation Association, Reoorts of the 
proceedings of the tenth annual convention held at Kamloops, 
B.C., July 25, 26 and 27, 1916, Ottawa, Gov. Print. Bureau, 
1917, p. 141. In a neat twist on achieving 'market 
requirements' Arthur Dahl suggested the planting of fewer 
acres more intensely. The Raymond Leader, December 24, 1914, 
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grower who stressed, "I cannot produce sugar beets at Agassiz 
[B.C.] and pay twenty cents an hour for ordinary labour and 
twenty-five cents an hour for a team, and pay interest on 
$150 an acre on land. That would be the quickest way for me 
to starve to death.n He concluded that the biggest obstacle 
to success in the business was 'labour' .~1 An observer from 
the Lethbridge Experimental Farm presented the argument that 
the collapse of Knight Sugar Co. operations was due to the 
failure of management to "bring in the proper labour" 
creating dependence "on local labour and Indian labour. 
There were other reasons, too, but that was the principal 
reason, ..• If the manager does not see to that question of 
labour; that is, thinning and topping, the factory cannot be 
operated successfully." Another observer unequivocally 
stated that "the labour has to be imported ..... ~B Raymond 
Knight also believed the latter to be true, and reportedly 
said that "the sugar industry failed because the proper labor 
p. 1. The conference also promoted mixed farming. The 
Kamloops Standard-Sentinel, July 28, 1916. 
82 d . . . . Western Cana a Irr~gat~on Assoc~at~on, Reports, p. 
144. 
83 d . . A • . Western Cana a Irr~gat~on ssoc~at~on, Reports, pp. 
144-145. Emphasis added. Thompson and Seager also agree 
that the failure of the enterprise is attributable to the 
"'labour problem.'" Thompson and Seager, "Workers Growers 
And Monopolists," p. 31; Dawson, Group Settlement, pp. 233-
234. 
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was not available at the proper time."~ 
Unfortunately, because the critics did not elaborate on 
the problems with local or Indian labour, it is difficult to 
evaluate these criticisms. The company had imported labour 
and that too had failed. Despite evidence to the contrary 
both critics and supporters of the sugar beet industry 
regarded labour as the weakest link in the chain of factors 
that ha~pered the successful development. Considering the 
period in which this industry had its rise and fall 1 one 
should not find this conclusion, however erroneous, 
surprising. This was a difficult time for labour/management 
relations in canada as workers strove to share in the booming 
Canadian economy during the pre-World War I period. This was 
followed by depression and unemployment in 1913 and 1914.~5 
Much of this unrest occurred in Alberta and British Columbia 
and it is inconceivable that this atmosphere of conflict did 
not contaminate the view of labour's place in the failure of 
Knight Sugar. 
Labour problems undoubtedly played a role in the 
operational difficulties experienced by Knight Sugar, but how 
significant a part is questionable. According to sociologist 
84 Raymond Leader, October 14, 1916, p. 1. Emphasis 
added. 
85 Stuart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour 
Unrest And Industrial Conflict In Canada, 1900-66 (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services, 1968), pp. 148-150. 
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C.A. Dawson it was the combination of weather, supply and 
labour, that ultimately brought about the failure of Knight 
Sugar. The problems for the industry were rooted in the 
initial miscalculations about the Southern Alberta 
environment. The Mormons had settled in that part of Alberta 
during a cycle of 'wet years', and so erroneously concluded 
the area suitable for sugar beet agriculture. The arrival of 
chinooks that resulted in the thawing of beets, after they 
had been initially frozen, were, if not common, certainly 
more than rare occurrences. Consequently, according to 
Dawson, the company failed to secure sufficient beets, never 
more than 22,000 tons, sometimes as low as 8,000.~ According 
to one estimate once production began, the Raymond plant 
required 400 tons of beets for a 24 hour run, and the season 
lasted for approximately two months.~; Indeed both Raymond 
Knight and J.E. Ellison had criticized the lack of support 
from local farmers,Hs in part explained by the farmers' 
preference for growing grain or raising livestock,~> likely 
86 Dawson, Group Settlement, pp. 233-234. 
87 The above figures are given in the Raymond Rustler 
for the 1911 season. Raymond Rustler, May 31, 1911, p. 7. 
88 Raymond Leader, December 24, 1914, p. 1. 
89 L.A. Rosenvall, "The Transfer Of Mormon Culture To 
Alberta," L.A. Rosenvall and S.M. Evans (eds.), Essays on 
the Historical Geography of the Canadian West: Regional 
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because such activities were more traditional, familiar and 
predictable. Industry boosters promoted beet cultivation, 
and indeed mixed farming in general, on the basis of a false 
economy; far from being economically profitable, beets 
required "more than ten times the labour required for an acre 
of grain." 'XI 
The concerted efforts of the company in the latter phase 
of its existence to arrange for a more extensive beet 
cultivation supports the contention that it was a shortage of 
sugar beets that was the main reason for the difficulties 
experienced by Knight Sugar. ·n Increased sugar beet acreage 
Perspectives on the Settlement Process (Calgary: University 
of Calgary, 1987), p.l43. 
90 
"About 115 hours of hand labour was required to 
produce an acre of beets ••• " Thompson and Seager, 
"Workers, Growers and Monopolists," p. 31. Paul Voisey has 
convincingly illustrated the misplaced faith in the 
profitability of mixed farming. Paul Voisey, "A mix-Up Over 
Mixed Farming: The Curious History Of The Agricultural 
Diversification Movement In A Single Crop Area Of Southern 
Alberta," in David c. Jones and Ian MacPherson (eds.), 
Building Beyond The Homestead: Rural History On The Prairies 
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985), pp. 179-206; 
Paul Voisey, Vulcan: The Making of a Prairie Community 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 85-87, 90-
92. 
91 Both Dawson and Thompson and Seager on the shortage 
of crop. See Dawson, Group Settlement, p. 233; Thompson and 
Seager, "Workers, Growers and Monopolists," p. 31. 
Production for 1907 fell below that of 1906 "on account of 
not being able to secure beets. The Farmers are slow to 
contract for the growing of sugar beets. The people of 
Cardston have quit altogether, the last season they planting 
only one half the acreage contracted and delivered no beets." 
GAI, KSCP, President to Board of Directors, March 31, 1908. 
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at a time when the industry was experiencing severe labour 
shortages only compounded the company's financial 
difficulties. The beet sugar industry should have been no 
more affected by labour problems than other sectors of 
agriculture, perhaps less so. 92 Beet harvesting occurred in 
October and November, after the harvesting of wheat and other 
grains had generally concluded, 93 and when, therefore, one 
could anticipate a surplus of harvesters, or at least little 
competition from other sectors of the agricultural economy. 
The fact that the plant closed when the government's 12 year 
tax exemption ended is a good indication that sugar beet 
cultivation was not a profitable enterprise.''* 
Although more extensive investigation is required to 
confirm the part they played, other market factors were 
likely significant in the demise of Knight Sugar. One 
contract grower complained of being left with a "Hinky Dinky 
narrow track" when the rail line between Cardston and Raymond 
92 Jeremy Adelman has argued that "The shortage of 
labour was the overwhelming constraint on frontier 
development in Argentina and Canada. Workers had to come 
from outside the region of settlement." Adelman, Frontier 
Development, p. 184. On the "absorptive power of the land" 
with which employers had to compete see; Adelman, Frontier 
Development, pp. 159-60. 
93 Thompson and Seager, "Workers, Growers and 
Monopolists," p. 33. 
94 Thompson and Seager, "Workers, Growers and 
Monopolists," p. 32. 
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was upgraded to standard gauge and so he contemplated leaving 
his beets in the ground.~ 
There are also indications that Knight Sugar lacked a 
certain marketing savvy. The company canceled a sales 
agreement it had with Nicholson & Bain, Calgary, apparently 
because of a lack of sales of its product. Nicholson & Bain 
protested that the problem was not of its making but could 
instead be attributed to Knight Sugar's failure to meet 
consumer demand for product in twenty pound sacks.% 
Furthermore, an Edmonton retailer complained that one of its 
competitors was receiving Knight Sugar at "jobbers" prices 
and threatened to "cut out Raymond sugar .. unless this matter 
were rectified.·~ Indeed only 20 percent of the 46,229 bags 
of sugar produced in 1906 was sold.·~ Quality control, ·:r-> the 
95 GAI, KSCP, Thos. H. Woolford to William Knight, 
October 18, 1905. 
96 GAI, KSCP, H.C. Andrews to Knight Sugar Co. Ltd., 
July 16, 1906. 
C)i GAI, KSCP, [Bedlington & Fisher) to Knight Sugar 
Company, July 17, 1906. 
98 GAI, KSCP, Knight Sugar Company Letterbook, April 2, 
1906. 
99 The company complained to one group of contractors 
about beets falling to the ground and not being properly 
cleaned before being loaded. GAI, KSCP, Knight Sugar Co. to 
Beet Growers of Magrath, October 10, 1907. 
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importance of government subsidies, tm transportation costs, 
competition from non-regional producers and government 
regulation are other factors worthy of detailed study. 
As indicated above, others agree with Dawson's 
assessment of the failure of the initial enterprise and 
although these various factors, compounded by labour 
difficulties, may explain the ultimate failure of the Knight 
Sugar Company, they do not explain its survival for more than 
a decade. Clearly Blood labourers were pivotal to sustaining 
the business. True the relationship between the Bloods on 
the one hand, and Knight Sugar and its contractors, for whom 
the Bloods worked on the other, was not without its 
irritants. And it may well be that the company and local 
farmers wanted an alternate source of labour. But the simple 
fact was that no other was available locally, and importing 
labour proved to be no solution; indeed it was as problematic 
as it was helpful. Cecilia Danysk has observed that 'hired 
hands' were notoriously unreliable 101 since "Agricultural 
100 GAI, KSCP, Knight Sugar Co. Letterbook, Minutes of 
Directors Meeting, April 2, 1906, p. 37. 
101 .1. k h d. Cec1 1a Danys, "'A Bac elor's Para ~se': 
Homesteaders, Hired Hands, and the Construction of 
Masculinity, 1880-1930, 11 in Catherine Cavanaugh and Jeremy 
Mouat (eds.) Making Western Canada: Essays on European 
Colonization and Settlement (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1996), 
p. 177. see also the experience of a hired hand in Stettler, 
Alberta in Paul Voisey (ed.), A Preacher's Frontier: The 
Castor, Alberta Letters of Rev. Martin w. Holdom, 1909-1912 
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labourers operated within the framework of capitalism but 
they pursued their own aims, which were often antithetical to 
those of capital. "101 The Bloods, however, were locally 
situated unlike migratory harvesters. Year after year they 
provided honest, and for the most part, dependable labour in 
the beet fields. Both Knight Sugar and the contractors 
admitted the Bloods were essential at all aspects of beet 
cultivation but particularly at harvest. 
Unfortunately for the industry the Bloods, like the 
hired hands they were, refused to subvert their own interests 
for the sake of the sugar beet, even though the agent 
occasionally altered the tribal calendar for the benefit of 
the company. Blood workers were also aware of the value of 
their labour and, as any sensible group in a competitive 
market, sold it to the highest bidder. When the offers were 
too low they simply withheld their services from the market. 
But the Bloods, as producers of labour and consumers of goods 
in the capitalist economy of which they were clearly a part, 
were willing to work more often than not, and as a 
consequence Knight Sugar survived as long as it did. The 
industry had not by 1915-16 reached such a state of 
mechanization that it could do without much manual labour. 
(Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1996), pp. 52-53. 
102 '1' k . d d d Cec~ ~a Danys , H~re Han s: Labour an the 
Development of Prairie Agriculture, 1880-1930 (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stweart, 1995), p. 11. 
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An opportunity to break the fetters of the agent's control 
and to gain additional income and economic independence lured 
the Bloods into the Raymond beet fields. 
The closing of the Knight Sugar Company factory at 
Raymond ended the initial phase of the sugar beet industry in 
southern Alberta. The second phase began with the re-opening 
of a factory, in 1925, by the Canadian Sugar Factory, Ltd., a 
subsidiary of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company.w3 It appears 
that the Bloods played only a minor and sporadic role in the 
newly reconstituted industry. In the first year of 
production and harvest, 1925, the company imported Hungarians 
from British Columbia to do the contract labour of thinning 
and hoeing for eight dollars a day. 104 With the crop ready to 
harvest, however, the local press again trumpeted the 
shortage of labour, 105 a problem that also plagued the 1926 
harvest season. For this occasion the labour problem was 
expected to be solved by settling immigrant families "right 
on the farms of the growers" thus ending the need to use 
"transient labour. " IIX"l 
103 Dawson, Group Settlement, p. 234; Arrington, Beet 
Sugar, p. 108; Laliberte, "The Canadian State," p. 39. 
104 Raymond Recorder, Sept. 7, 1925. 
lOS Raymond Recorder, Sept. 25, 1925. 
106 It is unclear whether or not the Bloods were 
248 
The industry was by this time in transition. Hill 
Spring students were given a two week leave from school to 
assist 107 in the 1927 harvest, which was expected to produce 
45-50,000 tons of beets. LOB There was also a new invention in 
the beet field, an automatic beet loader developed by Frank 
Leavitt of Glenwood, which could ''easily load 400 or 500 lbs. 
of beets at a single operation." Drawn behind a beet wagon 
it speeded up collection. The News predicted that this 
invention would change the nature of beet harvesting giving 
"promise of eliminating one of the most backbreaking and 
disagreeable phases of beet-growing, for the loading of beets 
into the wagon has always been the bug-bear of the be(e]t 
field." HH 
When the sugar factory began its production run in 
October, 1928, the nature of the work had changed such as to 
permit the employment of young high school girls for the 
lighter work 110 but there was no clue as to the identity of 
the remainder of the 200 employees. At the close of the beet 
considered part of this 'transient' labour. Cardston News, 
March 17, 1927, p. 1. 
107 U.I.D. News, October 20, 1927, 1. P• 
108 U.I.D. News, October 6, 1927, 1. P· 
109 U.I.D. News, October 27, 1927, 1. P· 
IIO Cardston News, October 11, 1928, p. 1; U.I.D. News, 
October 11, 1928, p. 1. 
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harvest in November the U.I.D. News noted that "A number of 
foreign laborers left Hill Spring" while others found 
employment with the local farmers. 11 t It was clear that the 
sugar beet industry had ceased to depend locally for the bulk 
of its labour needs. 
The references to the Bloods' participation in the sugar 
beet industry during the 1930s and subsequently are 
incomplete. There is evidence to suggest that although they 
may have participated on an individual and family basis 112 
other groups, such as Hungarian immigrants and Japanese 
Canadians, dominated labour in the beet fields. 113 
Not much has emerged about the Bloods' integrative 
economic pursuits in the decade of the twenties and thirties 
but there is no reason to suppose that their energies waned 
or that their desire to participate in local economic 
l l l u.r.o. News, November 8, 1928, p. 1. 
112 Hugh A. Dempsey, Tom Three Persons: Legend Of An 
Indian Cowboy (Saskatoon: Purich Publishers, 1997), p. 106. 
113 William M. Baker, William J. Lodge and James D. Tagg 
(eds.), Weddings, Work & war. Lethbridge 1914-1945: A 
Scrapbook Histo~ (Lethbridge: University of Lethbridge, 
1994), pp. 77, 107. Curiously Ronald Laliberte noted that an 
attempt by the sugar beet industry to recruit Blood reserve 
labour in 1953 was unsuccessful but he does not explain why. 
Laliberte, "The Canadian State," pp. 67-68. Esther Goldfrank 
also makes reference to Blood sugar beet labour during the 
1930s but offers no indication of the extent of this work. 
Esther s. Goldfrank, "Administrative Programs And Changes In 
Blood Society During The Reserve Period," Applied 
Anthropology, 2 (Jan.-Mar. 1943), p. 21. 
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activities subsided. The changing economic fortunes of the 
twenties and the economic collapse of the thirties brought 
more pressing needs for the Bloods and their neighbours. 
This period saw the collapse of commodity prices in the post 
World war I period and the devastation of the Blood cattle 
herd during the winter of 1919-1920. Those individuals 
engaged in agriculture experienced some success during the 
1920s but their enterprise alone could not wholly sustain the 
tribe. Such conditions made the search for additional income 
more pressing. tl-+ 
114 Esther s. Goldfrank, Changing Configurations In The 
Social Organization Of A Blackfoot Tribe During the Reserve 
Period: The Blood of Alberta, Canada (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1966), p.35. Except to highlights 
disasters Goldfrank does not discuss the economic activities 
of the Bloods in the twenties and thirties. See also Hugh A. 
Dempsey, The Gentle Persuader: A Biography Of James 
Gladstone, Indian Senator (Saskatoon: Western Producer 
Prairie Books, 1986), pp. 54-57. Indian income was reduced 
by almost one half, from $2,388,485 to $1,269,510 between 
1929 and 1933. John Leonard Taylor, Canadian Indian Policy 
During The Inter-War Years, 1918-1939 (Ottawa: Indian And 
Northern Affairs Canada, 1984), p. 92. 
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Chapter 6 
'A prospective citizen of no mean ~r~ance': Tbe Bloods As 
Consumers 
Introduction 
Credit and the expenditure of cash on hand was another 
aspect of the interaction of the local Anglo-European 
community and the Bloods. The nature of this commercial 
relationship in the post-buffalo period was largely 
determined by Treaty 7 which established an undeniable 
economic partnership between White and Native in the southern 
Alberta locality. 1 How else could the cash and goods promised 
1 That the Indians saw a 'shared' partnership or 
reciprocal relationship as opposed to a surrender is now 
accepted by many non-Native and Native historians. Why the 
subsequent relations between Natives and non-Natives is not 
seen in this light is unclear. The latest presentation of 
this argument is Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council with 
Walter Hildebrandt, et. al. The True Spirit and Original 
Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University 
Press, 1996), pp. 112-114, 127; Paul Williams, "The Act: 
Past, Present and Future," Ontario Indian (Vol. 4, No. 4, 
April, 1981), p. 18. Hugh A. Dempsey, Crowfoot: Chief Of The 
Blackfeet (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1973), p. 96, 106; 
Chief John Snow, These Mountains are our Sacred Places 
(Toronto: Samuel Stevens, 1977), pp. 28-33; John Leonard 
Taylor, "Two Views on the Meaning of Treaties Six and Seven," 
in Richard Price (ed.) The Spirit of the Alberta Indian 
Treaties (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 
nd), pp. 43-45. Lynn Hickey, et. al. "T.A.R.R. Interview 
with Elders Program," in Richard Price (ed.) The Spirit of 
the Alberta Indian Treaties (Montreal: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, nd), pp. 105-106, 132. Ovide 
Mercredi, National Chief, Assembly of First Nations raised 
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in the treaty2 be redeemed or otherwise provided except 
through the local economic infrastructure? The Indian Act 
established the Bloods as wards of the Crown and thus ensured 
that the economic tie would not be free and unencumbered. 3 In 
the words of one official of the Department of Indian Affairs 
(DIA), the Indian's "position seems like that of a child for 
whom the state stands in loco parentis." 4 Consigning the 
this issue recently when arguing for assistance to improve 
economic conditions on Native reserves; "We were willing to 
share-but instead they took and took and took, and they took 
so much that we did not have enough resources left to meet 
our own basic needs ••• Had the treaties been honoured, had our 
people been treated as partners, we would be able to provide 
for our own needs." Western Native News, September, 1996, 
Vol. 9, No. 6, p. 2. Some scholars believe that the Natives 
were a sovereign people who have never been conquered. The 
treaties are, therefore, "'peace and friendship' treaties, 
which if anything reinforce the concept of the equal 
nationhood of First Nations." John Olthuis and Roger 
Townshend, "The Case for Native Sovereignty", Crosscurrents: 
Contemporary Political Issues, Mark Charlton and Paul Barker 
(eds.), (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1994), pp. 65-66. 
J 
- See the text of Treaty 7 in Alexander Morris, The 
Treaties of Canada With The Indians Of Manitoba And The 
North-West Territories (Toronto: Coles Publishing Company, 
1979), pp. 368-375. 
3 L.C. Green views the relationship between the Canadian 
government as one of trusteeship, Canada having the 
responsibility to act on behalf of its natives. L.C. Green 
"Trusteeship and Canada's Indians," Dalhousie Law Journal 
(Vol. 3, No. 1, May, 1976), p. 104, 114-116. If the Indians 
are viewed as colonized implications for an economic 
relationship, though one of subservience, is still the same. 
L.C. Green, "Legal Significance of Treaties affecting 
Canada's Indians," Anglo-American Law Review (Vol. 1, 1972), 
p. 119. 
-+ J.A.J. McKenna, "The Indian Laws Of Canada," Catholic 
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Native population to legal minority status brought to the 
Canadian government responsibility to ensure that their basic 
needs were met and basic rights protected. Cultural 
isolation on reserves was an ideal, but economically 
separating the Natives from the remainder of the community 
was neither practical nor possible. 
When the Bloods selected a reserve and a sedentary 
existence they were forced into the local market economy. 
They became participants in a macro-economic arrangement 
externally driven and over which they had little or no 
control. Initially lacking the means to effectively sustain 
themselves, not unlike their White neighbours, they played 
out their consumer role on the promise of tomorrow and a 
cycle of credit and debt. The next 'harvest' or 'sale' held 
the key to future prosperity and independence while today's 
needs required satisfaction. The Bloods' participation in 
the market place as consumers will therefore be discussed for 
the period from the 1880s to the 1930s. In the process an 
analysis of business views of the importance of Native trade 
and of the Indians as customers will be given. The positions 
of the agents and DIA as intermediaries between local 
World (Vol. 54, Oct. 1891), p. 62. That this is believed to 
be the case was also recognized by former Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau when he observed that n'They're not citizens 
of the provinces as the rest of us are. They are wards of 
the federal government. ' " Green, Dalhousie Law Journal, p. 
118; Allan G. Harper, "Canada's Indian Administration: The 
'Indian Act'," America Indigena, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1946), 
p. 298-299. 
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businesses and the Bloods will also be revealed. The 
discussion will shed light on the varying economic fortunes 
of the Blood reserve and the region. 
The Merchant Environment 
Merchants' houses such as the u.s. firm of I.G. Baker 
quickly followed 'official' Anglo-Canadian presence in 
southern Alberta. I.G. Baker in particular found catering to 
the needs of the NWMP and the Indians very lucrative. 5 
Merchants appeared in Fort Macleod and Cardston soon after 
the towns were established. Their intent was to cater to the 
needs of the police and settlers but they soon appreciated 
the value of the Bloods as consumers as well. The trails, 
roads and especially railroads tied the towns to the national 
economy and brought needed merchandise to the local area.(] 
Travel for individuals was still sufficiently difficult, 
however, to restrict customers to local businesses for many 
of their immediate needs and to tie businesses to local 
customers. 
5 David H. Breen, The Canadian Prairie West and the 
Ranching Frontier 1874-1924 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1983), p. 15. 
6 Donald G. Wetherell and Irene R.A. Kmet, Town Life: 
Main Street and the Evolution of Small Town Alberta 
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1995), p. 80. 
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It was not long before the first businesses established 
in a town faced competition. Fort Macleod, for example, 
could boast 26 retail businesses by 1887. 7 Local town 
businesses, however, were not the only competition for the 
customer's dollar. Before the turn of the century T. Eaton 
Company was mailing its sales catalogue across Canada, 
including the west.~ Itinerant businesses and traveling 
sales men were also a presence in small town Alberta.<) Those 
that survived adapted their sales practices to suit local 
circumstances and served White and Native customers. 
The DIA set out that Natives could purchase locally 
goods that were 'needed' or those which provided basic 
requirements of daily existence or for individual economic 
functions. A listing signed by Agent J.T. Faunt, circa 1921, 
shows orders for hardware implements, blacksmith services, 
harness, lumber and building supplies, horses, and 
'machinery'. More personal purchases were groceries, 
especially beef and flour, clothing, medical services, and 
undertaker services. 11 l Supplying the reserve hospital proved 
i Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, p. 115. 
8 Thelma Dennis, "Eaton's Catalogue: Furnishings for 
Rural Alberta, 1886-1930," Alberta Histo.r.:y (Spring 1989), p. 
21. 
9 Wetherell and Kmet, Town Life, p. 126. 
10 See statement of Indian Indebtedness signed by J.T. 
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a significant source of revenue for Cardston businesses. 11 
Such approved purchases became 'legitimate' debt for the 
Natives and 'legitimate' sales for the merchants. 
There were times when local businesses purchased produce 
from the reserve although the extent and value of these 
transactions remains unclear. The sale of reserve produce 
required the agent's consent or it was illegal. However, 
reserve resident Tom Three Persons was one who 
surreptitiously engaged in disposing of grain, livestock and 
meat. 12 There is no indication that such large quantities of 
goods were sold as to require shipment outside of the region 
to be disposed off. 
There are indications, however, that some merchants, 
tied to the limited local market, charged their Native 
customers more because of the risk. One agent reported 
Indian complaints that merchants, when faced with the 
prospect of having to wait months for Natives to repay their 
credit advances, inflated the price of goods. Purchasing at 
wholesale rates for cash was suggested by the agent as a 
Faunt, in NAC, RG 10, val. 7881, file 35103. 
11 See GAI, BIAC, files 154, 156 and 172. See also 
Laurie Meijer Drees, "Reserve Hospitals and Medical Officers: 
Health Care and Indian Peoples in Southern Alberta, 1890s-
1930," Prairie Forum (Vol. 21, No. 2 Fall 1996), p. 156. 
12 Hugh A. Dempsey, Tom Three Persons: Legend Of An 
Indian Cowboy (Saskatoon: Purich Publishers, 1997), pp. 97, 
99. 
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suitable response to any unfair selling practices employed by 
the local merchants. 13 During the early years of western 
Canadian development not only Natives were subjected to this 
business tactic. Barry Broadfoot has noted that there was a 
difference in country stores between "the price marked ••• and 
the price the customer had in her head, and the real price 
might be somewhere in between. That's called haggling. 
You'd haggle. ,I-+ 
The Department's view was that credit purchasing was not 
conducive to wholesome Indian economic development, an 
attitude in keeping with public perceptions at this time. 
The Macleod Gazette, for example, believed that credit-based 
business, offered to Indian and homesteader alike, was 
unacceptable and blamed merchants for both the encouragement 
13 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1722, p. 227, Indian Agent to 
Secretary, Department of Indians Affairs, July 20, 1904. 
Hanks noted that the Blackfeet were subjected to this 
business policy in the 1940s and in fact could not get credit 
locally. L.M. Hanks Jr. and J.R. Hanks, Tribe under Trust: 
A Study of the Blackfoot Reserve in Alberta (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1950), p.83. This may have been 
very much a universal business ethic. Colin Bundy has noted 
of South African Natives that; "'The Native, particularly in 
the rural areas, has to pay more for the same article than 
would a European, while for the same class of goods of the 
same quality he would receive less than a European.'" 
Unfortunately South African natives did not enjoy the legal 
protection of their property possessed by Canadian Indians. 
Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 129-
130. 
14 . Barry Broadfoot, The P~oneer Years 1895-1914 
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1976), p. 279. 
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and retention of the practice. The system seemed so solidly 
entrenched that the paper admitted that it was futile to try 
to get rid of it. Instead, the Gazette suggested that credit 
be gradually limited until business on a cash basis only was 
established. The ending of credit, the paper speculated, 
would 11 Solve the dead-beat problem~~ and end an "evil" 
system. 1 ~ The Gazette, however, failed to give either the 
number of, or the identity of the '1 dead-beats". 
In its opposition to credit purchases, however, the 
newspaper opposed the basic economic practice which sustained 
much of prairie development. 1" Harry Buckwold, the owner of a 
general store at Admiral, Saskatchewan, indicated that credit 
was important to all customers to carry them from one harvest 
or sale to the next. Patrons used this option to run up 
bills at several stores at once or to play one business 
15 Macleod Gazette, March 15, 1894. The origin of the 
Gazette's view of the evils of credit is unclear, but it may 
have been related to the collapse of the speculative land 
market in Manitoba and the subsequent closure of banks in 
western Canada. "Between 1880 and 1910, it is estimated that 
approximately thirty percent of Canadian banks failed, .. 
though this setback was but temporary. R. Craig Mcivor, 
Canadian Monetary Banking And Fiscal Development (Toronto: 
The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1961), p.76-77. 
16 See for example, T.D Regehr, "Bankers and Farmers in 
Western Canada, 1900-1939," in John E. Foster {ed.), The 
Developing West (Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press, 
1983), pp. 306, 316; Jeremy Adelman, "Prairie Farm Debt and 
the Financial Crisis of 1914," Canadian Historical Review 
(Vol. LXXI, No. 4, December 1990), pp. 494-495. 
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against the other. In response, merchants kept and shared 
customer lists of amounts due and habits of payment. 17 
In 1907 Cardston's Alberta Star said the credit system 
was bad for both the merchant and the customer because 
administrative costs and risk required a 20 percent price 
increase. IX The Star reflected the local variation of a 
region-wide movement to eliminate the credit aspect of 
business operations. The May 24 edition listed 11 Cardston 
merchant houses that had declared that as of June 1, goods 
would be sold on a "cash or produce" basis only. The 
promised benefit to the consumer was cheaper goods. Among 
the companies participating in the new policy were H.S. Allen 
and Co. Ltd., and the Cardston Implement Co. Ltd. 1'> both of 
17 Payment could be made with cash or goods. Heather 
Robertson, Salt of the Earth: The story of the homesteaders 
in western canada (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 
Publishers, 1974), p. 180. 
18 Cardston Alberta Star, May 10, 1907, p. 9. 
19 Cardston Alberta Star, May 24, 1907, p. 4. Selling 
for produce was akin to barter or 'trade'. There was, 
however, very little discussion of this aspect of doing 
business. If the diary of Wallace Weiss is any indication 
this aspect of commercial exchange with one's neighbours is 
deserving of attention. Weiss lived south of Medicine Hat 
and his diary for January, February and March, 1937 shows he 
'traded' with neighbours on twenty different occasions and 
made several other unsuccessful attempts. Items traded 
included services, livestock, personal items such as rings 
and watches and a radio. Diary of Wallace Weiss, January, 
February, March, 1937. Courtesy of Robert Weiss Family. 
Copy in possession of author. 
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which were known to do business with the Blood reserve. 
Interestingly, during this brief campaign no criticism was 
directed at Blood customers. Ultimately, however, merchants 
could not resist the established practice and continued to 
advance credit to their customers. 
As national mail order houses made significant inroads 
into the prairie communities' purchasing habits, they caused 
a backlash by local interests. The southern Alberta press 
began to advocate and practically demand loyalty to home 
grown businesses. Lo The ready extension of credit by local 
merchants, with its attendant risks of default and capital 
flow restrictions, was likely a response to the competitive 
pressure of "the ultimate traveling salesman" the catalogue • .!I 
The business community faced the formidable challenge of 
curbing the demand for credit while at the same time facing 
down mail order operations and enhancing shopper loyalty. 
True, mail order houses, such as Eaton's, did not extend 
credit, but the convenience they offered along with 
competitive pricing based on volume purchasing, was 
20 Rocky Mountain Echo, April, 16, 1906; RG 10, Volume 
4035, file 306,458. 
21 Michael Bliss, Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of 
Canadian Business (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), 
p. 292. On Eaton's and its competitiveness see Joy L. 
Santink, Timothy Eaton and the rise of his department store 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 155-158, 
205, 251. 
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attractive. 11 The presence of mail order businesses invited 
criticism from local boosters well into the decade of the 
1920s.B Credit, therefore, was an essential risk of doing 
business. 
Such views, criticizing credit and promoting cash 
transactions, naturally surfaced during times of heavy 
financing of farm expansion. The Cardston News, February 3, 
1927, carried the views of one critic who argued that 
"unrestricted credit and flaws in the banking system," along 
with dependence on " 'next year Is crop I " were responsible for 
the credit crisis. The writer pointed out that short term 
personal credit had developed to assist businessmen for 
periods of 30 to 90 days. Such a system was obviously not 
suited to agriculture where the time needed to grow and 
market a crop took from six to 10 months and depended on the 
22 Broadfoot, Pioneer Years, pp. 287-282. See also pp. 
275-277. 
23 For example, in its effort to boost community 
enterprise, the Cardston Globe refused to sell advertising 
space to mail order-houses that, in the paper's view, posed a 
significant threat to local enterprise. The Globe 
admonished entrepreneurs to effectively increase their 
commerce by resorting to the more competitive practices of 
discounting, smaller markup, and sale on a cash basis only. 
By eliminating the expense incurred from direct loss and the 
management of credit accounts local merchants could, said the 
Globe, drive mail order houses out of business. The Cardston 
Globe, November 12, 1914, p. 1. 
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vagaries of both weather and markets.L~ The inevitable 
consequence of rampant credit was the crisis of 1920-21 which 
left the farmer owing "land vendors, mortgage companies, 
banks, machine companies, stores, garages, arrear taxes, seed 
and feed distributing centres, neighbours, friends and 
enemies." 5 Little wonder the Star branded farmers as the 
most ungrateful beneficaries of the credit system. 1~> 
Businesses, no doubt, accepted the wisdom of a credit 
free economy. This, however, was a highly unlikely solution 
to their problems and could prove eminently unprofitable in a 
local economy largely based on seasonal and sporadic 
employment. Credit was, therefore, available to the Bloods 
and to settler/farmers because the market value of their 
produce was significant enough to invite the risks. 
Inevitably, credit transactions with the Bloods came 
under some scrutiny. Louis F. Hardyman, a resident of the 
Blood Reserve, praised the fairness of Cardston business 
practices with the Bloods. He especially noted the one price 
24 Johns. Smith, "The Question of Credit," The Cardston 
News, February J, 1927, p. 7. Historian David Jones has also 
pointed out the inconsistency in the time element of a short 
term loan of three to four months when farm operations take 
twice that long. David c. Jones, "We'll all be buried down 
here": The Prairie Dryland Disaster 1917-1926 (Calgary: 
Historical Society of Alberta, 1986), p. lxi. 
25 Cardston News, January 26, 1928, p. 1. 
26 Cardston Alberta Star, May 10, 1907, p. 9. 
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policy for White and Indian alike and the 10 percent discount 
for cash purchases. As a result, the Bloods did much 
business there.L7 Cardston entrepreneur Charles Ora Card was 
pleased with himself over the extent and character of his 
trade with the Bloods. His diary entry for November 3, 1896 
indicates his willingness to bargain, giving the Indians 
discounts on demand, as well as gifts to the children and 
chiefs. Card stressed his fairness with the Natives, 
treating them "with the same consideration as white 
people ..• '' -'~ 
By 1899 the variety and location of the businesses the 
Bloods patronized suggests that they were discriminating 
shoppers who shopped where they could get the best return. 
Agent Wilson's records of the Bloods' accounts for August 
shows they were indebted to businesses in both Cardston1') and 
Fort Macleod .. -~~~ There was a decided preference in the number 
27 Cardston Record, April 7, 1899, p. 1. The discount 
for cash purchasing was in effect a two price policy to 
discourage credit purchases. 
28 D.G. Godfrey and Brigham Y. Card (eds.), The Diaries 
Of Charles Ora Card: The Canadian Years 1886-1903 (Salt Lake 
City: university of Utah Press, 1993), p. 369. 
29 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, p. 405, James Wilson to 
Messers. H.S. Allen co., August 31, 1899. 
30 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1564, p. 406, James Wilson to 
Messers. Barker and Gardiner, August 31, 1899. 
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of transactions in favour of Fort Macleod businesses, 31 
probably because most Bloods lived closest to that community. 
As a part of its policy of isolating the Natives from 
the negative consequences of direct association with White 
society, especially while on shopping sprees, the DIA granted 
the Hudson's Bay Company permission to establish trading 
facilities on selected reserves. 31 This policy was eventually 
judged unsatisfactory as, in the Department's opinion, the 
Indians all too quickly parted with their money. 
Consequently the Department decided that where reserves were 
situated close to towns it was just as well to let the 
Indians visit and trade as necessary •. H Agent Wilson believed 
31 See letters addressed to various businesses by Wilson 
in RG 10, val. 1564, pp. 404-430. 
32 See for example letters granting permission for HBC 
to trade on reserves: NAC, RG 10, vol. 3582, file 1024, by L. 
Vankoughnet, January 16, 1891; L. vankoughnet to Indian 
Commissioner, January 20, 1891; Letter signed by L. 
Vankoughnet , May 21, 1891. Also permission granted to 
George F. Tupper trade on Saddle Lake Reserve, No. 125 and 
Blue Quill's Reserve, No. 127, L. Vankoughnet, April 20, 
1891. 
33 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3582, file 1024, F.H.P. to Deputy 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, September 10, 1896. 
However, Indian Commissioner Hayter Reed disagreed with this 
new approach. He believed that prices were more open to 
influence by the Indians on the reserve than in the town or 
village store. NAC, RG 10, vol. 3582, file 1024, Hayter Reed 
to A.E. Forget, September 17, 1896. Desiring to restrict the 
Indians to the reserve as much as possible was in keeping 
with Reed's overall isolationist views. F. Laurie Barron, 
"The Indian Pass System in the Canadian West, 1882-1935," 
Prairie Forum, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1988), pp. 27-28. 
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that the Bloods were so placed on the reserve as to be able 
to easily and advantageously patronize the business of their 
choice in Macleod, Cardston and Lethbridge, not to mention 
the numerous independent traders near the reserve. -'4 
Indeed, the Bloods became such heavy purchasers that in 
1897 the DIA decided, as an experiment, to allow those 
individuals and businesses intent on collecting Native debts 
to be present on the reserves at treaty payment time. The 
agents were instructed, however, to prevent Indians being 
unduly influenced or coerced by the merchants. Providing 
this arrangement worked it could be continued, but the 
Department emphasized that it would play no part as 
intermediary in the collection of debt owed by Indians. 1::i It 
can be argued, however, that by virtue of providing access to 
the Indians at this most opportune time, the DIA was a party 
to debt collection. 
34 .1 2 . NAC, RG 10, vol. 3582, f~ e 10 4, James W~lson to 
Indian Commissioner, February 17, 1897. The documents do not 
reveal who these independent traders were. Though eventually 
reversed the policy of permitting shopping off the reserve 
was kept for the Bloods. See RG 10, vol. 3582, file 1024, 
A.E.F to The Deputy of the Superintendent General of Indian 
Affairs, June 4, 1897. 
35 NAC, RG 10, vol. 3582, file 1024, Circular Letter 
signed J.D. McLean, April 7, 1897. 
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The Reserve 
The annuities promised in treaty were, initially, very 
important in enabling the Bloods to provide themselves with 
daily necessities. Local merchants were certainly aware of 
the August, 1881, annuity payments of some $26,000.00 
received by 2,892 Bloods.·'(' By October 3,640 of the tribe 
were reported settled on the reserve. -17 Thus the next year' s 
annuity promised to be even more lucrative to local 
businesses. In the meantime the Bloods continued to be 
provisioned with supplies purchased locally. 3~ 
Vouchers for Indian supplies issued from the Indian 
office at Fort Macleod during the month of May, 1885, clearly 
illustrate the importance to the local economy of government 
money spent in support of the Indians. Statements show that 
$14,656.44 was spent for a variety of purposes such as stage 
fare, salary, wages and travel allowance. By far the biggest 
cash outlay, $13,279.51, was to the I.G. Baker Company for 
36 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1549, p. 4, Indian Agent to E. 
Dewdney, August 29, 1881. 
37 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1549, p. 16, N. Macleod, to [?], 
October 31, 1881. 
38 See for example a statement of supplies issued in 
NAC, RG 10, vol. 1550, pp. 836 ff.; RG 10, vol. 1551, pp. 46-
48, Indian Agent to Indian Commissioner, January 13, 1884; p. 
172, Statement by c.E. Denny July 7, 1883. 
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beef 1 $8 1 639.95 of it spent on the Bloods. :N The expenditure 
for June approached $12,700.00 with the Bloods receiving the 
lion's share at $11,289.67.~1 Similarly $6,933.65~1 had been 
spent on hardware for the reserve and most of this was likely 
purchased locally. Clearly the spending of so much money 
raised the profile of the Bloods with the local business 
community which hungered for cash. 
The initial view that local merchants held of Blood 
purchasing power is unclear. It is evident, however, that 
the Bloods so successfully promoted their limited means that 
businesses eagerly sought out Blood patronage when they had 
money and liberally extended credit when they did not. Agent 
James Wilson noted that the Bloods went on their usual 
spending spree in Fort Macleod and Lethbridge after receipt 
39 NAC 1 RG 10, vol. 1552, p. 671 ff., Statement by W. 
Pocklington, June 6, 1885. 
40 NAC, RG 10, val. 1552, p. 728 ff., Statement by W. 
Pocklington, July 14, 1885. A.B. McCullough has estimated 
that the value of government beef purchases in the Treaty 7 
area between 1886 and 1900 amounted to $2,097,793.50. A.B. 
McCullough, "Eastern Capital, Government Purchases and the 
Development of Canadian Ranching," Prairie Forum (Vol. 22, 
No. 2, Fall 1997), pp. 230-233. 
-+1 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1553, p. 34, Statement by W. 
Pocklington for July, 1885; p. 324, Statements by w. 
Pocklington November, 1885; pp. 491-92, w. Pocklington to E. 
Dewdney, February 9, 1886. See RG 10, Vols. 1552, 1553, 1554 
for further inventories of purchases make on behalf of the 
Bloods. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1553, pp. 35-44, Statements by w. 
Pocklington June 30, 1885. 
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of their treaty annuity in the fall of 1893. Wilson admitted 
that the Bloods were sensible consumers. He had 
reservations, however, about the growing trend in advancing 
credit which, he felt, was ultimately not to the benefit of 
the Indians as they quickly incurred debt.~L 
Through credit, however, merchants assured themselves a 
portion of the Bloods' annual treaty payments and other 
income. The Bloods were not only recipients of government 
beneficence. Individually-earned incomes were an added 
incentive for merchants to regard the Bloods as welcome 
customers. In his report for March, 1895, agent Wilson noted 
that their earnings for the previous nine months were 
$5,989.00, the largest to date.~-' Total earnings for 1896 saw 
yet another increase at $7,510.11.~ Even at this early stage 
42 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, p. 330, James Wilson to 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, August 1, 1894. 
Though the Department expressed a desire to end the credit 
system as early as 1904 it did not follow through with 
concerted action. See GAI, BIAC, file 17, J.D. Mclean to 
R.N. Wilson, February 13, 1904. 
-+3 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1560, p. 858, James Wilson to Indian 
Commissioner, April 4, 1895. A final tally for the income 
for 1895 could be $7,500. Fraser Taylor, Standing Alone, p. 
31. 
44 Esther s. Goldfrank, Changing Configurations In The 
Social Organization Of A Blackfoot Tribe During The Reserve 
Period: The Blood Of Alberta Canada (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1945), p. 21. 
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of reserve development the Bloods were a growing economic 
force. 
It is clear that the Blood reserve and its people were 
too significant an economic force to be ignored or alienated. 
The Blood Agency report for 1904 gives three major divisions 
of the Blood population of 1,202. There were 25 self-
supporting men with 75 dependents for a total of 100, or 
slightly more than eight percent of the reserve population. 
Add to these the 166 men considered partially self-
supporting, with their 362 dependents; then slightly under 44 
percent of the reserve had some or significant purchasing 
power. There were 574 persons classed as destitute or 
infirm. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1904, the 
'working' group earned $36,154.78 from wages, the sale of 
beef, hay and ponies, freighting coal and supplies and coal 
mining and other occupations~ and income for the reserve was 
in excess of $40,000.00.~' Moreover, at times when the 
Department was cutting spending~ the trade of Bloods of 
45 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1722, p. 455, J.W. Jewett to Indian 
Commissioner, Winnipeg, October 13, 1904. 
46 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1548, p. 535, R.N. Wilson to 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, September 19, 1905; 
CSP 27, No. 11, 1905, Vol. XXIX, p. 203. 
47 
"The merchants of Macleod, Cardston and Lethbridge 
can tell you that their business from the Indian Agent's 
orders-which was considerable in past years-has under my 
management become insignificant and in many cases (groceries 
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independent means became even more important. The income 
reported above is, of course, only 'official' income and does 
not account for income •unofficially' earned beyond the 
reserve boundaries by individual contract agreement. This 
latter income is practically impossible to determine. The 
money earned, however, from such sources as cutting hay, 
freighting coal, and working the Raymond sugar beet fields, 
was substantial. 
Significant also were DIA expenditures on behalf of the 
destitute and infirm to ensure that they received the 
necessities of life. The upkeep of the agency itself 
required yearly spending for maintenance, and sometimes 
substantial expenditure was required as new projects were 
undertaken on behalf of the Bloods. 
Despite a decade of fluctuating economic growth on the 
prairies the Bloods experienced substantially increased 
prosperity beginning in 1911. Total income for that year was 
$56,750.00 and by 1920 reached $254,332.00,~ over a four-fold 
increase. A synopsis of the Department's 1913 report for the 
Blood reserve contained some revealing facts about Blood 
income and resources. The population was now 1,140, down 62 
from the 1904 figure. Of this population 51 Bloods were 
for instance) disappeared entirely. This is a common 
complaint against me, so great has been the reduction in the 
issue of orders." NAC, RG 10, val. 1548, p. 332, Indian 
Agent to Secretary, DIA, June 20, 1905. 
48 Goldfrank, Changing Configurations, p. 32. 
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grain growers and 305 were engaged in stock raising. Clearly 
the great majority of working males were officially ranchers 
or farmers and as such were likely absent from the reserve 
only when seasonally released from their duties. The reserve 
was 354,000 acres valued at $5,306,990.00. Total income was 
given at $61,600.00, an increase of approximately $20,000.00 
over the 1904 figure. The total of real and personal 
property owned by the band was $5,674,000.00 or about 
$5,000.00 per capita. 4L> According to Agent W .J. Dilworth, 124 
of the Bloods had incurred an authorized debt of $9,053.60 as 
of December 1913~0 for a per capita debt of 73 dollars for 
those listed or an average debt of seven dollars and 94 cents 
per person for the entire tribe. It is little wonder that 
businesses failed to single out the Bloods as a problem when 
discussing their discontent with the credit system. The 
failure to point their fingers at the Bloods suggests that 
the delinquency rate on debt was not so great as to alienate 
the Bloods or the agency. 
49 Macleod Spectator, December 18, 1913, p. 11. 
50 See NAC, RG 10, vol. 7595, file 10103, pt. 2, Agent 
Dilworth's statement. We conclude that this was authorized 
debt as it was entered in the agent's accounts. 
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Policy 
Treaty 7 promised both sustenance and assistance that 
could only be provided through the non-Native market economy. 
With the need to replace the buffalo economy the Bloods were 
driven to the business community as consumers in need of 
credit and were thus tied to mercantile interests through 
contracted debt. How familiar they were with the workings 
and trappings of a frontier capitalist economy is an 
important point as the Bloods had little difficulty utilizing 
local businesses to satisfy their basic needs. The result 
was that the Bloods, a people presumed to have so little in 
the way of personal wealth, had little difficulty in amassing 
uninsured credit. The general acceptance of Native credit 
trade was, by 1891, so extensive, and so contrary to the 
government's ideal of a self-supporting Native population, 
that the DIA issued a circular "forbidding" orders on 
credit. ;; 1 
51 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1558, p. 592, w. Pocklington to 
deputy of the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, November 18, 
1891. Agent J.A. Markle of the Manitoba Dakota was likewise 
opposed to credit as "detrimental" to the Indians interests. 
Peter D. Elias, The Dakota of the Canadian Northwest: 
Lessons for Survival (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba 
Press, 1988), pp. 89-90. An American historian referring to 
the commercial exchange between Indians and local merchants 
has noted: "Another group that stood to gain from the opening 
of reservation lands were merchants and others who did 
business with either Indians or whites near a reservation. 
Merchants with an established trade with Indians could expect 
increased sales after the opening of a reservation," to 
settlement. Leonard A. Carlson, Indians, Bureaucrats, And 
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The treaties had saddled the federal government with 
responsibility for the Indians' economic well-being. 
Initially this was largely done through the government acting 
as a welfare agency and doling out sufficient goods to meet 
their minimal needs. The government was aware, however, of 
the long term costs of such maintenance. One of the 
principles of the management of Indian affairs in Canada was, 
therefore, to direct Indian development towards eventual 
economic independence or self-sufficiency. The key was to 
teach Natives a healthy appreciation for the value of 
amassing wealth through individually owned property. They 
had to be taught to live within their means today to achieve 
financial independence tomorrow. The DIA and Indian agents, 
therefore, initially went to great lengths to keep the 
Indians from buying on credit. 
The Department's policy on credit purchasing was 
straight-forward. To be legitimate all Indian purchases had 
to be 'authorized' through the agency office. Once approved 
the Indian took the official permission to purchase specified 
goods directly to a merchant who was often pre-determined by 
the agent. The cost for 'needed' purchases was subsequently 
collected from that person's individual earnings by the agent 
and forwarded to the merchant. 5l Since the agent managed 
Land: The Dawes Act and the Decline of Indian Farming 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 38. 
52 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1722, pp. 226-27, Indian Agent to 
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Indian income earned on the reserve, the CIA's policies were 
thus fulfilled. 
This system of controlling purchases, however, had 
limitations. Not all individual earnings resulted from 
reserve employment or sales, and the agent had little or no 
control over money earned off the reserve. The 
appropriateness of purchases was then left to individual 
discretion. With their own money, and not needing a 
'guarantee' from the agent, the Indians could exercise more 
freedom of choice in their purchase of goods and services. 
Natives also visited pool halls53 when in towns such as Fort 
Macleod, Cardston or Raymond. In the 1930s, for example, one 
agent complained that the Bloods had spent a lot of money on 
cars which now required maintenance. 54 Such behaviour served 
to reinforce the belief that Natives were not yet ready for 
free choice and that without supervision would quickly spend 
themselves deeper into debt. 55 
Secretary, Department of Indians Affairs, July 20, 1904. 
53 Donald G. Wetherell with Irene Kmet, Useful 
Pleasures: The Shaping of Leisure in Alberta 1896-1945 
(Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1990), p. 359. 
54 NAC, RG 10, val. 7899, file 40103-1, Statement of 
J.E. Pugh. 
55 See for example NAC, RG 10, vol. 1722, pp. 226-27, 
Indian Agent to Secretary, Department of Indians Affairs, 
July 20, 1904. 
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Another significant limitation of the DIA policy was the 
independence of the merchant. They could voluntarily 
undermine the Department's goals by extending 'unauthorized' 
credit to Natives. 56 Defying the Department's wishes, 
however, was not without its attendant risks. In 1904, for 
example, Blood Indian agent James Wilson advised one Magrath 
business that, instead of calling on him, it should look to 
the collection of its accounts when the Indians returned to 
work in that community the following year.~i Thus this 
creditor was forced to carry the accounts on his books for a 
full year risking the possibility that the individuals 
concerned were either deeper in debt, had not returned to 
work or had died. 
The collection of debt from Natives was likewise 
difficult in cases where the debtor was unwilling or unable 
to pay. The problem was rooted in the Indian Act which 
established the wardship status of the Indians and in the 
communal nature of property holding. Land, their most 
valuable commodity, could be alienated or sold only in right 
56 The behaviour of Blood rancher Tom Three Persons is 
a good illustration of the limitations of the DIA to control 
individuals. He kept a personal bank account, sold goods 
and produce without permission and spent his own money at his 
pleasure. Hugh A. Dempsey, Tom Three Persons: Legend Of An 
Indian Cowboy (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1997), pp. 54, 
72, 97, 99. 
57 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1722, p. 476, Indian Agent to R.W. 
Fletcher, November 29, 1904. 
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of the Crown. SH Natives were also protected from liens and 
mortgages against their property, except by another Indian 
and only against taxable property. 5l) It is unclear how well 
local entrepreneurs understood the legal position of the 
Indians when they so readily extended credit. The agent, 
however, was frequently asked to assist with debt collection, 
or to render an account of delinquent creditors. Most 
merchants believed the DIA responsible for legitimate claims 
against Natives defaulting on accounts. 
The Business of Deb~ 
It is clear that although incurring debt was against DIA 
policy, the Bloods did not take it seriously. The Bloods 
were offered the convenience of credit by local merchants 
unwilling to lose their source of revenue. Thus the agent 
reported in November, 1904, that the Bloods owed $4,750.40 
58 McKenna, Catholic World, p. 65. See also Allan G. 
Harper, "Canada's Indian Administration: The Treaty System," 
America Indigena, Vol. VII, No. 2 (April, 1947), p. 137. It 
has been argued that this fact alone severely restricts the 
Indians' access to credit in the market place; "Because of 
the legal restrictions on the alienation of reserves, Indians 
are usually unable to obtain long-term or mortgage loans by 
pledging land or buildings." H.B. Hawthorn, c.s. Belshaw, 
S.M. Jamieson, The Indians of British Columbia: A Study of 
Contemporary Social Adjustment (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1958), p. 189. See also Elias, Dakota, pp. 
120, 125. 
59 h d' Harper, "T e In ~an Act,u p. 303. 
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for materials purchased from 13 dealers in Macleod, Cardston 
and Lethbridge on orders issued under authority of the 
agency. The merchants in all three communities granted 
credit, agent James Wilson said, with the knowledge that 
payment would occur when the agent could collect. To remove 
some of the uncertainty of re-payment Wilson suggested that 
the debt be paid by "vouchers against the tribal fund."w 
In a letter to H.S. Allen & Co., Cardston, Wilson 
clarified his position with regard to collection of funds due 
creditors, "I only undertake to pay you (and others) upon the 
Indians paying me - that is I simply act as your collecting 
agent using due diligence in effecting collection as quickly 
as the Indians earn or otherwise acquire money over which my 
official position gives me control. "111 The collection of debt 
from the Bloods, though based on the agent's good will, was 
hampered by the restrictions of his powers. Only if the 
debtor cooperated could moneys be collected with the agent's 
assistance. In one case in 1915 the Canadian Credit Men's 
Association's attempt to collect on a debt owed to E. 
60 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1722, p. 473, Indian Agent to 
Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, November 29, 1904. 
Earlier in the year Secretary J.D. McLean had written R.N. 
Wilson that the Department wished to abolish the order system 
of purchasing and encourage Indian purchasing on a cash basis 
only. GAI, BIAC, file 17, J.D. McLean to R.N. Wilson, 
February 13, 1904. 
61 NAC, RG 10, val. 1723, p. 369, James Wilson to 
Messers. H.S. Allen & Co., April 9, 1900. 
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Doberere, Macleod, was turned aside by Agent W.J. Dilworth. 
Because the account had not been officially authorized, 
Dilworth said, he could only "advise" the debtor to pay. hl 
Agents at times foiled merchant attempts to recover 
debt, especially when Natives pawned their property. Pawning 
was counter to the DIA's desires to indoctrinate Natives with 
62 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.J. Dilworth to 
Canadian Credit Men's Association, January 20, 1915. The 
Department concurred with Dilworth's decision. NAC, RG 10, 
vol. 7881, file 35103, J.D. McLean to Canadian Credit Men's 
Association, July 20, 1915. Indeed Dilworth's advice to 
creditors was "that the Department will not recognize such 
orders and will not be responsible for their payment." GAI, 
BIAC, file 92, Indian Agent to Messers. Macleod and Gray, 
June 26, 1915. In another case when barristers attempted to 
collect a debt against Chief Mountain, owed to the Riverside 
Lumber Company, the agent informed them that he could not 
assist as his instructions from the Department were to the 
contrary. GAI, BIAC, file 92, Indian Agent to Messers. 
Macleod and Gray, June 26, 1915. Interestingly an account 
submitted by Massey-Harris, September, 1914, listed 72 
different orders for a total of $3,022.12. The amount for 
individual accounts was $2,950.81 and for the Agency $71.31. 
Clearly individuals were transacting a preponderance of the 
business. Of these 13 had no order number suggesting that 
they were unauthorized. Two were for the agency and 11 for 
individuals. Of the 11 listed to individual Bloods only five 
were entered in Dilworth's register of debtors, again 
suggesting unauthorized accounts. With regard to these five, 
Massey-Harris's statements do not agree with Dilworth's, 
Dilworth showing more than the company billed in three cases. 
Though Dilworth's statement is not dated, differing dates in 
issue and the possibility that individuals had made payments 
to reduce their debts, may account for this discrepancy. In 
the case of A.D. Cairncross [Company), Cardston, only two of 
the eight accounts submitted are entered in Dilworth's 
ledger. And in the case of George Tanner only one of the 17 
account purchases made from him are registered with Dilworth. 
See George Tanner Statement, October 28, 1914 Blood Indian 
Agency Correspondence, File [?], Glenbow Alberta Archives, 
M1788. The total for all of these was $887.75 or 29.37% of 
total orders. See GAI, BIAC, file 96, Massey-Harris 
Statement in Blood Indian Agency Correspondence. 
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a proper appreciation for personal property and the 
acquisition of wealth. In these cases James Wilson referred 
to Section 78 of the Indian Act when reminding individuals 
that their transactions with the Bloods were illegal and 
demanded the return of the pawned property.w The Blood habit 
of pawning eventually became serious enough for Agent R.N. 
Wilson to seek advice from the Department only to be informed 
that the Bloods, like other individuals, were free to dispose 
of personal property subject to the provisions of the Indian 
Act. 1 ~ Wilson was further hampered by the fact that Indians 
generally failed to see pawning in the same 'evil' light as 
the agent. They resisted efforts to restrict their right to 
dispense with their private property in ways they perceived 
to be for their own benefit. h~ 
63 
'1 --~ 22 906 James W.'L son to Mr. Brewster, Sept~uuer , 1 , 
GAI, Blood File 11; James Wilson to Mr. Easton, September 29, 
1906, GAI, Blood File 11; Agent Wilson to H.S. Allen and 
Company, August 23, 1906, GAI, Blood File 11. The proper 
reference was section 79. See Treaties and Historical 
Research Centre, Indian Acts And Amendments 1868-1950 
(Ottawa: Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1981), p. 
42. 
64 GAI, BIAC, file 60, J.D. McLean to R.N. Wilson, April 
22, 1908; BIAC, file 42, Indian Agent to Sup't Primrose, May 
11, 1909; BIAC, file 40, F.M Pajet to W.J. Hyde, March 6, 
1912. 
65 GAI, BIAC, file 60, Indian Agent to Secretary, DIA, 
April 16, 1908. 
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A further disadvantage to merchants in their dealings 
with the Bloods was the Department's standing instructions to 
agents. Wilson was told that, as agent, he was not to assist 
in the recovery of debts contracted by his wards without 
departmental approval. Furthermore, agents were to remind 
merchants that the DIA extended no recognition to claims 
"against the Indian's annuity or interest moneys .... " Indeed, 
by 1911 agents were cautioned against permitting the presence 
of collectors on the occasions of the payment of such funds 
to the Indians . llh This was an obvious departure from the 
arrangements made in the 1890s when debt collectors were 
permitted on the reserve. In the face of such policies 
businesses could be left carrying a substantial debt load 
over an unacceptably long period of time. hi 
The Blood reserve was a microcosm reflection of the 
economic fortunes of the prairie west in general. Historian 
T.D. Regehr has noted that in regards to the banks, "During 
66 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1547, p. 23, J.D. McLean to R.N. 
Wilson, January 31, 1911. 
67 James Wilson reported in 1901, that in August 1899, 
the Bloods had incurred debt to a total of $6,000.00, an 
amount which had been reduced to $1,850.00 by March 1901. 
Though he felt that this placed the Bloods in a "very good 
financial position," they had not managed to liquidate the 
entire debt thus obligating their creditors to absorb the 
loss and pay the interest. Such circumstances continued for 
both the Bloods and their creditors. NAC, RG 10, vol. 1724, 
pp. 116-19, James Wilson to Indian Commissioner, March 20, 
1901. 
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the pioneer period, at least, the West was a debtor region." 08 
But the banks were not the only sources of credit on which a 
homesteader could call. Credit was universally demanded and 
generally unreservedly given. In fact, the banks were 
possibly among the most restrictive credit institutions to 
grant loans against guarantees of property. (f) 
Credit was essential for a farmer/homesteader or Indian 
to establish operations and to continue them in the face of 
poor crops, poor prices or both. Farm yields for southern 
Alberta, for example, plummeted from an average 35 bushels of 
wheat to the acre in 1915, to 10.7 in 1917, 4.9 in 1918, and 
1 . 4 in 1919 • 70 The Fort Macleod area had a lower average of 
31 bushels to the acre in 1915, followed by 24, 13, four, and 
nil respectively. The 1920 and 1921 season showed only 
marginal recovery with four and two bushels of wheat to the 
acre.~ 1 Although the total bushels marketed from Fort Macleod 
in 1918-19, some 707,000 bushels, was greater than that from 
some other regions, it was a substantial reduction from the 
68 Regehr, "Bankers and Farmers," p. 306. 
69 Regehr, "Bankers and Farmers," p. 311. See also R. 
Bruce Shepard, "The Mechanized Agricultural Frontier Of The 
Canadian Plains," Material History Bulletin (Ottawa: Spring 
1979), p. 13. 
70 Jones, "We' 11 all be buried down here", p. xxxvi. 
71 Jones, "We'll all be buried down here", p. 27. 
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amounts marketed in 1915-16, 1916-17 and 1917-18 at 
4,244,000, 3,1197,000 and 2,318,000 bushels respectivelyn and 
is a good indication of the declining fortunes of the area. 
The bright light in the disastrous crop failure of 1919 was 
that the price of No. 1 Northern wheat was $1.99 per bushel, 
provided a farmer had wheat of this quality. Beginning in 
1918, however, wheat prices declined and never again reached 
the 1918 levels during the subsequent two decades.i3 
Comments by Indian Commissioner W.M. Graham in 1927 
suggest why, even in the most distressing circumstances, 
merchants were willing to advance credit to the Bloods. 
Graham noted that "Considering that there are over 200 
farmers on the Blood Reserve and the indebtedness to the 
merchants is only $5,000.00 from the two previous years, the 
amount, when divided amongst the many farmers, is very 
small." Graham believed that this was not even one-tenth of 
the total value of business done. i-+ 
72 Jones, "We'll all be buried down here", p. 33. 
73 During the early Depression wheat prices collapsed to 
as low as 34 cents per bushel for 1931-32. David C.Jones, 
Empire of Dust: Settling and Abandoning the Prairie Dry Belt 
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1987), p. 268-269. 
74 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
Secretary, DIA, June 28, 1927. we should not assume that 
only farmers were in debt. 
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It is difficult to gauge the accuracy of Graham's 
statement but it was his opinion that the Agency was a 
responsible customer, more prompt in the repayment of credit 
than most. Graham believed that the merchants were well 
aware of the Department's methods of business and they 
willingly assumed the risks of the uncertainty of prompt 
repayment. His conclusion was that, generally speaking, the 
Cardston merchants "were highly pleased with the treatment 
that they had received • .,;:; 
Despite Graham's disclaimers merchants often held the 
agent personally responsible for the difficulty experienced 
with both authorized and unauthorized debt collection. By 
1915, for example, agent W.J. Dilworth's popularity was at 
such a low ebb that complaints were made about his handling 
of the agency's business and his influence on the Bloods' 
patronage of local stores.~ Similarly, in 1924 the Bloods 
75 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
Secretary, DIA, June 28, 1927. 
76 GAI, BIAC, file 92, Indian Agent to Duncan c. Scott, 
August 14, 1915. Interestingly at the same time Agent 
Dilworth was blamed for directing business from Fort Macleod 
to Cardston thereby negatively affecting the economic 
fortunes of the former. Macleod Spectator, July 8, 1915, p. 
2. Business in the previous year had been good. Macleod 
Spectator, November 12, 1914, p. 1. George Scott complained, 
through the local Conservative Association, that he did not 
get a fair share of Blood reserve patronage for his livery 
stable a complaint rebutted by Dilworth. NAC, RG 10, vol. 
1547, p. 248, w.s Gray to W.J. Dilworth, December 31, 1914; 
p. 255, Indian Agent to Sec'y, Conservative Executive, 
January 28, 1915. By 1916 the Bloods were again patronizing 
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accused Agent T.J. Faunt of directing reserve business to 
Cardston through his purchasing orders. The result was that 
the Bloods sometimes paid more for the same article if 
purchased in Cardston than in Fort Macleod. 77 
Although Dilworth made reasonable efforts to retire 
agency-sanctioned debts, 78 he was less helpful with 
unauthorized debts, taking guidance from the departmental 
regulations. For example, he advised the Riverside Lumber 
Co., Cardston, that their unauthorized credit to Indians had 
been advanced at their own risk. He informed them that in 
one case the individual concerned had little property though 
some income. The income, however, was beyond Dilworth's 
control.~ 
Granting the Bloods credit without proof of agency 
approval, however, appears to have been a common practice. 
Dilworth found himself mostly in agreement with M.A. Coombs, 
Cardston, regarding his statement of account showing 26 
individual Blood accounts totaling $1,031.54, but he 
businesses in Macleod. Macleod News, December 7, 1916, p. 1. 
77 NAC, RG 10, vol. 4035, file 306,458, J.A. Webbe to 
Officer Commanding, R.C. Mounted Police, Lethbridge, November 
14, 1924. 
78 GAI, BIAC, file 92, Indian Agent to Assistant Deputy 
and Sec'y, DIA, September 2, 1915. 
79 GAI, BIAC, file 92, Indian Agent to Riverside Lumber 
Co., September 4, 1915. 
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protested he had no record of accounts for three others and 
insisted that the accounts were not authorized through his 
office. ~0 Although he might wish to collect the debt, the 
varying fortunes of the individuals interfered with 
Dilworth's ability to do so. Peter Heavy Shield, for 
example, suffered from tuberculosis and could not work his 
farm. Joe Bullshields, though "a good boy and a good 
worker," had suffered a crop failure. 
Consequently, the demands made of Dilworth to facilitate 
the swift repayment of debts were futile, and he angrily 
vented his frustration to the Department. He charged that he 
had only one rule with regard to debt collection, "Collect 
every time an Indian owing has funds to his credit in this 
office and pay in the order of seniority. "~ 1 Such a promise, 
however, did little to satisfy the merchants' need for 
repayment in order that they might keep their own creditors 
at bay. 
80 GAI, BIAC, file 92, W.J. Dilworth to M.A. Coombs, 
September 17, 1915. One problem is that the amounts for 
unauthorized accounts are often not quoted and so it is 
difficult to determine what percentage of the total business 
contracted was unauthorized and therefore, perhaps, not 
collectable. 




Though desiring both agency and individual Blood 
patronage, unpaid accounts were a matter of great concern and 
distress for some businesses. Merchants employed a variety 
of tactics to encourage the agent or the DIA to assume 
responsibility for all unpaid Indian and agency credit. For 
example, the Western Lumber Company Ltd., Lethbridge, 
stipulated that business done with the Bloods had to be on 
the "ordinary terms of credit"; that is paid in full within 
90 days. Therefore, accounts that were nearly two years in 
arrears were unacceptable. Though not stating the balance, 
the company wanted payment with interest.~z Equally 
frustrated at not being able to collect on an account, J.M. 
Callie, the Pioneer Furniture Store, Fort Macleod, wrote 
directly to the DIA for redress.~3 Callie's plea of pressing 
82 NAC, RG 10, vol. 4024, file 290,240-2A, Western 
Canada Lumber Co. Ltd. to Minister of the Interior, August 
22, 1916. For other examples of late accounts see GAI, BIAC, 
file 92, McLaren Lumber Co. to Indian Agent, November 24, 
1915; W.H. Steed to W.J. Dilworth, December 15, 1915. The 
matter with the Western Canada Lumber Company was never 
satisfactorily resolved and by 1917 the company was in 
receivership, the liquidator having no more success with 
Dilworth than did former management. NAC, RG 10, vol. 4024, 
file 290,240-2B, Western Canada Lumber Co. to Secretary, DIA, 
August 28, 1917. 
83 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, J.T. Faunt to 
Secretary, DIA, February 28, 1921; J.D. McLean to J.T. Faunt, 
February 22, 1921; J.M. Callie to Indian Department January 
31, 1921. 
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need for the funds prompted DIA Secretary McLean to urge 
Agent Faunt to get the funds and pay the bill if possible.~ 
The general crop failure in 1927 increased the 
merchants' debt load. Smith and Pitcher Limited of Cardston 
looked to the payment of the reserve's $14,000.00 account to 
meet demands from its own creditors. The company was 
informed that "the account would be reduced as collections 
(from Indians] were made ... For a larger company, perhaps, 
this assurance would have sufficed, but for this small 
business it spelled hardship. For redress the company 
appealed to the Minister of the Interior: 
The above seems rather hard blow to us, as we have 
been forced to pay the Harvester Company every cent 
cash outlay, depending on the mentioned account 
being paid. This has been almost more than a small 
concern as we are to carry, because we presume you 
are aware of the fact, crops here were almost a 
failure, collections very poor, naturally the need 
of money for our present needs being necessary, we 
therefore appeal to you, is there anyway that this 
account can be realized? or arrangements be made 
with the bank giving collateral that we could use 
in order that we can carry on. gs 
84 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, J.M. Callie to 
J.D. McLean, March 3, 1921; J.D. McLean to J.T. Faunt, March 
9, 1921. 
85 NAC, RG 10, val. 7881, file 35103, W.E. Smith to Hon. 
Charles Stewart, December 23, 1927. 
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As with all such submissions to the Minister, Scott required 
a full report from Agent Pugh on the likelihood of the debt 
being retired.~~ 
Massey-Harris Company stated its belief that its sales 
were to the DIA and not to individual Bloods. As the agent 
had departmental approval to make the purchases, the 
Department was therefore responsible for ensuring payment. 
The company suggested that it had given the DIA a bargain in 
quoting "a very special price", on the understanding that the 
Department would pay.~7 Similarly, the Cardston Implement 
Co., with regard to its $6,000.00 of credit issued to the 
Bloods or the agency, denied any understanding that the 
repayment of debt was dependent on crop returns.~M It is 
clear that even though merchants differed in their 
86 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Duncan c. Scott to 
J.E. Pugh, December 31, 1927. 
87 d h . d d" Base on t ese assumpt1ons or un erstan 1ngs the 
company now wanted payment of $2,931.82. NAC, RG 10, vol. 
7881, file 35103, J.A. Rowat to Deputy Superintendent 
General, DIA, March 3, 1928. Scott's response was a 
perfunctory denial of responsibility. "These arrangements 
were," Scott wrote, "undoubtedly made with individual 
Indians, the payments to be made from crop returns. This, as 
you are no doubt aware, has been the usual practice. " NAC, 
RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Duncan C. Scott to J.A. Rowat, 
March 8, 1928. 
88 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Cardston Implement 
Company to Honorable Charles Stewart, December 29, 1927. The 
Honourable Charles Stewart was asked to intervene in this 
matter. Charles Stewart to Cardston Implement Company, Ltd., 
January 27, 1928. 
289 
understanding or acceptance of the Department's 
responsibility for Indian incurred debt, practically all of 
them tried for departmental guarantees. 
The general view that business took in their dealings 
with the reserve, however, was best expressed by R.N. Wilson 
of the Standoff Trading Co. from Standoff, Alberta. The 
account with his firm was for $792.38. As a former long-time 
agent of the Blood reserve he knew the system and so directly 
wrote D.C. Scott and indicated that he did not wish to wait 
another year or two for payment. He pointed out the business 
pressure he was under, with wholesalers demanding monthly 
payment of their accounts. He clearly stated his 
understanding of doing business with the Bloods - that the 
government was responsible for the repayment of the debt. 
Debts that remained unpaid for years were, said Wilson, "a 
misfortune to the merchant and a disgrace to the Government 
of Canada." Getting at the crux of the matter he pointed out 
to Scott, "You will readily perceive that if departmental 
assistance to Indians in seeding and harvesting their crops 
was considered necessary for the proper administration of the 
reserve, it was the business of the Department to finance it 
when the expected revenue failed or when it became other wise 
inconvenient to collect in due course. "~'J Scott' s response, 
89 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, R.N. Wilson to 
D.C. Scott, January 3, 1929. 
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as always, was that there was no official fund from which the 
debt could be repaid. •xl 
For local businesses, getting 'their money' was 
sometimes a difficult proposition.'H The point was made by 
the solicitors for one company that the system of doing 
business with the Indians was restrictive, "the situation 
really is that the goods were furnished as much to the 
Department as to the Indian himself, the situation being that 
our clients were practically prohibited from dealing direct 
with the Indian. n'U This was in essence a summation of the 
wardship legally conferred by the Indian Act. They therefore 
refused to see the position of the DIA as anything but the 
rightful debtor. 'l.~ The Department, however, accepted neither 
90 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Duncan c. Scott to 
R.N. Wilson, January 16, 1929. 
91 See for example the correspondence regarding the 
Pioneer Lumber Company, Lethbridge. NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, 
file 35103, Pioneer Lumber Co. Ltd. to Secretary, DIA, 
October 7, 1930; Pioneer Lumber Co. Ltd. to Secretary, DIA, 
October 7, 1930. See bill in same file. 
92 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Virtue, Paterson & 
Company to Superintendent, DIA, June 24, 1931. For other 
discussion on this disagreement see W.M. Graham to Secretary, 
DIA, August 31, 1931; A.F. MacKenzie to Virtue, Paterson & 
Beaumont, September 4, 1931. 
93 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Virtue, Paterson & 
Company to Secretary, DIA, September 21, 1931. 
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moral nor legal obligation.·~ 
Despite the Department's attitude, and at a time when 
fundamental monetary policy questioned the extension of 
personal credit, the agency and the Bloods appeared to be 
incurring some of their heaviest debt. ·>s If business 
practices prevailing in other areus of the prairies are 
representative, Native and White were treated very much 
alike. One dryland area farmer reported the ease with which 
creditors lent money during the good years and the ferocity 
with which they harassed farmers to pay up. This farmer 
admitted that the habit of "'buying on time'" spelled trouble 
for farmers.% Merchants and credit institutions, without 
distinction, harassed Indian and White alike to make good on 
their credit purchases. It was the 'farmer' who was the 
liability, especially for the local merchant. "In the long 
chain of creditors," writes David Jones, .. local merchants 
94 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, T.R.L. Macinnes to 
Virtue, Paterson and Company, September 28, 1931. 
95 See Table 2 for the collapse of Blood farming income 
in 1927. As farming income declined debt rose from 
$17,056.12 in 1926 to 36,173.22 in 1927 and $75,423.11 in 
1928. GAI, BIAC, Statement of Indebtedness As At Audit On 
Feb. 13, 1928, File 163. 
96 Jones, "We'll all be buried down here," pp. lx, 39-
41. 
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were at the last link ... \>7 With bank liens against poor crops 
there was often pitifully little left to be applied against 
the merchants' credit advances. Jones observes that in 1921 
"Hotels were filled with collectors tracing across the 
countryside seeking to pry loose dollars from penniless 
farmers . "·~ 
Unlike the banks which were often 'visiting 
institutions', merchants were more often members of the local 
community dealing with neighbours and friends who would be 
returning yet again to be provisioned against the next year's 
crop. Business woman Mrs. F.A. Moir, Milk River Alberta, 
wrote that 
As a business woman running the largest 
general store in this district and knowing how 
my customers were situated I simply held back 
this fall [1921] on collections, only to see 
the banker, lumberman or implement man grab it 
all by threatening suits or court action. 
There is no use my holding off only to let 
some other heartless creditor clean the debtor 
up.':l'l 
97 Jones, Empire of Dust, p. 155. Also see David c. 
Jones, "An Exceedingly Risky And Unremunerative Partnership: 
Farmers And The Financial Interests Amid The Collapse Of 
Southern Alberta," in David C. Jones and Ian MacPherson, 
Building Beyond The Homestead: Rural History On The Prairies 
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985), pp. 210-11. 
98 Jones, "We'll all be buried down here", p. lx. 
99 Jones, "We'll all be buried down here", pp. 55-56. 
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The tendency for local businesses to show mercy was somewhat 
curbed by their own operating constraints which demanded that 
their own credit purchases from their suppliers be paid in 
thirty days while their "customers just paid when they 
could." tm 
Local businesses, however, were generous with credit 
despite the knowledge born of long experience, that 
Department policy and the application of the Indian Act made 
such business transactions risky. It is an important 
consideration whether, in the long run, most of these 
accounts were paid, and so reduced the overall view of credit 
extension as more a short-term nuisance than a risk. Perhaps 
businesses reduced their risk by employing the double pricing 
system as discussed above. Since there were, by law, no 
liens against the Indians' property, all creditors were on a 
level playing field and each stood a chance to reap some 
benefit. Being the local supplier and having some knowledge 
about the ebb and flow of crops and currency, community 
businesses might possibly have had an edge. Regardless, many 
merchants probably looked upon the risks as the cost of doing 
business. 
100 Barry Broadfoot, Next-Year Country: Voices of 
Prairie People (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), p. 
82. 
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The Department: Explanation and Reaction. 
Agent Faunt, in 1921, calculated Blood indebtedness at 
$4,590.18, down from approximately $37,000 five years 
earlier. 101 This statement of debt listed 29 businesses and 
the reasons for the debt but unfortunately not the location 
of the companies though most were likely in the vicinity of 
the reserve. 1111 This was also • guaranteed indebtedness' that 
is debt incurred through and with the approval of the agent's 
office. There is every reason to suspect that unauthorized 
credit purchasing occurred at the same rate as for non-
Natives of similar financial means. 
Subsequent attempts to raise the Bloods and the agency 
to debt free status were frustrated. The policy followed on 
the Blood reserve had been to issue orders for work and pay 
after harvesting. By the fall of 1926, however, the 
accumulated debt was so pressing that some creditors were not 
paid as the Bloods soon ran out of funds. Pugh now asked the 
Department to pay about $5,000.00 in outstanding debt. With 
a seemingly minor financial crisis on his hands, Pugh was 
instructed to curtail expenses by cutting the food bill from 
101 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
D.C. Scott, January 8, 1921. 
102 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Statement of 
Indian indebtedness signed by Agent J.T. Faunt. Vouchers 
often show business contracted with concerns as far east as 
Winnipeg. 
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$3,500.00 to $2,500.00 monthly. The results were 
predictable, "the Indians became very ugly, and last week one 
Indian attempted to assault me, for which I laid a 
charge, .•. "w3 
By 1927 repeated crop failure placed the 'guaranteed' 
debt accumulation seriously in arrears because the Indians 
did not have sufficient funds to meet their obligations. 
Pugh now estimated a total approximate debt of $21,017.00. 104 
Merchants' collections from their Indian creditors now 
became practically impossible. Like Whites in the area, the 
Bloods were also without a crop and Pugh was instructed to 
advise merchants that accounts could not be paid. 
Importantly, in a contradiction of the DIA's previously 
argued position, Pugh stated his belief ''that the merchants 
certainly were under the impression that these accounts would 
be met by the Department in the event of crop failure. " 10=' 
103 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, J.E. Pugh to 
Secretary, DIA, June 7, 1927. 
104 Pugh broke down the debt as follows; $6,000.00 due to 
the Cardston Implement Company, $3,200.00 due to Massey-
Harris Company, $1,100.00 due the International Harvester 
Company. There was also a $2,000.00 twine debt and $1,400.00 
for hail insurance. It was much the same situation for those 
companies who supplied the Indians with groceries; $2,700.00 
due the Cardston Trading Company, $2,040.00 due Burt 
Brothers, $1,750.00 due E. McNeil and $827.00 due R.N. 
Wilson. NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, J.E. Pugh to 
Duncan C. Scott, January 6, 1928. 
lOS NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, J.E. Pugh to 
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Whether this impression was given by Pugh, or by previous 
practice, Pugh did not say but the latter is more likely. 
The DIA now turned its attention to the twin concerns of 
debt reduction and the ordering system. Secretary McLean 
specifically wanted to know the extent of the Department's 
responsibility in meeting credit-order-incurred debt. McLean 
feared that paying any questionable accounts would bring a 
flood of demands from creditors. Such an eventuality was a 
concern given that neither departmental appropriation nor 
band funds were available to settle individual Blood 
accounts. ux~ The alternatives seemed to be not to engage in 
the ordering system or to allow the Indians to incur bad 
debt. 
It was Commissioner William Graham's opinion that the 
current debt crisis originated when credit borrowed was not 
re-paid from the 1925 crop. Subsequently, the following year 
the Bloods were short of funds and had to be financed again 
with the result that two years' operations had to be financed 
out of one year's crop (1926). Although the 1926 harvest 
looked promising bad weather cut the anticipated harvest from 
the 175,000 bushels expected to only 120,000 bushels. Much 
of this was graded as 'feed', bringing only 64 cents a bushel 
for a net return of approximately $97,000.00. The bill for 
Duncan c. Scott, January 6, 1928. 
lOG NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, J.D. McLean to 
W.M. Graham, June 14, 1927. 
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the threshing operations was an estimated $18,000.00 and, in 
Graham's words, "the Bloods had to have some money out of the 
proceeds of the crop to buy clothing for themselves and their 
families, as well as something to live on." 107 
Although Graham believed that Natives could not 
responsibly handle their own financial affairs, he recognized 
that farming Indians were no different than Whites - both 
needed "a little financing" from both banks and merchants. 
Merchants in particular, Graham noted, needed assurance of 
payment which, in the name of the Department, he was willing 
to give. But Graham pointed out the limitations of his 
assurance by stating that merchants knew orders were issued 
on the promise of crops. Ill..~ When all was said and done 
getting into debt, even for Indians, was considered an 
essential part of surviving in prairie agriculture. 109 
107 NAC, RG 10, val. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
Secretary, DIA, June 28, 1927. 
108 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
Secretary, DIA, June 28, 1927. Pugh was given instructions 
to withhold funds from those Indians who could afford it. 
NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to Secretary, 
DIA, June 28, 1927. 
1 09 On debt and f V · V 1 pra~r~e armers see, o~sey, u can, pp. 
133-134; Jones, Empire of Dust, pp. 169, 172-174; Jeremy 
Adleman, "Prairie Farm Debt and the Financial Crisis of 
1914," Canadian Historical Review, LXXI, No. 4 (December 
1990), pp. 493-502; Royden K. Loewen, Family, Church, And 
Market: A Mennonite Community and the New Worlds, 1850-1930 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993), pp. 206-207. 
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The crop returns for 1927 were far worse than 
anticipated. Through a combination of frost, rain and snow 
an anticipated harvest worth $300,000.00 was reduced to 
$30,000.00. Graham now found himself forced to resort to the 
same tactical retreat from responsibility for increased debt 
that he was quick to condemn in the agents. He held out the 
hope of a possible reduction of $15,000.00 in a $40,000.00 
debt, "and the balance will possibly have to be carried by 
the merchants."lUJ The crop failure was so extreme that many 
Indians would have to be supported by the Department if 
severe hardship was to be avoided.lll Yet Graham declared 
that despite "crop failures or other contingent 
circumstances" the numbers of destitute should not increase 
"except by the addition of the aged and incapacitated." lll 
* This figure does not entirely agree with the figure in 
Table 2 
ll 0 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
Secretary, DIA, December 13, 1927. 
111 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
Secretary, DIA, December 13, 1927; Report and Diary for month 
of November 1927, J.G. Pugh, December 2, 1927. 
1 l) 
- The DIA was well aware that some members of the 
reserve had fallen on hard times. The number of Bloods said 
to be destitute in 1928-29 was one hundred and ten down from 
the two hundred and fifty reported for 1927-28. This was a 
substantial reduction and given the economic decline, calls 
into question the criteria used to determine eligibility for 
relief. Provincial Archives of Alberta, (PAA), Accession No. 
70.189/SE., W.M. Graham to John E. Pugh, January 27, 1928. 
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Able bodied Bloods now without resources were clearly 
not intended to be provisioned. Pugh, however, felt that 
such an action was wrong. The Blood Agency, unlike other 
agencies, was a special circumstance since there was no 
economic diversification to permit other income. Unlike 
Graham, Pugh saw a connection between available work and 
whether or not an individual was in destitute circumstances. 
With no alternative, however, he responded that he would cut 
costs despite any hardship caused. LU 
Conceivably Graham's narrow views were the result of his 
intimate knowledge of the financial circumstances of the 
Blood reserve, and from appearances they should indeed have 
been well off. According to Inspector of Reserves M. 
Christianson's calculations, the Bloods had realized from 
farming and stock-raising more than a million dollars in the 
decade previous to 1928. 114 Such information likely made 
113 PAA, Accession No. 70.189/SE., Indian Agent to W.M. 
Graham, January 30, 1928. The criteria for determining need 
were not consistent. Destitution was sometimes determined by 
the kind of assistance needed whether "tea, rice and soap", 
beef and flour, or clothing. For example a list of "old 
destitute Indians" in need of underclothing for the winter of 
1930 numbered 62 individuals. See also list dated Blood 
Agency, November 24, 1930. 
ll 4 h . . h f 11 . $90 618 80 f c r~st~anson gave t e o ow~ng: 7, • rom 
farming and stock-raising. Currently the grazing lease 
brought in $14,844.00 and a farming lease $5,780.00 for a 
total of $20,624.00, "which brings their total income derived 
from farming, stock-raising and leases to well over a million 
dollars." NAC, RG 10, vol. 7595, file 10103, pt. 5, M. 
Christianson to W.M. Graham, May 18, 1928. 
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Graham believe that the Bloods earned sufficient capital to 
meet immediate needs. The reports of repeated crop failure 
on the reserve, however, make it clear that income was 
sporadic and not uniformly spread over the decade. (Table 3). 
The danger was to see all the Bloods as beneficiaries of this 
apparent prosperity and to attribute a general well-being 
that was best credited to those individuals engaged in 
relatively prosperous farming and cattle raising. Income of 
this nature would certainly have made for the financial 
prosperity of some individuals. Local merchants must have 
indeed been buoyed by the infusion of much of this money into 
the local economy. Hence the economic tie was solidified. 
In January, 1929, Pugh listed 15 companies to which the 
Bloods owed a total of $19,676.19. 115 This indebtedness, he 
said, had occurred over several years. Although orders were 
not issued in 1928 the crop was struck with frost, threshing 
costs were high, and after twine, hail insurance and repairs, 
insufficient funds remained to meet creditor demands and 
Blood needs. At the same time, Pugh accepted responsibility 
for the apparent sorry state of the reserve's financial 
affairs, blaming his failure to terminate the "order on 
115 NAC, RG 10, val. 7881, file 35103. See List of firms 
carrying Indian indebtedness. Strangely the Marshall-Wells 
Hardware Co. was not listed among these. J.E. Pugh to Duncan 
c. Scott, January 26, 1929. 
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credit system. " 11u Commissioner Graham's solution was still 
to wait for "one good crop, " 1L7 an action which, he apparently 
failed to see, was the original source of the accumulated 
indebtedness. 
Threats by businesses to cut credit to the reserve and 
warnings of imminent collapse or appeals to higher authority 
left both Scott and Graham unmoved. lLM Scott eventually 
concluded that nothing could be done about these debts, they 
were an unfortunate, involuntary but necessary circumstance. 
Credit, concluded Scott, was "one of the vices of our 
system. " 11 ') Accounts would have to await the realization of a 
bountiful harvest which was once again anticipated for the 
116 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, J.E. Pugh to 
Duncan c. Scott, January 26, 1929. 
117 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
Duncan c. Scott, February 7, 1929. 
118 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, D.P. Sullivan to 
J.D. McLean, February 13, 1929; W.L. Smith to Duncan Scott, 
February 20, 1929. NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, D.C. 
Scott to J.E. Pugh, January 11, 1928. On the situation in 
the west at this time see Jones "We'll all be buried down 
here", pp. 10-21; Jones, Empire Of Dust, p. 151 ff. 
119 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Memorandum, Duncan 
c. Scott to Mr. Pratt; May 23, 1929; Duncan c. Scott to W.L. 
Smith, February 26, 1929. Only in "a few cases of real 
hardship" to the government's friends might something be 
done. NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Charles Stewart to 
W.A. Buchannan; June 21, 1929. Senator W.A. Buchannan of 
Lethbridge personally pleaded the case of the Cardston 
Implement Co. to the Hon. Charles Stewart. He said that the 
"MATTER IS A DISTURBING FACTOR AS OUR FRIENDS ARE AFFECTED". 
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Blood Reserve for the fall of 1929. 120 In its expectation for 
credit financing for Indians the DIA's attitude was no 
different than that of the farmer/settler. When it came time 
to pay the bills the DIA, like the farmer/settler in 'next 
year country', looked to the elusive bumber crop. 
Depression 
By comparison with the two previous years, 1929 brought 
a bountiful harvest with 130,250 bushels of wheat average No. 
2 grade. The sale of 110,000 bushels at an advance of eighty 
cents per bushel brought in $88,000.00. Approximately 
$42,200.00 of this amount was used to pay off old creditors. 
Fifteen thousand dollars were placed at the disposal of 
individuals for purchases such as wagons, furniture or living 
expenses and the balance of $20,000.00 was deposited in 
individual Indian bank accounts. The Bloods still owed some 
$11,533.84 on individual personal credit accounts. How much 
of this would ultimately be discharged was uncertain until 
the final payments from the sale of the grain. Even with 
further payments, Graham estimated that a debt of about 
The account was subsequently paid. W.A. Buchanan to Chas. 
Stewart, June 17, 1929. Emphasis in original. Stewart 
reminded Buchanan that the accounts were owed by the Indians, 
not the Treasury. Duncan c. Scott to W.M. Graham, July 24, 
1929. See also Duncan c. Scott to W.M. Graham, July 24, 
1929. 
120 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, Duncan c. Scott to 
Marshall-Wells Company, Ltd., July 26, 1929. 
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$8,000.00 would remain on the books. Inspector Christianson, 
with a view to once and for all being rid of the debt, now 
advised that the merchants be paid in full out of collections 
for beef and seed grain. This placed the Indians in debt to 
the Department rather than to the local merchants. 111 
Any possibility of such debt relief was subsequently 
dashed when the Bloods, like many others, were victimized by 
the fall in commodity prices during the Great Depression. 
The Blood's tenuous position was further aggravated by the 
market speculations of Agent Pugh. Pugh believed he could 
get a better price for the Bloods' harvest and held the grain 
off the market as the price rose eventually expecting to get 
$1.40 a bushel. When the markets subsequently collapsed and 
the grain was finally sold, the tribe received less than 77.5 
cents per bushel or about $88,000.00. Pugh accepted 
responsibility for the disaster insofar as the decision not 
to sell had been his. But that was only the beginning. The 
onset of winter shut down ploughing and haying earlier than 
usual, even cutting short work in the sugar beet fields. All 
of this severely limited the income of many Blood families. 
These circumstances led to disillusionment on the part of 
reserve farmers and many quit. By 1932 acres under 
cultivation decreased by fifty percent while income from 
121 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, M. Christianson to 
W.M. Graham, November 30, 1929. 
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farming dropped from $100,000.00 in 1930 to $24,000.00 in 
1932. 121 From a decade of prosperity for some and limited 
financial success for others, the reserve and surrounding 
communities had suddenly descended into a period of economic 
chaos and depression. 
In these circumstances survival, not debt restructuring, 
became the most urgent concern of the Blood reserve's 
residents. Yet the DIA's senior person~~, remained 
singularly inflexible and insensitive to the Bloods' 
situation and refused to return to the order system as a 
means of temporarily alleviating the distress. Christianson 
still expected that future successive crops would square the 
Bloods with the Department. 1~ Graham wanted any moneys 
collected applied against accounts with creditors "and we 
would at least be square with the public at large, ••• " IH to 
122 Esther s. Goldfrank, "Administrative Programs And 
Changes In Blood Society During The Reserve Period," Applied 
Anthropology, 2 (Jan.-Mar. 1943), p. 21. Dempsey gives the 
income for 1929 as $97,000. Dempsey, The Gentle Persuader: A 
Biography of James Gladstone, Indian Senator (Saskatoon: 
Western Producer Prairie Books, 1986), pp. 75-76. 
123 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, M. Christianson to 
W.M. Graham, November 30, 1929. 
124 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, W.M. Graham to 
Duncan c. Scott, December 4, 1929; M. Christianson to W.M. 
Graham, November 30, 1929. The DIA's Chief Accountant, F.M. 
Paget, pointed out that "collections made from Indians on 
account of Beef and Seed Grain, are due the Band's Interest 
Account, and not the Department." Though such payments 
"could be diverted towards paying off merchants [sic] 
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which Scott gave approval. 1B This was a change in that some 
of the senior bureaucrats recognized Departmental 
responsibility for legitimately authorized Indian 
indebtedness. 
Little changed, however, and the 1932 crop was so poor 
that only about $1,000.00 could be spared to pay on all 
debts. llb As a consequence of conservative policy and a 
shortage of funds, the debt was permitted to languish "until 
at least next fall, and only then if we get a fair crop. "lli 
In 1933 the total indebtedness of the agency stood at 
approximately $10,000.00,· an amount which Christianson felt 
would be very difficult to clear. Christianson believed that 
indebtedness, and when subsequently collected from the 
Indians would be credited to the Band's account as refunds 
due for seed and beef." Memorandum; F.M. Paget to Dr. Scott, 
December 18, 1929. 
125 h . d d b h . f Aut or~ze e ts to mere ants were g1ven pre erence 
over monies owed the Department and the band. NAC, RG 10, 
vol. 7881, file 35103, Duncan c. Scott to W.M. Graham, 
December 19, 1929. 
126 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, M. Christianson to 
Secretary, DIA, November 23, 1932; Memorandum for the Right 
Honourable The Prime Minister from Duncan c. Scott, October 
19, 1931. Correspondence over this particular debt continued 
into 1933 with only $97.76 being paid on the account in a two 
year period. M. Christianson to Secretary, DIA, December 1, 
1933. 
127 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7881, file 35103, M. Christianson to 
Secretary, DIA, December 1, 1933. See also A.F. MacKenzie to 
Virtue and Company, December 6, 1933; and Hugh B. Brown to 
General J.S. Stewart M.P., January 4, 1934. 
* This does not include monies owed the Department. 
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"The good farmers on the reserve have all paid their accounts 
in full." The balance was owed by the deceased, farmers who 
had quit, or poor farmers, and this debt was unlikely to be 
eliminated soon. 12~ 
The trying problem of debt adjustment was long standing 
for merchants and the Department and was without an apparent 
satisfactory solution. In 1934, with much attention directed 
by the Department at Blood indebtedness, Agent Pugh did a 
major inventory of the accounts owing to the Department, 
agency, and to outside creditors. Pugh divided his study 
into four classes: Class A - Deceased Indians, Class B - Old 
and Destitute Indians, Class C - Able Bodied Indians Farming 
or Cattle Raising (F/C), Class D- Able Bodied Indians Not 
Farming or Cattle Raising. (Table 4.) According to his 
calculations the Bloods were in debt to all creditors, 
including the Department, in April, 1934, for a total of 
$122,521.31. He recommended that the balance owed by all 
classes to the Department be written off, plus what Class A 
and Class B owed to the agency, for a total write off of $92, 
445.53 or 75.45% of the total debt. He further recommended 
that what classes C and D owed the agency ($12,351.53) and 
what all classes owed outside creditors ($17,724.25), be 
llB NAC, RG 10, val. 7881, file 35103, M. Christianson to 
Secretary, DIA, December 1, 1933. 
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collected. He offered no suggestion about how to collect for 
Class A and from B for outside creditors. Ll'J 
The $17,724.25 owed to outside creditors was 14.5% of 
total debt. If Pugh's recommendation that the debt owed the 
Department and also what classes A and B owed the agency be 
forgiven outside creditors, perhaps, stood a much better 
chance of having their debt repaid. In theory, this move 
would have placed less strain on the incomes of the 
individual indebted Bloods. Unfortunately, this was the 
Depression and incomes were reduced as a result of both 
depressed prices and reduced harvests. Outside creditors now 
had to compete with the agency which wanted to collect the 
portion of debt owed by Classes C and D. These creditors 
also stood to lose, or at least face great difficulty in 
collection, of the portion of the debt owed by Classes A and 
B, which amounted to $3,254.39 or %18.4 of the total 
$17,724.25 debt owed. 130 (For a breakdown and summary of the 
ll9 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, J.E. Pugh to 
Secretary, April 18, 1934, and attached details. 
130 Pugh judged most of the outside debt legitimate, with 
one qualification: the $7,798.14 owing the Cardston Implement 
Company. The debts owed to Massey-Harris Co., Smith & 
Pitcher, and the Cardston Trading Co. in particular, he said, 
were the res•llt of "Orders issued to Indians by Authority of 
the Department and remained unpaid at the end of 1928, at 
which time this system was discarded and no orders issued 
after that year." NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, J.E. 
Pugh to Secretary, April 18, 1934. The Cardston Implement 
Co., the Bloods largest creditor, was itself in debt and 
consigned its account of $7,798.14 with the Bloods to 
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debt by class/community see Tables 5 and 6.) Fortunately, 
the Department permitted Pugh to collect the debt owed the 
agency and use these funds to pay outside creditors. 131 
The winter of 1934-35 was a difficult one for the 
Bloods. Most of the revenue came from the sale of horses 
which Pugh permitted because of a shortage of funds from 
other sources. Pugh went on to explain that some of those 
individuals currently experiencing difficulties were good 
workers with good incomes who had built up estates requiring 
Marshall-Wells Co., Winnipeg. Marshall-Wells in turn was 
owed $1,026.08 by the agency. These two creditors alone 
accounted for $8,824.22 or %49.8 of the total reported Blood 
outside debt. NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, See 
Cardston Implement Co. Ltd. and Marshall-Wells Ltd., 
Assignment of Blood Agency Account; z.w. Jacobs, Barrister, 
and Solicitor, Cardston, Alberta. 
131 Pugh noted the unfairness of this approach given that 
those owing the most, Classes A, B and D, (total of $9,106.91 
or %51.4 of the total of $17,724.25 owing Outside creditors), 
he would be able to collect the least from. He felt that the 
Class C would be more than compensated by being so penalized 
because they stood to gain the most if the debts owed to the 
Department were written off. Their saving would be 
$49,226.09 or %54.8 of the total of $89,773.74). It is 
difficult to determine the fairness of this approach since we 
do not know how much each individual owed to the outside 
creditors or to the Department. Individuals with the least 
debt in both cases would not be receiving equitable savings 
from the cancellation of the debt to the Department and 
therefore would be subsidizing those more heavily in debt in 
both cases. To do what Pugh advocated would have meant that 
the agency was in fact foregoing collection of its debt, 
since the funds received were to be used to pay outside 
creditors, and therefore that portion of the debt was also 
being canceled. NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, J.E. 
Pugh to Secretary, April 18, 1934, and attached details. 
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maintenance. 131 Some of the Bloods did have personal means 
and Pugh reported that for the period of December 31, 1934, 
to December 31, 1935, the Bloods had transacted some 
$5,177.01 worth of private business, mostly for groceries and 
car repairs, through the agency.u3 
Despite a poor harvest in 1936 1~ the amount owing to the 
agency and outside creditors had not increased. Pugh was 
much more tight-fisted because of the experience of the past 
decades and the added attention of the Department to the 
Bloods' financial affairs. They, however, continued to spend 
from their own accounts, and for the period of January 1 to 
132 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, Report of J.E. 
Pugh, March 27, 1935. 
133 The two largest expenses of this sum were $862.88 for 
groceries and $341.91 for car repairs. NAC, RG 10, vol. 
7899, file 40103-1, Statement of J.E. Pugh. 
134 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, J.E. Pugh to 
L.W. McCutheson, December 11, 1936; N.C. Allen to J.E. Pugh, 
January 17, 1936. Another indication of difficult times is 
the reduced balance in the Blood Agency Bank Account which 
"prior to 1929 this Trust Account would contain balances 
ranging from $20,000 to $70,000 for several months, generally 
from about September to January. It would rarely fall below 
$1,000 or $1,200." Since 1929, however, "owing to reduced 
prices for farm products and poor crop returns these monthly 
balances have dwindled, and during 1935 a further reduction 
has been caused by placing monies due the Receiver General in 
a separate Bank Account ••• " As a consequence of the above 
conditions the average monthly balance for the ten months of 
February to November, 1935 was $5,448.99 or approximately 
half of what it should have been. See RG 10, vol. 7899, file 
40103-1, N.C. Allen to Dr. McGill, January 23, 1936. 
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December 31, 1936, transacted $6,708.55 of private 
business. 135 
After several years of disaster the projected 1937 crop 
promised a general recovery. The Cardston News predicted 
more than $18,000,000.00 in earnings for Cardston and its 
trading area. In a clear indication of the importance of 
reserve business to the Cardston economy, local merchants 
were challenged to turn their energies towards thwarting the 
attempts of Lethbridge and other areas to attract a share of 
this money. The paper speculated, "Unless Cardston merchants 
become active in the realization that this year presents an 
opportunity unparalleled for many years past much of this 
cash trade will glide over the graveled roads to distant 
points. " l.ilJ Coming at the end of several years of depression 
and bad crops, it is not surprising that the News would view 
this local bonanza as a gift from heaven and be reluctant to 
share it with competitors. 
Like those around them, the Bloods were increasingly 
prosperous. Individually financed business transactions 
135 In 1936 179 Bloods had active accounts and enjoyed a 
per capita income of $104.00 while the per capita income for 
the tribe was $15.00. NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, 
Statement of J.E. Pugh. *The problem with these figures is 
that they do not show the business the Indians may have 
conducted through barter or through the expenditure of money 
in hand. 
l36 Cardston News, September 7, 1937, p. 1. 
311 
amounted to $24,978.43 for the period January 1 to December 
31, 1937. There were approximately 160 accounts with 
$28,375.87 paid to the Indians. 13i Undoubtedly local 
businesses reaped the benefits of the Bloods' increased 
prosperity which lasted for the next several years. 138 
Overall indebtedness for the period 1934 to 1942 experienced 
only minor fluctuations and the amount officially owing to 
outside creditors was reduced from just under one thousand 
dollars to just under one hundred dollars of total debt. 
{Table 7.) It is not clear whether the Bloods were spending 
and financing less or whether there was simply less being 
done officially through the agency office. t.~l) 
Individual fortunes seem to have improved late in the 
Depression and spending for those who could afford it was 
significant. In 1938 the Bloods spent $37,392.48 from 
individual accounts with the two biggest expenditures being 
groceries at $10,882.57 and car repairs etc. at $5,303.61.L~1 
137 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, Statement of 
J.E. Pugh. 
138 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, Statement of 
Clerk Anthony McMillay; Statement of J.E. Pugh. 
139 Meanwhile the uncollectable debt was put at 
$86,824.84 for 1934 and by 1942 still stood at $86,696.38. 
NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, See Statement of J.E. 
Pugh and Statement of Clerk Anthony McMillay. 
140 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, Statement of 
Clerk Anthony McMillay. 
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Expenditure for 1939 was down at $33,312.45 but still 
significant. Again groceries, car repairs, gas and oil 
accounted for most of this expenditure at $15,571.21 and 
$6,411.98 respectively.L~L The total sum spent did not dip 
below $31,000 during the following few years. There was, 
however, very little change in the amount of debt incurred or 
retired during eight years of records between 1934 and 1942. 
(Table 7.) 
Conclusion 
Though DIA policy on permitting Natives to purchase on 
credit and incur debt was clear, its application was less so. 
A number of factors intervened to cause variations in policy 
implementation. The feelings of the agent and DIA field 
personnel, political exigencies and the view from Ottawa, the 
personal wealth of the individual concerned, the amount of 
money on hand, economic circumstances in general and the 
perception of urgency all played a part in decision making 
regarding policy implementation. The fact that the 
Department was very restrictive in both releasing funds, and 
in sanctioning purchases, for example, encouraged the Bloods 
to incur unauthorized debt. The one immutable fact is the 
general acceptance that the Bloods needed financing in order 
141 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, Statement of 
J.E. Pugh. 
to make their reserve activities economically viable, 
especially with regard to farming. 
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From the beginning the Bloods were planned into the 
economic strategies of the merchant community. Their 
patronage was both encouraged and appreciated. Attempts by 
the Department to limit or curtail this form of economic 
integration with the non-Native community had only limited 
success. Had the Bloods been simply a debtor society, their 
commercial involvement with local businesses might have been 
more easily and formally regulated - the DIA purchasing on 
their behalf and for their needs as it saw fit. Because the 
Bloods displayed some commercial independence, however, they 
were in a position to maximize their efforts to use credit. 
The difficulties that attended all settlers' attempts to 
succeed in 'next year country' also attended the Bloods. 
Success could not be attained independent of national 
economic structures, such as banking institutions, or 
patterns of commercial exchange such as credit. Crop 
failures in the southern Alberta region and on the Blood 
reserve made the DIA realize that Indians were very much in 
the same position as Whites, and their isolation on reserves 
could not mitigate this fact. The result was that eventually 
Department bureaucrats at Ottawa came to the same realization 
as Blood reserve agents - policies had to bend with 
circumstances if the Bloods were not to be totally reduced to 
a commercially impotent and beggar society. The boundaries 
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of the reserve and departmental supervision were no antidote 
to the changing economic fortunes of the region or the 
nation, or to the Bloods' own efforts. The Bloods could 
neither be driven nor restrained without reference to the 
extended environmental and commercial community in which they 
lived. 
Clearly the Bloods' personal spending habits, and Indian 
Affairs expenditures on their behalf, resulted in a 
significant cash transfer to merchants in Cardston, Fort 
Macleod, and the small businesses situated close to the 
reserve. In December, 1928, the Cardston News recognized the 
special commercial relationship that existed between Cardston 
and the Blood reserve. The paper wrote that "The Indian is a 
prospective citizen of no mean importance ... t-u In March, 
1929, the News elaborated on this bond, describing business 
relations with the Bloods as 
... most cordial. It is true that the system 
sometimes causes annoyance to those who must give 
credit but generally speaking, the Indians' 
business is fully as well paid and as properly 
conducted as that of any similar group or community 
of white men. In fact some of our own business 
methods might well be remodeled to measure up to 
the standards of business ethics set by many of our 
Indian friends. 1~3 
l-+2 Cardston News, December 27, 1928, p. 1. 
143 Cardston News, March 21, 1929, p. 4. 
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As the Depression ended, increased spending by the 
Bloods likely ended most of the complaints about the non-
payment of debts by individual Bloods. It is clear that much 
of the delinquency regarding settling of accounts was 
attributable to agency and Department of Indian Affairs 
policies. The Bloods were but one portion of the consuming 
public, of necessity tolerated and, as any other group with 
financial wherewithal, harassed or wooed by business as 
alternating economic fortunes dictated. The Bloods' 
attraction as shoppers, however, may stem from a tradition of 
garnering prestige through 'conspicuous' consumption, 
mistakenly viewed by Indian Affairs officials as "riotious 
living. " l+t 
Both Department-sponsored and individually arranged 
expenditures were eagerly sought, even though collecting on 
the credit extended often proved exceedingly frustrating or 
even impossible. Undoubtedly the impact on some commercial 
establishments was considerable, but for most it was well 
worth it as the benefits outweighed the risk. This was 
especially true where establishments were not totally 
dependent on the local area for their sales. Though, like 
144 Goldfrank, Changing Configurations, p. 28. 
others, the Bloods' fortunes varied, collectively they 
represented a financial opportunity too great to ignore. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: Change OVer Tt.e 
317 
This study has looked at one small area of southern 
Alberta containing an immigrant population encountering a 
host Native culture. The intent was to ascertain how both 
fit together at the economically significant points of 
encounter, land and products from the land, and labour and 
monetary exchange. 
This specific southern Alberta location fits historian 
W.L. Morton's definition of a 'site', that is, an area having 
both significance of position and function. Though the 
significance of a 'site' "varies with the nature of the 
environment and the state of technology", 1 the region has been 
deemed more or less significant over time by its various 
inhabitants and for a variety of reasons. Historian Paul F. 
Sharp viewed the area as a natural northern extension of the 
American plains, and a hinterland of American commerce. 2 At 
the same time, Canada, driven by a dream of continental 
1 W.L. Morton, "The Significance of Site in the 
Settlement of the American and Canadian Wests," in A.B. 
McKillop, Contexts of Canada's Past: Selected Essays of W.L. 
Morton (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), p. 87. 
2 Paul F. Sharp, Whoop-Up Country: The Canadian-
American West. 1865-1885 (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1973), pp. 7-8. 
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expansion, regarded the region and the surrounding expanse of 
prairie and parkland as necessary for its own geographic and 
imperial arnbitions. 3 The Bloods clearly indicated the 
significance of this region to themselves when they selected 
their reserve. 
The significance of this site was rarely, if ever, 
questioned by the nation which viewed the west as a fount of 
wealth, a hinterland appendage to be exploited.~ Those 
settlers who lived there came to question its suitability for 
their purposes only after the heady visions of progress and 
prosperity had been tempered by the bitter experience of 
failure. This in turn brought about a reassessment of the 
3 Andy den Otter argues that the Canadian government's 
"nationalistic fiscal regime, set within a business and 
transportation revolution" drove American entrepreneurial 
influences out of this region. Andy den Otter, 
"Transportation, Trade and Regional Identity in the 
Southwestern Prairies," Prairie Forum, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 
1990), p. 1. See also Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: 
Studies In The Ideas Of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 56-58; 
Doug OWram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist 
Movement and the Idea of the West 1856-1900 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 49, 59 ff.; R. 
Douglas Francis, Images of the West: Changing Perceptions of 
the Prairies, 1690- 1960 (Saskatoon: Western Producer 
Prairie Books, 1989), pp. 73-103. 
4 For discussion of the west as national hinterland see 
J.M.S. Careless, Frontier and Metropolis: Regions, Cities, 
and Identities in Canada before 1914 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1989), p. 40 ff.; J.M.S. Careless, Careless at 
Work: Selected Canadian Historical Studies (Toronto: 
Dundurn Press, 1990), pp. 120 ff. 
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viability of this 'next year country' to sustain their 
dreams. Fluctuating fortunes and altering circumstances 
threatening their survival gave added critical significance 
to the area of the Blood reserve and its possessors. It 
seemed to be endowed with rescue potential, the potential of 
the surrounding community to repair the frustrated hopes 
shattered by nature and the limitations imposed by the 160 
acre homestead. 5 
The dynamic at work in this area both encapsulated the 
hopes and reflected the policies of Canada's expanding 
national influence: Fort Macleod founded by the NWMP 
represented the extension of authority, Lethbridge the grasp 
of expanded eastern enterprise/) and communities such as 
Cardston and Raymond the reality of transplanted society and 
economy, the tramp of 'civilization' across the frontier. 
The formation of the Blood reserve illustrated for the 
newcomers the dispossession of the Natives and foreshadowed 
their imminent assimilation or even extinction. The new 
5 It is now accepted that the 160 acre homestead was not 
sufficient for general economic well-being and that access to 
other land on which to expand was essential to make ends meet 
or survive. John w. Bennett and Seena B. Koh, Settling the 
Canadian-American West, 1890-1915 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 18. 
6 For a complete discussion of this idea see A.A. den 
Otter, Civilizing the West: The Galts and the Development of 
Western Canada (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 
1982.) 
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economy created demands for land, materials, money and 
labour, all of which the Bloods possessed in varying degrees 
at various times. Thus the fortunes and history of the 
Indians and the Whites were of necessity intertwined. The 
needs of both the Bloods and their neighbours, though seen by 
some as competitive, rationally encouraged co-operation and 
integration of the 'white' neighbourhood with the reserve. 
Irene Spry has argued that after the influx of 
immigrants into the Red River area, Natives in the vicinity 
collaborated with and integrated themselves into the new 
economic arrangement, opted for economic and cultural change 
and in so doing gained an appreciation for "a cash 
calculation of well-being". 1 This possibility has not been 
properly evaluated by historians with regard to the study of 
southern Alberta Natives, in particular the Bloods, in the 
post-buffalo period. Historians have been too willing to 
accept the picture of an economically frustrated, incompetent 
and incapacitated people failing to thrive. The focus of 
scholarship on Native and newcomer interaction in general has 
been on an Indian marginalized existence8 and the failure to 
7 Irene M. Spry, "The Transition from a Nomadic to a 
Settled Economy in Western Canada, 1856-96," Transactions Of 
The Royal Society Of Canada Vol. VI, Series IV (June, 1968), 
p. 190. 
8 Lucas noted the failure and inability of Indians to 
integrate with developing 'white' communities. Rex Lucas, 
Minetown, Milltown. Railtown: Life in Canadian Communities 
321 
reconstruct him as an "imitation white man. "9 Thus the impact 
of the various influences; ranching, mixed farming, and the 
competition between the two, White/Native interaction and 
animosity, and economic developments which reflected the 
aspirations of the region and the nation have largely been 
ignored. 
The narrow historical focus on reserve agricultural 
ventures has blinded many to the possibility that a 
diversified economic approach periodically produced a viable 
economy on reserves such as that occupied by the Bloods. 
This perspective neglects other economic activities that 
contributed to the overall economic welfare of the Natives, 
in particular the Bloods. Samek, for example, viewed the 
Blood economy only as a crop agricultural venture and 
concluded that the reservation economy was an outright 
failure. She attributed Blood economic stagnation early in 
the 20th Century to the government's policy of leasing 
of Single Industry (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1971), pp. 33, 128-30, 133. 
9 Spry, Transactions, p. 196. See also J.R. Miller, 
Shingwauk's Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools 
(Toronto: university of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 151-216; 
Robert F. Berhkoffer, Jr., The White Man's Indian: Images Of 
The American Indian From Columbus To The Present (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 113-133; Jennifer Lorretta Pettit, 
"'To Christianize and Civilize': Native Industrial Schools 
in Canada," (Calgary: University of Calgary, Ph.D., 1997), 
See especially chapter 10, pp. 337-360. 
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reserve land to local ranchers. 10 She concluded that after 
nearly fifty years of reservation existence the Bloods, like 
their Blackfoot neighbours, had failed to "establish a viable 
economy. " 11 
The problem with this conclusion is Samek's sole focus 
on farming. Rolf Knight is more accurate in his contention 
that the limited economic return from agriculture on the 
prairies stimulated an outward and diversified approach to 
earning income. 12 Indeed the Reports of the DIA in the 
Sessional Papers bear this out and indicate a much more 
diversified approach to work and income than Samek credits. 
For example, as early as 1896 the DIA recognized that the 
area in which the Bloods resided was not particularly suited 
to crop agriculture and as a result the Department encouraged 
them to take up mixed farming or stock-raising. 13 Within two 
years the Bloods had added freighting to their economic 
10 Hana Samek, The Blackfoot Confederacy 1880-1920: A 
Comparative Study of Canadian and u.s. Indian Policy 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987, pp. 84-
85. 
l 1 Samek, Blackfoot Confederacy, pp. 84-86. 
12 Rolf Knight, Indians At Work: An Informal History Of 
Native Indian Labour In British Columbia 1858-1930 
(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1978), p. 169. 
13 CSP 14, 1897, pp. 155-156. 
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activities. 14 By 1903 the agent downplayed the significance 
of farming, noting that cattle, hay, and freighting, both for 
"the reserve and the neighbouring ranchers," returned more 
revenue. 15 
By 1904 the Bloods had diversified once again and added 
labour in the Raymond sugar beet fields to their income 
earning opportunities. Crop agriculture may have been, as 
Samek argues, unsuccessful but its modest nature should not 
be construed to represent overall Blood economic achievement. 
Even officially-measured economic returns from these 
recognized activities may not indicate the true measure of 
successful Blood economic endeavours as they responded to 
off-reserve demand for their labour and resources. 
It may be more revealing, therefore, to compare the 
Bloods not with prairie farmers who pursued cereal grain 
monoculture, but rather with Whites who practiced subsistence 
farming and were required to follow a variety of seasonal 
occupations. This included working for others and migrating 
to other areas in order to eke out an existence. Thus a 
variety of occupations were followed in the completion of a 
work year. Geographer Larry McCann has pointed to the need 
for such an adaptive strategy among Atlantic Canadians 
14 CSP 14, 1899, p. 133. 
15 CSP 27, 1904, p. 141. 
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responding to the failure of industrialism to bring full and 
permanent employment. 16 
Although the Canadian government recognized aboriginal 
right or title to the lands they occupied17 others did not. 
Expansion to the westward, for the man on the street or 
behind the plough, simply meant the acquisition of free and 
available land. This view was totally at odds with Native 
perceptions that they owned the land and continued to have 
unimpeded rights to it confirmed by treaty. Once 
established, however, reserves were accepted by many as 
inviolable Indian lands only as long as they were not needed 
by the non-Native community. The attitudes and actions of 
both settlers and government placed intense pressure on the 
Indians to alienate large segments of their reserves in the 
interests of the incoming settler population. 1 ~ The Bloods, 
16 Larry McCann, .. The 1890s: Fragmentation and the New 
Social Order, .. in E.R. Forbes and D.A. Muise (eds.), The 
Atlantic Provinces In Confederation (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 122-123. 
17 Christopher McKee, Treaty Talks In British Columbia: 
Negotiating a Mutually Beneficial Future (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1996), pp. 5-10. 
Though recognized or acknowledged the precise definition or 
character of aboriginal title has eluded both politicians and 
jurors alike and in consequence is as much a problem today as 
it has been historically. Kent McNeil, "The Meaning of 
Aboriginal Title, .. in Michael Asch (ed.), Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and 
Respect for Difference (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1997), pp. 135-136, 141-152. 
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however, largely resisted such persuasion and pressure 
successfully. 
The influx of settlers after the turn of the century and 
the enthusiasm of town booster ideology resulted in a more 
integrated region. Towns vied for supremacy in the 
surrounding hinterland and insisted that communication and 
commerce required efficient transportation routes. The 
pressure on the Bloods to open their reserve's borders to 
provide access was strong and persistent. Cardston 
insistently regarded the reserve roadways as thoroughfares to 
more effectively extend its reach and became troublesome to 
the Bloods. When in 1899, for example, the DIA granted a 
road allowance through the Blood Reserve from Cardston to the 
St. Mary River, Agent Wilson wanted to close the old road 
allowance which he felt was now redundant. Wilson was 
perturbed to learn, however, that the new one was simply to 
be an addition to the two existing ones, and that the White 
settlers considered all three roadways necessary. Wilson 
believed that since the Bloods had no use for such a road, 
and since it interfered with the reserve boundary, it was 
obviously intended solely for the benefit of the citizens of 
Cardston. l'J 
18 Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History 
{Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 159-160. 
19 NAC, RG 10, val. 1564, pp. 270-71, James Wilson to 
Deputy Minister of Public Works, April 10, 1899. 
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As towns and villages such as Hillspring, Glenwood, 
Mountain View, Magrath and Raymond extended their reach 
towards both the east and the west the reserve was absorbed 
into the local transportation system by travelers and 
entrepreneurs who sought the most efficient and shortest 
means of communication and movement. In 1899 the Bloods 
fenced the road connecting Cardston and Mountain View where 
it crossed the reserve much to the chagrin of local residents 
who complained that it inconvenienced the traveling public 
and hindered mail delivery. Despite the fact there was clear 
trespass on the reserve the DIA recommended that the fence be 
removed to grant unimpeded movement across the reserve. 10 
Though the DIA determined that the Government of the 
Territories could not secure road access without the consent 
or surrender of the Bloods, this was an exceptional case 
which held potential for future strife and could, perhaps, 
set a precedent. DIA secretary J.D. McLean pointed out to 
Agent James Wilson that "Old traveled roads, referred to in 
section 108 of the N.W.T. Act and amendments thereto, are not 
included in the foregoing opinion. "21 
20 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1535, p. 11, Deputy Commissioner to 
Jas. Wilson, July 7, 1899. 
21 NAC, RG 10, vol. 1535, p. 39, J.D. McLean to Jas. 
Wilson, November 3, 1899. 
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Villages or towns separated from other Euro-Canadian 
settlements by the reserve felt that they qualified for 
special dispensation where the reserve was concerned. Thus 
McLean instructed Agent W.J. Hyde, in August 1911, that in 
order to avoid potential conflict with the Bloods, as 
Glenwood residents were demanding a thoroughfare across the 
reserve to Cardston, he was to tell the Indians of the right 
of the government to construct roads across reserves as 
granted by Treaty Seven. 22 It is clear that in such cases the 
DIA was not prepared to allow the public to be unduly 
inconvenienced by interference with "a continuous and large 
volume of trade and travel between the two places ..... n The 
petition requesting the surveyed road had one hundred and 
twenty three signatures and was supported by the Lethbridge2~, 
Macleod and Magrath0 Boards of Trade. 
The demands for roads across the reserve, and reserve 
surrender to facilitate their construction, continued through 
22 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7730, file 23103-1, J.D. McLean to 
W.J. Hyde, August 2, 1911; s. Bray Memorandum to Deputy 
Minister, Dept. of Indian Affairs, June 24, 1911. 
23 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7730, file 23103-1, Edward Leavitt 
et. al. to Han. Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, 
November 19, 1913. 
24 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7730, file 23103-1, D.J. Hay to 
Minister of Indian Affairs, December 15, 1913. 
25 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7730, file 23103-1, W.O. Finley to 
W.J. Roche, December 20, 1913. 
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the 1920s. Added pressure was exerted on the Bloods in the 
1920's and 1930's by the province of Alberta as it sought to 
update and better integrate its transportation systems to 
accommodate rural and urban growth. 26 Ultimately these 
roadways proved beneficial to the Bloods as people and 
commerce used the right of ways. Any attempt to socially and 
economically isolate the Bloods was frustrated by the demands 
and needs of the non-Native community and the governments 
that worked on their behalf. As late as 1926 DIA secretary 
J.D. McLean, on the occasion of turning down the most recent 
request for yet another road right of way across the Blood 
reserve, reassured the Province of Alberta that "the 
Department is willing to expedite the development of the 
country by allowing roads to be established anywhere 
necessary ••. " D 
The Bloods clearly did not remain economically or 
physically isolated despite prevailing attitudes towards the 
Natives' menial social position18 and the existence of their 
26 s . . 1 d . 0 ee ~n part~cu ar correspon ence ~n NAC, RG 1 , vol. 
7730, file 23103-1 and NAC, RG 10, vol. 7730, file 23103-lA. 
27 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7730, file 23103-lA, J.D. McLean to 
Deputy Minister, Department of Public Works, Alberta, March 
17, 1926. 
28 1 ah . d . For examp e Sar Carter, "Categor~es An Terra~ns Of 
Exclusion: Constructing The 'Indian Woman• In The Early 
Settlement Era In Western Canada," Great Plains Quarterly, 13 
(Summer 1993), pp. 147-48, 158. 
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reserve as a social and political entity. The Bloods were 
almost immediately drawn into the newly emerging complex of 
economic patterns established by the rancher, farmer, town 
and village regimes. The needs of the new settlers, both 
real and imagined, forced open doors to mutual cooperation 
and exchange with the Bloods. Economics proved more potent 
than social attitudes and prejudice and ultimately proved 
more of a unifying force than a divisive one. 
Canada's early activities in southern Alberta were 
largely influenced by the Native presence. Fears of Indian 
wars and American influence brought the North West Mounted 
Police. Fears of American expansion brought Canadian 
sponsored and planned settlement and for the Bloods and other 
Native peoples, planned reserve homelands. The Bloods began 
adapting to their changed circumstance almost as soon as the 
Whites arrived, responding with permanent settlement on their 
reserve and engaging themselves in the recently developed 
economic activities. 
Historians have often viewed the period of plains Native 
history that followed the collapse of the buffalo herds as a 
time of traumatic economic and cultural adjustment and 
evidence for the belief that Natives only played a minor part 
in local, regional or national schemes of development. They 
picture Natives as outside the bounds of modern capitalist 
society in an officially imposed isolation. It is generally 
assumed that Natives lacked the skills to adapt to the 
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economic circumstances unfolding around them. They were 
therefore unable to overcome the obstacles intentionally 
placed in their way by legal restrictions, such as those 
contained in the Indian Act, and by DIA policy. It is also 
assumed that non-Native communities required or demanded 
little from the Native land base or the people living on the 
reserves other than that they should surrender their land to 
the use of Whites. In the case of southern Alberta and the 
Bloods this view is inaccurate. 
It is inconceivable that the Blood Indians with their 
more than 500 square miles of territory, would have had no 
impact on, or part to play in a local or regional economy. 
It is inconceivable, as well, that local business enterprises 
and mercantile interests, in general, did not recognize the 
benefits to be gained from tapping the resources of this land 
base and its people, and were, therefore, content to let the 
Bloods remain in isolation. Though reserves were planned as 
isolation units Natives and Whites could not be kept apart 
except through a rigorous application of the regulations. To 
believe they could denies the Bloods' active participation in 
the economic life of the region. The reality is, however, 
that the Bloods did have a significant impact. 
The Bloods entered the late nineteenth and the early 
twentieth centuries having to deal with a much different 
incoming society. The primary desire of the new arrivals was 
to integrate the region into the national economy and 
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exchange agricultural products for the manufactured goods of 
central Canada. They quickly found that the Bloods had much 
to offer in fulfilling their individual or collective dreams 
for prosperity. With their traditional economy made 
obsolete, the Bloods themselves needed goods that could make 
their existence more comfortable. Whites needed both Blood 
land and labour and the purchasing power the tribe 
represented; hence it was impossible for the Bloods to remain 
detached from the economic forces at play around them. Acts 
of mutual exchange occurred not through default, but were 
deliberate and generally welcomed by all parties. 
Both the Bloods and the non-Native community recognized 
the potential each held for the other. Non-Natives were 
aware of the benefits that Blood land promised and recognized 
that the Blood people could supply needed raw materials. For 
the ranching industry the increase in the number of cattle 
and the subsequent reduced grazing capacity, limitations 
imposed by variations in weather and natural disasters made 
the large area of the Blood reserve important to its well-
being. The Bloods systematically and strategically offered 
their land as a market commodity. When direct access to the 
Bloods' land and its resources was denied to non-Natives, the 
Bloods were contracted to supply their labour and the desired 
produce. By all indications the Bloods were not loath to 
accept such arrangements if they believed they could 
financially benefit from them. The intensity with which the 
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payment of land rents was fought or avoided sustains the 
argument that access to the Blood reserve was perceived by 
many Whites as a necessary right which Whites were reluctant 
to give up. The voluminous correspondence on this issue 
suggests this was regarded as a genuine need. The arguments 
made by ranchers and settler/farmers about supposed excessive 
rental costs, however, are less easy to gauge. 
Ranchers could co-exist with the reserve as a political 
entity, so long as they were not deprived of access to 
grazing land. Farming, however, was more land use intensive, 
and individual. Land that was separate and legally 
inalienable was simply not available for farming. The Bloods 
dismissed demands to surrender land, and the more insistent 
the demands became the more the Bloods refused to accommodate 
the needs of the non-Native community, preferring instead to 
move to large scale land rental. 
During the early years the Bloods lacked the means to 
fully exploit the reserve's resources and recognized the 
potential to export its wealth for profit. They therefore 
arranged exchanges that fit local needs. Eventually, 
beginning in 1895, these arrangements became more formal. 
Contract leasing provided the Bloods with needed money, while 
local ranchers and farmers considered access to the land's 
resources as essential. The terms of the contracts, however, 
often proved unsatisfactory and the final arbitrator in all 
such arrangements, the DIA, convinced of its own correctness, 
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often did not act as either the Bloods or the renters would 
have wished or expected. 
Land became the focus of development both for the 
Indians and the non-Native mercantile interests. Opinions 
differed between the Government, seeking to realize a 
specific policy aimed at answering the needs of an immigrant 
population, and the Bloods hoping to realize benefits from 
their titled possession. And although historians have often 
judged Indian agents as mean spirited and neglectful of 
Native interests, agents defended the rights of the Bloods as 
often against the Department as they did against rancher and 
farmer interlopers. It is clear that the land base of the 
Blood reserve played an important part in the economic well-
being of ranching and subsequently the mixed farming 
enterprises of the region. When the non-Native needs did not 
clash with the Bloods' own requirements an accommodation, 
though sometimes strained, could usually be worked out. 
Problems arose when over-exploitation exhausted the land to 
the detriment of the Bloods, as happened during the drought 
of the 1930s. Difficulties also occurred when the government 
failed to recognize or adequately protect the Bloods from the 
impact of illegal land use and the abuse of lease privileges. 
The Bloods, through their agents, pressed the 
Department, often unsuccessfully, to protect their reserve 
from illegal and unwarranted intrusion and exploitation. The 
main problem was that the DIA felt it knew best what the 
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Bloods needed and acted accordingly. Thus the reserve's 
resources were sometimes alienated despite the protests of 
both the Indians and the local agent. Though this often 
occasioned bitterness on the part of the Bloods, neither they 
nor their customers lost sight of the value of each other. 
The Bloods' needs, reserve politics, agents' ambitions, 
Department policy and natural conditions, all had a part to 
play in decisions affecting the disposal of reserve 
resources. Drought conditions during the 1930s, for example, 
eventually led to a decision to curb outsider access but this 
was never fully implemented. 
As the land became more settled and urban centres 
developed, a much greater awareness of metropolitan-
hinterland associations emerged. This, in conjunction with 
the local adherence to the booster ideology that held to the 
belief that every town or village had unlimited potential for 
growth, resulted in pressure on the Bloods to surrender a 
portion of their large reserve to satisfy the needs of the 
settler/farmer. The most vocal proponents of this view were 
local newspapers which often echoed the feelings of local 
boards of trade. 
Not only did the Bloods integrate their land into the 
growing economic system of their area but they also sold 
their produce and labour. Thus for a short time the Bloods' 
coal and hay sales and their contract freighting displaced 
those who were less competitive or who lacked the Bloods' 
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connections. Significantly, despite official policy directed 
at curbing the Native competition with Whites, the Blood 
agents were forceful and energetic in acquiring off-reserve 
employment for their charges. This approach was not 
seriously challenged by the DIA. Attempts by the public to 
restrict the Bloods' market access all failed and indeed by 
the 1920s the DIA had accepted the Bloods' right to 
inclusion, if only because it saved public money. 
Blood labour in the Raymond sugar beet fields provides 
the best example of their participation in the local economy. 
They were aggressively recruited for this work and were 
deemed essential by the growers to the functioning of the 
industry. Despite repeated attempts by the industry no 
suitable alternative labour could be found to replace them. 
The beet industry eventually went into decline and while 
critics blamed an inadequate labour supply, it is clear that 
market forces independent of labour supply were important 
contributing factors to the failure. A more detailed 
examination of the sugar beet industry in southern Alberta 
for this early period is clearly indicated. 
Blood income was also important to the local economy. 
Both the DIA and the Bloods themselves could only meet their 
immediate needs through commerce with off-reserve businesses. 
Whether or not Indians possessed personal wealth, they 
generated wealth by their needs. Most non-Native 
entrepreneurs held the mistaken idea that the government was 
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a bottomless purse on which the Bloods had call. Thus 
merchants in both Cardston and Fort Macleod curried Indian 
favour; in fact competed for it despite the obvious risks. 
Indeed problems with collection never resulted in a long term 
denial of credit to the Bloods though the Department did 
attempt to apply and enforce its own restrictions by making 
the collection of debt difficult. 
What was striking, however, was that the Bloods, even 
though they became a numerical minority and faced an 
increasingly complex and more competitive market situation, 
increased their economic influence. Anthropologist Esther 
Goldfrank reported an annual Blood income in 1895 of $7,500. 
Where Samek envisioned agricultural failure Goldfrank saw 
change, the partial abandonment of crop agriculture in favour 
of cattle raising and the development of the more lucrative 
contract haying, with the result that the annual income in 
1906 was $40,000. By 1920 the income was $254,332, more than 
a six fold increase, and, as significant, less than one half 
of this was realized from agricultural products, including 
Jl) hay.~ The implications of this dramatic increase can better 
be appreciated when one considers that during this period the 
Blood population remained fairly constant, a population of 
29 Esther s. Goldfrank, "Administrative Programs And 
Changes in Blood Society During The Reserve Period," Applied 
Anthropology, 2 (Jan. -Mar., 1943), pp. 19 -20. 
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1, 168 in 190630 and 1,15831 in 1924. • True, the Bloods' income 
collapsed with the onset of the Depression, from $100,000 in 
1930 to $24,000 in 1932. 32 This dramatic collapse, however, 
did not set the Bloods apart; they simply suffered, as did 
all their neighbours, the misery of general national economic 
collapse. 33 
3
° CSP No. 27, 1907, p. 161. 
31 CSP No. 14, 1925, p. 28. 
* This population decline is most likely due to the 
influenze epidemic of 1919-1920 and the probability that some 
Bloods were absent from the reserve doing work in the 
surrounding area. Hugh A. Dempsey, Tom Three Persons: 
Legend Of An Indian Cowboy (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 
1997), p. 85. 
32 Goldfrank, "Administrative Programs," P. 21. 
33 The decade of 1911 to 1920 had been one of increased 
economic diversification and increasing, if limited, 
prosperity. Incomes for 1911, 1914, 1919, 1920 were $56,750, 
$61,100, $233,746, and $254,332 respectively. Goldfrank, 
Changing Configurations, p. 32. It was not until the decade 
of the 1920's that reserve farming finally accounted for more 
reserve income than other revenue sources. Prior to this, 
therefore, one must not give too much weight to crop 
agriculture; as its importance was discounted by agents and 
that of hay was stressed. By 1921, however, the total value 
of farm products including hay was $80,000 or 60.2% of total 
income of $132,989. C.S.P. No. 27, 1922, p. 58. In 1922 it 
was $50,000 or 41.8% of $119,735;33 1923, $108,300 or 61.5% 
of total income of $176,070;33 and in 1924 it was $209,000 or 
74.6% of total income of $280,332. CSP No. 15, 1925, p. 78. 
*The difficulty with the statistics is that the value of hay 
sales is generally included in agriculture returns and so it 
is not possible to determine its value relative to other 
agriculture income. For some years the Agents do give the 
value or the tonnage harvested. 
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The Bloods' economic adaptations, however, suggest that 
the necessary integrative strategies that they had developed 
in the early reserve days were essential throughout much of 
the period of study. The reserve remained incapable of 
completely supplying the economic needs of all its residents 
and thus some integration into the surrounding economic 
environment of southern Alberta, both from a reserve base and 
through temporary out migration, continued to be a practical 
and necessary alternative. 
The Bloods participated in the tremendous economic 
growth experienced by Canada's agricultural sector during the 
1920s and it is in this decade that agricultural production 
became a critical factor in the Blood reserve economy.~ This 
evidence contradicts the commonly held belief that the Bloods 
had been so continually poverty stricken that they did not 
even notice the collapse of regional and national economies 
in the Great Depression. 35 It is inconceivable that they 
failed to realize that their hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in income in the 1920s had shrunk to mere thousands in the 
34 Between 1911 and 1920 the percentage of income 
attributable to farm products, including hay was 52.2%, 
39.2%, 42.6%, 43.3%., or less than fifty percent except for 
the year of least income. C.S.P. No. 27, 1922, p. 58. 
35 See for example Taylor, Standing Alone, P. 35. Hugh 
A. Dempsey, "One Hundred Years of Treaty Seven," in Ian L. 
Getty and Donald Smith (eds.), One Century Later: Western 
Canadian Reserve Indians since Treaty 7 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1978), p. 28. 
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early 1930s. It is more likely that the misery of the 1930s 
was worse because of the relative prosperity of the previous 
decade, a problem common to the entire region. Despite 
severe setbacks, however, the Bloods maintained their market 
share. 
Contrary to the perception that the economy held no 
place for them, the Bloods adapted well from the beginning 
and carved out a niche for themselves. Non-Natives also 
recognized the contributions that the Bloods could make to 
their efforts at amassing wealth and influence. The economy 
was based on the use of land and the exchange of produce, 
labour and capital. These, in part, define the relationship 
of the Bloods and the non-Native southern Alberta community. 
The flawed perception of some historians is largely a 
result of viewing the history of relations from the 
standpoint of what was officially desired, demanded or 
perceived as ideal by government, especially in creating a 
western economy based on farming, and not in viewing 
particular circumstance of specific locations. There is also 
a tendency to see Natives as exploited rather than as 
competitive or exploitative, a view that does not recognize 
the reality of relationships with neighbours. The Bloods' 
self-interested behaviour in the leasing of their land, the 
sale of their labour and produce, the way they spent their 
money, and incurred debt provides sufficient evidence. Their 
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actions in the Raymond area beet fields is simply a further 
proof. 
Clearly the Bloods and the surrounding community 
attempted to maximize their own potentials and work out 
arrangements to meet their own needs. In the end it was 
mutually agreeable circumstances that permitted each to 
function in conjunction with the other. The Blood reserve 
could not, no more than the surrounding countryside, exist in 
'splendid isolation', functioning independently of local or 
national forces. Both communities accommodated each other's 
needs, while operating within the national economic system. 
In the period of this study the Bloods overcame the 
calamitous loss of the buffalo, took advantage of market 
forces and largely avoided becoming totally marginalized. 
What emerges is a clear indication that the Bloods were more 
or less disadvantaged depending on the general economic 
circumstances to which both Natives and Whites were 
subjacted. some Bloods were likely more economically 
marginalized than some of their White neighbours, and less 
than others. Whites who were suffering financially could 
either leave or seek help from financial institutions and 
banks, options not open to the Bloods because of legal and 
cultural restrictions. The Bloods' land and patronage, 
however, often determined the well-being of the industries 
developing around them and thus they became an essential, and 
not an irrelevant factor, in the local economy. 
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Accepting the hypothesis of Natives as insignificant to 
the processes unfolding around them is to believe that they 
suffered from an absolute disadvantage. Such was not the 
case. In fact, Whites were so desirous of making the Bloods' 
land and labour a part of the overall economy of the area 
that these became necessary. As a consequence the Bloods 
could sometimes pick and choose the means with which to 
define the associations, a situation wholly out of keeping 
with an insignificant status. 
Unlike the Peigans who were coerced into selling their 
land for the benefit of settlers, the Bloods resisted the 
market forces. The agricultural and grazing leases, the crop 
share harvesting of hay, the sale of coal, freighting and 
sale of labour permitted the Whites to integrate the Blood 
reserve into their economy, perhaps never to the extent they 
desired, but certainly to an extent they and the Bloods could 
live with. Therefore demands for the sale of the reserve, 
though periodically brought to the fore, were never 
sufficiently powerful to achieve success. 
Life changed with the catastrophic disappearance of the 
buffalo. However, as far as human potential was concerned, 
skill, energy, foresight and planning to maximize benefits 
from economic activities were still needed and used and still 
existed. True, the economy was driven by Whites. The 
Bloods, however, successfully responded to resource depletion 
and a new economic and political order. Unlike the Dakota, 
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who Peter Elias concluded suffered from an imposed isolation 
and therefore exclusion from the surrounding labour market,~' 
the attempt to impose the same on the Bloods did not succeed. 
The mistake has been to assume that all plains Natives 
experienced the same fate following the loss of the buffalo, 
and to accept the conclusion that somehow today's stereotypes 
either reflect a historical reality in all cases, or 
represent a continuity of experience through time. To do so 
is to assume that the Bloods were submissive in the face of 
government repression, failed to appreciate the value of the 
wealth they possessed in their land and labour, had no need 
for material possessions that could improve their standard of 
living, and deliberately chose to remain outside the market 
economy. It is also to conclude that non-Natives did not 
recognize any potential in their Blood neighbours or, if they 
did so, chose to ignore it in favour of some perceived status 
QYQ· Neither conclusion is sensible or true. Each society 
had materials and skills the other needed, so an 
accommodation had to be worked out for both to thrive or 
function in their common environments. 
For Natives and non-Natives living in a shared 
neighbourhood the economic changes that occurred with time 
required shared efforts. Historian Daniel Francis has 
36 Peter Douglas Elias, The Dakota of the Canadian 
Northwest: Lessons for Survival (Winnipeg: University of 
Manitoba Press, 1988), p. 223. 
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concluded that "In the White version of history, Indians 
stood in the way of Canada realizing its true potential .... ll 
And although many ranchers, farmers and government officials 
believed this to be true this stereotype does not hold up in 
southern Alberta. Whites recognized that it would take a 
partnership, a blending of interests and efforts if either 
one was to prosper. 
Through diverse economic, environmental, social and 
cultural changes the Blood reserve and its people remained, 
a constant in the fluctuating fortunes of the area. The 
reserve was an oasis, promising respite from the shrinking 
economies of scale for those Whites who could access its 
benefits. The promise of the reserve's potential forged an 
environmental and economic link between it and the 
surrounding neighbourhood. 
This thesis has attempted to show an Indian reserve and 
the surrounding non-Native community as in some ways 
integrated. However, the extent of economic interaction was 
not overwhelming, nor was it consistent for all the factors 
during the time period considered in this study. There was a 
period, for example, when there was no coal mine and when 
sugar beet labour was not required. Though limited the 
extent of integration, however, has not previously been 
37 
. 1 . h . d' f Dan~e Franc1s, T e Imag1nary In ~an: The Image o 
the Indian In Canadian Culture (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp 
Press, 1992), p. 222. 
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appreciated for its significance. The Bloods were important 
first to the ranching community and then to the farmers and 
the towns for the produce, services and capital they 
provided. Much more detailed work will have to be done to 
determine the extent to which this was common to other 
reserves or whether the Bloods were indeed a special case. 
It should be noted, however, that the size and location of 
the Blood reserve makes it difficult to apply conclusions 
reached here to other Native groups and communities. But 
there is no reason to suppose that the Bloods were 
exceptional in responding to the challenges of the post-
buffalo period. 
An attempt has been made to determine some of the 
principal ways in which the Bloods participated in the 
economic institutions brought into their homeland. Much 
remains to be done and several possibilities for further 
research may be suggested. No attempt was made to define or 
explain the nature of Blood cultural adaptations for this 
period. It remains for the cultural anthropologist to 
determine the extent to which the Bloods used their 
participation in the local capitalist system to sustain 
economic or cultural traditions. Nor was this study intended 
to be a history of the Blood reserve therefore a more 
detailed spatial study of this and other reserves is in 
order. 
345 
While the Bloods did not achieve either economic 
independence, or wealth, they did make the most of their 
opportunities, so much so that they presented an attractive 
prospect for the mercantile interests in the vicinity. More 
detailed work will have to be done before a complete picture 
of the role and impact of Natives and their land on the non-
Native communities around them can be detailed or determined 
with any certainty. 
Detailed works on towns38 and regions39 exist but such 
studies need to be approached with a view to explaining the 
Native participation and attachment to urban and rural areas, 
to considering Natives as integral rather than peripheral. 
The Peigan reserve near Pincher Creek and the Blackfoot 
reserve near Gleichen suggest parallel studies. 
The economic impact of Natives and their wealth and 
resources on adjoining towns and regions await the economist, 
as does the impact of reserves on the exchange of land await 
the historical geographer. Research is also required to deal 
38 Donald G. Wetherell and Irene Kmet, Town Life: Main 
Street and the Evolution of Small Town Alberta, 1880-1947 
(Edmonton: university of Alberta Press, 1995); Walter 
Hildebrandt, Views from Fort Battleford: Constructed Visions 
of an Anglo-Canadian West (Regina: Canadian Plains Research 
center, 1994). 
39 John w. B d S B hl s 1· h ennett an eena • Ko , ett ~ng T e 
Canadian-American West. 1890-1915 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1995). 
346 
with the perceptions, such as those of Howard Palmer, that 
Native Canadians were isolated from the mental landscape.~) 
Unclear too are the mechanisms of the Bloods' decision-
making structures, the politics of the reserve which 
determine the nature of relations with the outside community. 
Hugh Dempsey has done admirable work in detailing the 
leadership of the Blood reserve for the late nineteenth 
century and has offered glimpses of the later period. To 
date, however, no detailed study of the political processes 
exist for the reserve during the twentieth century and these 
surely would contribute significant information on factors 
defining the relations of the Bloods with the non-Native 
community during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Social relationships between the Bloods and their 
neighbours also require analysis. The extent to which both 
formal and informal social intercourse occurred, as are the 
factors controlling it, remain unclear. 
It would also be illuminating to trace the fortunes of 
the Bloods up to the present to determine how much of the 
economic relationship established during the period of this 
study remains. Did, for example, opportunities decline in 
the decades after the 1930s causing a retreat to the 
40 1m f . d' . Howard Pa er, Patterns 0 PreJu ~ce: A H~story of 
Nativism in Alberta (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 
p. 12. 
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reserve,~ 1 a trend believed to have been entrenched early in 
the history of the reserve and with which this work 
disagrees. The evidence in this study refutes the view of 
Native homelands managed in isolation, struggling 
unsuccessfully to forge successful economic links and achieve 
well-being in an economic climate and environment dominated 
by Whites. Leasing continued in the period beyond this 
study, but the nature of the arrangement and its significance 
for both the Bloods and their neighbours has yet to be 
examined.~l Though a start has been made on studying the 
family and gender response to labour and production,~ for 
this period and beyond, more detailed analysis is necessary. 
The DIA exercised a great deal of paternalistic control 
over the Bloods. Clearly there were many times when the 
-H 1 . See for examp e the comments of John E. Pugh, ~n 
1940, that "Passage of time and development of the outside 
areas, and the consequent settlement, has naturally confined 
the Indian to his reserve, and where years ago the Indian was 
sought for hay contracts, beet work, threshing and so forth 
outside the confines of his reserve, today his living has 
largely to be eked out on the reserve." John E. Pugh, "The 
Blood Indians at Cardston and Macleod, Alberta," Canadian 
Cattlemen, vol. 3, no. 2 (September, 1940), p. 420. 
42 k 1' lood d' George Yac u ~c, "the B In ~ans ponder progress," 
Canadian Business, 25 (April, 1952), p. 148. 
-B . ' '11 d' d' . Janet Manc~n~ B~ son, "Stan ~ng Tra ~t~on on Its 
Head: Role Reversal among Blood Indian Couples," David R. 
Miller et. al. (eds.), The First Ones: Readings In 
Indian/Native Studies (Craven, Saskatchewan: Saskatchewan 
Indian Federated College Press, 1992), pp. 215-225. 
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Bloods would have been better off without departmental 
interference. There were occasions when the DIA placed the 
Bloods' interests second to those of their White neighbours 
and where the Department's decisions were nothing if not 
misguided. Equally, however, there are examples that 
indicate that the Bloods benefited from the guidance and 
guardianship of well-intentioned agents and their 
intercession with Ottawa. This is not to argue that the 
Bloods were incapable of looking after their own affairs. 
Clearly they were. Agents like R.N. Wilson, however, 
sometimes made the Bloods' defense of their interests a 
little easier. 
The southern Alberta area went through periods of 
economic highs and lows much as the economy of the rest of 
the country. Those economic downturns caused by nature and 
the world economy generally affected the region as a whole, 
when the surrounding White population suffered so did the 
Bloods, and vice versa. As the initial settlement phase 
ended the Bloods had cast their lot with their neighbours, 
integrating themselves and becoming integrated into the local 
economy. In consequence they were sometimes victimized by 
Whites, the DIA and individual tribal members. But they did 
not respond as helpless victims. Instead the Bloods enjoyed 
the benefits of economic cooperation and also suffered 
setbacks while making their contribution to the general well-
being of the region. 
349 
The best agents on the Bloods' behalf were themselves. 
They adapted to the new reality and refused to be made 
'strangers' in their own land.# Native reserves had a more 
important part to play in the local or regional history than 
has previously been credited. In this case the Bloods' 
importance to the ranching and farming community and to 
Cardston, Fort Macleod and Raymond is clear. 
44 Jennifer Reid, Myth, Symbol. And Colonial Encounter: 
British And Mi'kmag In Acadia. 1700-1867 (Ottawa: University 
of Ottawa Press, 1995), p. 110. 
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Population at Census Year 
Town 1901 1906 1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1946 
Card 0639 1001 1207 1370 1612 2034 1672 1711 2334 
ston 
Macl 0796 1144 1844 1811 1723 1715 1447 1365 1649 
eod 
Ray 1568 1465 1205 1394 1799 1849 2094 2116 1 
mond 
Total 1435 3713 4516 4386 4729 5548 4968 5170 6099 
Blood1 1253 1168 1128 1154 11583* 1325"'** 
Blood 
as % 87.3 31.5 25.0 26.3 20.9 25.6 
of Total 
1 Census of Prairie Provinces, Vol. 1, 1946, p. 522. The 
1881 and 1891 census reports do not differentiate on the 
basis of community and so were not used. 
2 Taken from Agent's Reports contained in Canada 
Sessional Papers. 
3 
*This is the population count for 1924 taken from 
c.s.P., No. 14, 1925, p. 28. 
4 
**This is a reading for 1935 taken from NAC, RG 10, 
vol. 12645, file 205/3-2, pt. 1, M. Christianson to R.H. 
Coats, December 30, 1935. 
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Table 2 
19 3 S - Lease Monies due Bloods Year Rate -$1.25 
Blackmore, H.J. Cards ton 1934 $194.60* 
1935 $194.60 
1935 $ 32.00 
Penney. W.T. Mcgrath 1935 $570.54* 
Patterson Ranching Co. Lethbridge 1935 $600.00 
Parker, Russel Orton 1935 $112.15 
? B.G. Lethbridge 1935 $ 11.00 
Hom, Fred Lethbridge 1935 $ 70.68 
Stringham, G. L. Glenwood 1935 $1100.18 
Crest, C.S. Lethbridge 1935 $869.09 
jensen, L. Lethbridge 1935 $916.06 
Meldrum, Jas. Mcgrath 1935 $322.41 
Pitcher, W.F.M. Cards ton 1935 $824.59* 
Smith, J ./Kearl. S. Cards ton 1935 $248.80 
$ .60 
Whitney, A., et. al. Kipp 1935 $429.28 
~cNab, W.H. et. al. Macleod 1935 $153.60 
*denotes year and amount in arrears 
Above statistics taken from NAC, RG 10, vol. 1538 
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Table 3 
Blood income from the sale of wheat and oats for the years 
1920 - 1927. 
Value Total 
1920- 32,598 Bus. Wheat- $065,196.00 
16,260 Bus. Oats - 6,504.00 $071,700.00 
1921- 27,985 Bus. Wheat- $027,985.00 
7,206 Bus. Oats - 2,522.10 $030,507.10 
1922- 60,537 Bus. Wheat- $054,483.30 
12,899 Bus. Oats - 4,514.65 $058,997.95 
1923-212,319 Bus. Wheat- $191,087.10 
27,249 Bus. Oats - 9,537.15 $200,624.25 
1924-197,642 Bus. Wheat- $187,859.90 
29,598 Bus. Oats - 8,879.40 $196,739.30 
1925- 89,580 Bus. Wheat- $116,454.00 
3,497 Bus. Oats - 1,049.10 $117,503.10 
1926-120,825 Bus. Wheat- $097,000.00 
5,191 Bus. Oats - 1,557.30 $098,557.30 
1927- 69,995 Bus. Wheat- $041,997.00 
2,482 Bus. Oats - ,992.80 $042,989.80 
Total $817,618.805 
5 Figures taken from NAC, RG 10, vol. 7595, file 10103, 
pt. 5; M. Christianson to W.M. Graham, May 18, 1928. 
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Table 4 
Blood tribe debt as of April 1934. 
Class Dept. Outside Agency Total 
A-Deceased 3079.92 512.00 826.21 4418.13 
B-Old/ 
Destitute 15442.96 2742.39 3111.58 21296.93 
C-Able Bodied 
(F/C) 49226.09 8617.34 6749.40 64592.83 
D-Able Bodied 20758.77 5852.52 5602.13 32213.42 
Totals 88507.74 17724.25 16289.32 122521.31 
1266.00 
89773.74b 
% of Total 73.3 14.5 13.3 
Table 5 
Blood tribe debt on the basis of community. 
No. of Co.s 





















6 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, J.E. Pugh to 
Secretary, April 18, 1934, and attached details. 
7 NAC, RG 10, val. 7899, file 40103-1, J.E. Pugh to 




Summary of Blood tribe debt by class. 
Year Class A Class B Class c Class D Total 
1922 232.65 0022.00 1056.17 1032.48 2343.30 
1923 000.00 0370.00 0370.00 
1924 059.05 0152.92 0127.00 0338.97 
1925 648.46 2915.18 6677.46 4800.01 15041.11 
1926 782.23 3115.34 8455.15 6584.23 18936.95 
1927 847.99 3204.67 6548.44 5631.36 16232.46 
1928 820.30 2816.46 7369.79 3888.27 14894.82 
1929 295.00 2138.74 5435.39 2252.30 10121.43 
1930 569.63 3971.47 17104.61 3628.17 25273.88 
1931 076.24 0798.65 2828.81 0741.21 04444.91 
1932 057.60 1121.40 4909.81 1393.13 07481.94 
1933 028.98 1022.62 4160.26 1765.08 06976.94 
Total 4418.13 21279.45 64545.89 32213.24 
21296.43 64592.83 32213.42S" 
Table 7 
Blood tribe debt 1934 - 1942. 
OWing 
Collectable Collections Incurred Current Outside 
Indebtedness on Creditors 
Year 
1934 14538.59 
1935 14538.59 0960.64 0671.85 14249.80 0989.79 
1936 14249.80 0000.00 0426.48 14676.28 0989.79 
1937 14676.28 1325.20 1056.18 14407.26 0989.79 
1938 14407.26 2088.52 0999.36 13235.34 0097.00 
1939 13235.34 0000.00 0000.00 13187.59 0097.00 
1940 13187.59 0000.00 1685.84 14873.43 0097.00 
1941 14873.43 0000.00 0000.00 14873.43 0097.00 
1942 14873.43 000.00 000.00 14873.43 0097.009 
8 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, J.E. Pugh to 
Secretary, April 18, 1934, and attached details. 
* Indicates official figures which do no agree with my 
own calculations contained in the line above. 
9 NAC, RG 10, vol. 7899, file 40103-1, Table compiled 




